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MEN, WOMEN AND WAR: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR

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MEN, WOMEN AND WAR:
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR

A dissertation submitted to the Wright
Institute Graduate School of Psychology
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Psychology

By

OFER ZUR

APRIL 1984

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APPROVAL PAGE

I certify that I have read MEN, WOMEN AND WAR: GENDER
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ABSTRACT

War has traditionally been seen as an institution of man, which carries no appeal for women. This research attempts to study the attitudes of men and women toward different aspects of war. Unlike the common belief that men are for and women are against war, this study reveals the true complexity that exists in the differences between the attitudes of men and women toward war.

This study also offers a new definition of war, which is more complete than former definitions, reflecting the complexity of the war institution. Also included is an extensive review of the studies of attitudes toward war. Further, the study reviews the major approaches to the psychology of war.

C. Gilligan developed a new model of psychosexual development based on N. Chodorow's work. The model concludes that women's personality and moral development are defined in terms of interpersonal relationship, while men's morality is abstract and legalistic. Using Gilligan's theory in the context of war, a 48-item Likert-type scale constructed in this study attempts to tap into four diffeent aspects of war dynamics, and to elicit different clusters of responses by men and women.

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The four major findings of this study are: 1) Men are more prone than women to justify war according to rational and legal criteria. 2) Women find it more difficult than men to accept, condone, or justify any acts of violence, killing and destruction during war. 3) Men more than women accept stereotypical sex roles during war, e.g., men as warriors and protectors and women as caretakers. 4) Women support war at least as enthusiastically as men when an appeal is made based on empathy for oppressed minorities, or an emphasis is placed on group cohesion and intensification of interpersonal relationships in the community during war.

The differences between men's and women's attitudes toward different aspects of war has been studied, the findings and their implication for the prevention of wars and the future of our planet has been discussed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I especially wish to thank my Committee: E. Zaretsky, my Committee Chair, who helped me to focus and find a manageable and comprehensible subject for this dissertation; A. Morrison, who helped me tremendously in translating my ideas to a researchable form and facilitated the completion of this dissertation within the narrow range of harsh deadlines; and K. Regan, who accompanied me on my search and struggle in the quest for the roots of war, and who has always challenged me in a supportive and constructive way.

Special thanks go to S. Siegel, who uncommittedly but consistently and reliably led me through the process of scale construction. I also thank D. Gilbert who, in her unique way, opened new and creative avenues which facilitated this original research. S. Bliss also deserves acknowledgement, since it was his course, Psychology of War, which helped me recall the exciting, joyful and challenging aspects of my military service. I also thank P. Blair, who typed and retyped many forms of the manuscript in her professional, responsive, and supportive style.

My wife, M. Steele, was instrumental to me in completing this study. Besides being my best friend,

she helped me realize what I should have known long before: that war also has to do with men. Final thanks go to my daughter Azzia, who is giving me additional motivation to study the roots of war in order to raise more hope for her future and the future of our planet.

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There never was a war that was
not inward, I must fight till
I have conquered in myself what
causes war.

    Marianne Moore, in

    "Distrust of Merits"

With the boundaries of the self
expanded, they sense a kinship
known before. Their "I" passes
insensibly into a "we," "my"
becomes "our," and individual
fate loses its central importance.

    Glen Grey, in

    "The Enduring Appeals of Battle"

Since wars are made in the minds
of men, it is in the minds of
men that the defenses of peace
must be constructed.

        UNESCO Charter

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this study is to explore men's and women's attitudes towards war. This study applies the theory Gilligan describes in In A Different Voice (1982), in a new and expanded context: war. To broaden the understanding of the complexity of war behaviors, I focus, in this study, on the exploration of attitudes toward war. Such understanding may increase our chances to avoid future war and the destruction of the planet.

This study attempts to critically explore some myths or common beliefs or myths about war. The first myth is that men are pro-war and women are anti-war; instead, this study posits a greater complexity in the sexes' attitudes towards war. A second myth resides in a common accepted definitions of war. In an attempt to broaden the definition of war, this study discards the convention that war is equated solely with violence and homicide. Although aggression is always involved, it is not necessarily a goal of war. A third myth is that war is seen as purely evil and holds no appeal. This study attempts to discover how during war men and women identify with certain roles. This identification with specific sex roles during war means that some aspects of war appeal to individuals.

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Psychoanalytic theorists, "authoritarian personality" theorists, and social psychologists all attempt to study the roots of war. They vary in the way they view the link between the sexes and war. This study explores this link in depth.

A review of the literature, concentrating on psychoanalytic theory, social psychology, and the authoritarian personality theory, is given. Psychoanalytic theorists studied unconscious functions of war for the individual. They describe the important processes of displacement and projection as they apply to war. This theory consistently neglects reference to the role of the sexes in relation to war. Social psychologists studied attitudes towards war extensively. They used scales and questionnaires testing attitudes towards war. But the researchers who studied attitudes did not define war. A weakness in these measures is that they approach the subject with variations on the question "are you for or against 1) defensive wars and 2) aggressive wars?" This approach ignores the complexity of war behavior, and most of the conclusions of social psychologists extend the myth that women are generally more pacifistic than men. or that men are more militaristic, or more warlike than women, without

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probing into the complex wellsprings of such perceived differences. The authoritarian personality theorists paid special attention to the study of war. This theory, first stated by Adorno et al. (1950), links attitudes and behavior to personality structure. The authoritarian personality is described as more prejudiced, less tolerant, more ethnocentric, and more prone to militaristic solutions of conflict. However, the authoritarian personality theorists did not apply their findings to the issue of differences between the sexes.

The hypotheses tested in this study are based on the work of Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan, who offer a new model for psychological and moral development in the two sexes. They suggest that while boys think hierarchically in abstract terms of legality, girls think in terms of relatedness and interconnectedness. While girls' dynamic is interrelatedness, boys' dominant dynamic is separateness. These differences stem from the fact that mothers are the primary caretakers, and thus are a more profound physical and emotional influence in the child's first years of life than fathers. For girls, female identity formation takes place in the context of ongoing relationships with their

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mothers. They identify themselves as females like their
mothers. Boys, unlike girls, need to separate
themselves from their mothers to identify themselves as
males. The complete theory is described in this
proposal.

A major purpose of this study is to extend
Gilligan's theory to the context of war. This study
originally concentrates on three aspects of war. Later
on a fourth aspect was studied. Using Gilligan's theory
I predict the following clusters of attitudes by men and
women, as follows:

A. Men are more prone than women to justify war
according to rational and legal criteria.

B. Women find it more difficult than men
to accept, condone, or justify any acts of
violence, killing and destruction during war.

C. Both men and women accept stereotypical sex
roles during war, e.g., men as warriors and
protectors; and women as caretakers.

D. Women will respond more favorably to issues
of increase in cohesion of the community
during war and will also be more prone than
men to justify war in defense of oppressed
minorities and children in foreign lands.

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(This fourth category was added later on as described in the Results Chapter.)

In order to test Gilligan's theory in the context of war, a new measurement has been developed especially for this purpose. As will be described later, none of the existing measurements are suited to test the hypotheses of this study.

If these hypotheses are valid, the model of Chodorow and Gilligan will be a meaningful contribution to the standing of the war phenomenon. This new understanding might be crucial in its potential to prevent future wars.

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Introduction

This study proposes to uncover similarities and differences in men's and women's attitudes toward war. Simultaneously, the study tests Gilligan's model for sex differences in psychological and moral development.

Wars have always been attributed to certain features of their era's dominant socio-political organizations. Conflicting religious creeds, dynastic ambitions, munitions manufacturers, the struggle for markets--all have had the accusing finger pointed at them, but the simple fact is that industrialized societies have always found something to fight about. Societies may change, but war seems to endure. Economic, ideological, dynastic, political, and other sources of international conflict can all apparently mobilize war efforts. One possible conclusion is that aspects of human nature are necessary, although not sufficient, causes for war, but it is difficult to discern the nature of these aspects because they manifest themselves only through socio-political institutions. This study of men's and women's attitudes toward war intends to uncover some of these aspects within the individual that make war possible.

It is widely accepted that war is intimately

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related to aggression, violence, and homicide, even though it is not simply equated with any of these. In recent years, there has been a clear trend of increased violent behavior. In the past twenty years, the annual rate of violent crime has risen from 581 to 1616 per 100,000 population in the United States. Since 1960, reported rape has incrased fourfold nationwide, as has armed robbery (Nagler, 1982). This increase of violence and destructiveness, combined with the threat of annihilation of nuclear war, has increased activity by scholars seeking to prevent the escalation of violence and to develop theories of the causes of this behavior. Although there is growing concern among psychologists about thermonuclear war and the future of the planet, there is a scarcity of writing about war from the psychological point of view. Of 20,242 articles listed under "psychology" in the Psych Info Data base as of 1983, only 52 have some direct relation to the psychology of war. There are probably no more than fifty books that approach war from a psychological point of view. Nagler (1982) also notes the dearth of theoretical writing on causes and prevntion of aggressive behavior of all kinds, from individual quarrels to war. This scarcity is alarming, although it

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may reflect a general feeling of helplessness among the public as well as scholars. Lifton (1982) describes this alarming phenomenon as "psychic numbing.

This paper is a contribution to the search for the roots of war, largely neglected in writings by psychologists. It concentrates on the link between gender and war. Questioning the myth or common belief that men are for war and women are against it. This common belief will be described and documented later. This study attempts to uncover more complexity in men's and women's attitudes toward war. My hope is that this study will contribute to the understanding and thus to the prevention of future wars.

The following pages are a discussion of some aspects of war and some corresponding definitions of war by different writers. I follow that discussion with a new definition of war—the operational defintion of this study. Following this is a brief review of historic war cycles and comments on the evolution of wars.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

Among those who write about war, there is a deep-seated confusion between description and definition. Many book titles—for instance, <u>Roots of Wars</u> (Barnet, 1973), <u>Psychological Basis of War</u> (Winnick et al.,

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1973), and On War (Aron, 1968)--create in the reader an expectation of a definition, but disappoint that expectation. Instead, many writers describe situations related to war, such as economy, leadership, international negotiations, and the like. The confusion is especially profound among historians. A good example is The Causes of War by the historian Blainey (1973), who defines war according to the duration of the historical events that precipitated them (for instance, the death of a king). He even describes some wars as "accidental."

Other writers' definitions reflect only certain elements of war. Durbin and Bowlby (1938) stress the organizational elements of war. They define it as "organized fighting between large groups of adult human beings." Barbera (1980) defines war as "organized physical hostilities between at least two politically independent nations in pursuit of goals" (p. 259). Barbera, like Durbin and Bowlby, stresses the organizational aspect of war. Quincey Wright, in his monumental Study of War (1965), broadens the definition of war. He defines it as "a legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflictby armed forces." Wright uses the key word

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<u>legal</u>, which implies social approval of aggression and destructive behavior that under most other circumstances would not be approved morally, ethically, or legally by the same culture. Wright also alludes to another important aspect of war, its social organization.

Other writers have been more to the point. The most inclusive definition of war is given by S. Mansfield (1982). Mansfield defines war as an "organized, premeditated, socially approved action, involving groups of men in relatively complex operations of aggression and defense, and pursued in a rational fashion in order to accomplish a certain goal" (p. 1). Implicit in this definition is the notion that though war involves violence, aggression, and homicide, it is not simply equated with an of these. According to Mansfield's definition, war, unlike individual aggression, requires a long-term and well-prepared social structure in the form of an army and civilian backing. There is definitely violence, homicide, and aggression that is not war (e.g., street crime, football, ice hockey, etc.). Violence, homicide, and aggression are thus not the goals of war, though aggression is always involved.

One aspect of war has been consistently neglected

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by most writers: the involvement of the whole population during and before war. In other words, the supportive role women play in the waging of war plays no part in past definitions. Rejecting the belief that war is a man's institution, I view war, like any other social phenomenon, as interactive. Women, children, the elderly, and all other noncombatants are part of the war operation, regardless of whether they carry guns, babies, or wounded soldiers in their hands. The generals who send the soldiers on leave count on women to be there. The men who leave for war also count on their wives and sweethearts to take care of their homes, their children, and basic economic needs (Bar-Yosef & Padan-Eisenstark, 1977). Drafted men also count on women for moral support during war (Rupp, 1978). Rupp also documents that the wartime economy relies heavily on women.

A new direction in the research and planning of intervention in cases of sexual abuse of daughters by their fathers sheds light on this issue. New research questions the role of the mother as innocent bystander in the interaction of the father-daughter-mother triad (Charny, 1973; Shoham, 1976; Sheleff, 1970). Only a few researchers attempt to study the analogous role of women

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during war (Stiehm, 1982; Shoham, 1976; Elshtain, 1982). Some of these studies explore the quality of the interaction beteen the protector-warrior men and the protected, defenseless women. They see this interaction and the rigid sex roles in our culture as an extremely important antecedent of war.

This study takes a systems approach and attempts to discover how men and women relate to certain aspects of war without assigning the blame or responsibility to either. The possibility that some aspects of war might appeal to women may shed light on the effect of interaction beteen the sexes in the waging of war. Taking into account the systems approach, I define war in this way:

> War is a rationally planned, socially approved and organized action that attempts to pursue a certain goal and involves the whole population in different capacities: Men are organized hierarchically in groups, carrying out complex operations of aggression and defense; women and other noncombatants are involved in moral and physical support of the combatants and other operations of defense.

The new definition includes elements of the former

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definitions but adds the aspect of the involvement of the total population in the making of war.

A cynic once said, "we are such a peace-loving people that we go to war every twenty-five years to prove it." This remark, unfortunately, expresses the unpleasant reality that, on the average, wars occur in cycles of twenty-five years (Denton & Philips,1968). Demause (1982) presents more recent data about the seventeen major American wars, covering a period of 365 years. The American cycle, according to these data, lasts an average of twenty-one years. Singer and Small (1972) also studied the frequency of war. They conclude, "Whether we look at the number of wars, their severity, or their magnitude, there is no significant trend upwards ordown over the past 150 years" (p. 201). It seems, then, that researchers agree about this. Fromm (1973) is an exception. He reinterprets Wright's (1965) report on the frequency of war and challenges Wright's conclusion. Fromm (1973) suggests a rapid increase in the number of wars fought per time unit and uses Wright's data to support his dual thesis that wars become progressively more destructive in the modern industrialized Western world and that violence does not have its basis in human nature. Even though there is

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some disagreement about the frequency of war throughout history, all researchers agree on the progressive destructiveness of wars and weapons.

Fornari (1974) sees the evolution of wars and weapons as regressive. Using a psychoanalytic framework, he compares the unconscious symbolism of weapons to the technological evolution of warfare. The most primitive weapons (sword, spear, lance) penetrate the body of the enemy in the confrontation between two individuals and as such are associated with genital-sadistic fantasies. Firearms, however (involving the use of projectiles--that is, of something ejected towards the enemy), appear to be traceable to anal-sadistic fantasies. Chemical warfare and nuclear weapons, because they introduce the pantoclastic prospect, appear to be most easily interpretable in terms of a fantasy universe dominated by fears of annihilation, which are typical of oral sadism. As technology of weapons evolves, humans are also being motivated by unconscious fantasies that are evolving regressively.

A different view of the evolution of war is based on the current movement in the Western world toward abolishing the glamor of war. This trend might indicate

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the reduced willingness of people to go to war, at least in industrially advanced nations. Military enthusiasm is being eroded by a growing reluctance to be drafted. All wars since World War II have ended in settlements and not in complete submission of the defeated nations. The trend toward viewing wars as unglamorous and the erosion of the men-hero myth in Western culture have also been intensively and painfully experienced by the veterans of Vietnam in the last decade upon their return and afterward (Williams, 1980). The growth of the peace movement in the United States, Germany, and more recently, Israel, is also an indication of this trend. This trend can be viewed as progressive evolution toward the abolishment of war.

These two simultaneous evolutionary trends--one progressive and one regressive--signal vastly different consequences for the human race. There is cause both for pessimism and optimism. The pessimistic view, because of its consequences, deserves special attention.

The UNESCO Charter claims that "Since wars are made in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defense of peace must be constructed." Although this statement does not exhaust the truth about war and peace, it is a useful point of departure from which to

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study the development of the psychology of war and peace.

<div align="center">Review of the Literature</div>

This review of the literature focuses on 1) psychoanalytic theories of war and a critique, 2) investigations of attitudes toward war by social psychologists and a critique, 3) theories grouped under the rubric "authoritarian personality" and a critique, 4) theories acounting for sex differences in the development of morality, and 5) studies of the relationship between gender and war.

<div align="center">Psychoanalytic Theories of War</div>

The following is a critical review of works by psychoanalysts who attempted to inquire about the roots of war. First, the drive theory of war is described. The relevant work of Freud and E. Jones, their conclusions on future wars, and their views on the potential for its prevention are addressed. A second topic is the relevant works of some psychoanalysts who depart from the limited drive concept of war in their study of war. Among these are object-relation theorists, who focus on the instincts as well as their aims (or objects) in different developmental stages. Third, the theories of those psychoanalysts who view war

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as an outcome of the dialectic balance between the Oedipal and the Medea complex are evaluated.

The Drive Theory of War

Fifty-one years ago, Freud initiated the psychoanalytic search for the roots of war in a paper entitled "Why War" (1933/1961), and since then few psychoanalysts have attempted to exten his inquiry.

Freud's early work ignores the phenomenon of war. Only during World War I did he postulate his new dichotomy between the life instinct (Eros) and the death instinct (Thanatos), as described in"Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920/1955), "Civilization and Its Discontents (1928/1961), and "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" (1922/1955). During the years of the war he also wrote "Thoughts for the Time of War and Death" (1915/1957). He divides this last paper in two parts: the first is "The Disillusionment of War," and the second is "Our Attitudes Toward Death." In the summer of 1932, the League of Nations International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation proposed that Professor A. Einstein invite a person, chosen by himself, to a frank exchange of views of any problem that Einstein might select. He asked Freud to respond to the question, "Is there any way of delivering mankind

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from the menace of war?" In 1933, Freud responded with his famous paper "Why War?"

In these two papers, "Why War?" and "Thoughts for the Time of War and Death," and in other writings, Freud states that war, a social phenomenon, and aggression, a personal phenomenon, are different manifestations of the same drive system. As individuals evolve, they must find the balance between life and death forces within their psyches. Societies undergo a similar evolution of a balance between destructive and constructive forces. Men, according to Freud, "are not genteel creatures who want to be loved and who at most defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness" (1928/1961, p. 111). "The constitutional inclination of human beings to be aggressive toward one another is the greatest hindrance to civilization" (1930/1961, p. 142). Common libidinal ties are not sufficient by themselves to hold society together. One of the major tasks of civilization is to set limits on man's aggressive instinct. The role of the "outgroup" (the external, other group) becomes extremely crucial to any society. Group members can externalize and displacet their aggressiveness toward

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the outgroup and by doing so release the instinctual
destructive impulse that was originally directed toward
one's own ego on the individual level, or toward
internal group destruction on the community level.

Freud viewed the church and the army as structures
in which group cohesion can evolve through
identification with the leader and the incorporation of
the leader as one's own ego ideal. The army also
provides a social context in which desexualized (aim
inhibited) ties between members can evolve in a socially
approved context. In Freud's words, the army and the
church are structures in which the individual is "bound
by libidinal ties on the one hand to the leader and on
the other hand to the other members of the group"
(1922/1955, p. 95). Freud used the army and the church
only as examples to describe his theory of group
dynamics and group cohesion.

World War I influenced Freud greatly. His initial
excitement and later disillusionment facilitated his
construction of his new dual theory but did not bring
about a cohesive new theory of the unconscious function
of war. He does allude to the importance of
acknowledging death to promote life and the analogous
relationship between war and peace. He implies that to

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prevent war, civilization must come to terms with its own destructive capabilities. Even though Freud did not complete a theory of war, his basic assumption and theoretical framework were the basis for the theories of other psychoanalysts.

Ernest Jones, a good friend and devout supporter of Freud, attempted in 1915 to explore the unconscious roots of war in the individual. He wrote two essays entitled "War and Individual Psychology" (1915) and "War and Sublimation" (1924). As a psychoanalyst, he questioned whether there is, regardless of specific political circumstances, "in the human mind some deep, or some set of recurrently acting agents, which tend to bring about wars more or less regularly, and to find or create pretexts for war whatever the external situation may be" (1924, p. 79). This theory implies an internal pressure or warlike impulse that needs regular release in warlike activities.

War, according to Jones, is an outcome of "blind repression" of destructive, sadistic instincts that are first repressed and later sublimated in the permissible outlet of war. The repression is induced by civilization through its educational agents: parents, teachers, and so on. The repressed instincts constantly

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strive for expression and constantly meet the counterpressure of civilization. Sublimating these impulses is essential for their proper guilt-free release. Jones defines sublimation much as Freud did, as the exchange of an originally sexual aim for one which is no longer sexual, though it relates psychologically to the original aim. He agreed with Freud that the pressure of the civilized world forces people to live beyond their ability to repress. Under these circumstances, war, as a socially approved institution, offers a regular outlet for these repressed aggressive impulses.

The main claim of the drive theory is that repression is natural, inevitable, and partly induced by civilization. Repressed impulses constantly strive for expression and constantly meet the counterpresure of civilization. War is a socially accepted outlet for this dammed-up pressure. Such a traditional hydraulic concept of aggression is similar to Lorenz's concept of aggression (1966), even though Jones and Lorenz disagree about the origin of the drive. Both view the aggressive drive, if it is not released in time, as the cause of war.

Freud took an important step from a purely

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physiological-mechanistic model to a biological, more holistic one. He tried to consider the organism as a whole and to find the original sources for all feelings and behavior. His theory is highly speculative and abstract, however, and he offers very little convincing empirical evidence. There is much criticism of the drive model among psychologists, ethologists, and anthropologists. One objection is that, if it is true tha the death instinct is a biologically innate force in all living organisms, there should be evidence of more illness or early death in less outwardly aggressive animals and men and vice versa. There are no supportive data for this (Fromm, 1973). In a recent work, Tavaris (1982a & 1982b) reviewed dozens of experiments showing that ventilating anger deepends anger, anxiety, and frustration. She claims that human beings are not "tea pots" that must explode from accumulated pressure unless it is released.

The anthropologist R. Sipes also cites data that call the drive theory into question. Sipes compared ten peaceful cultures with ten constantly warring societies and discovered that the pacific people played far fewer combative games than the bellicose cultures (Tavaris, 1982a).

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It seems that the drive theory as well as its conclusions about war are not completely satisfactory. The evidence suggests that although the basic concept of the destructive force within the individual does contribute to an understanding of certain aggressive destructive behavior, such a concept does not explain it. Although Freud makes brief mention of the potential role of the army in providing a context in which men can experience emotional ties with other men, he does not elaborate on it. He also does not relate such a need in men but apparently not in women to the potential differences in the development of boys and girls.

Post-Freudian Theories of War

A few psychoanalysts, among them E. Glover, Durbin and Bowlby, Money-Kyrle, and F. Fornari, attempt to write directly about war and its psychological origin in the individual psyche. They all go beyond the instinctual theory of Freud and concentrate not only on the instinctual drive but also on the agent through which the instinctual aim is achieved. They also strive to put the relationship of the infant with his or her object, even though in a limited way, in a cultural context.

In his book War, Sadism and Pacifism, Glover

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(1946) makes an important contribution to the theory that there is an unconscious attraction to war. His main concern is the role of sadistic and masochistic impulses in armed conflicts. A psychoanalyst, Glover sees sado-masochistic impulses as originating in infantile experiences and finding later unconscius expression in aggressive sexual actions. For Glover, the origin of sadism in the anal stage and the potential destructive mixture of the sexual and the death instinct are expressed by the following symbolism: The commander of the B-52 bomber that dropped the bomb on Hiroshima named the airplane after his mother, Enola Gay. The bomb bore the name of the "sex bomb" Rita Hayworth. The image of a man dropping the destructive (sex) bomb from the bottom of the plane named after his mother exemplifies anal-sadistic energy.

Glover finds symbolic significance in relations between men. For instance, symbolic anal impulses (man's giving birth) and sadism can be ascribed to the fact that Leslie Grove, director of the ManhattanProject and father of the atomic bomb, after a successful first experiment, cabled President Truman: "Baby is born" (Fornari, 1974).

Glover also stresses the fundamental identity

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between the imppulses promoting peace and those promoting war. The latter differ from the former only in their end products. Pacifism is, according to Glover, a defense against unconscius sadism. This sadism originates in infantile fantasies in which the good child and the good mother are victimized by the bad father. Glover lists other intrapsychic mechanisms that contribute to the outbreak of war: fear of homosexuality, sado-masochism, herd instincts, and others. He does not discuss how these different processes might interact with each other and simultaneously contribute to war.

Glover does add cultural evolutionary aspects by viewing modern wars as more destructive due to the additional defense of rationalization urged by modern nations. Primitive tribes, unlike modern nations, did not hesitate to declare war to satisfy their sadistic impulses openly. At the same time, the losing party could satisfy its need to mourn. The difference in the open acknowledgment of the urge to fight is documented also by S. Mansfield (1982), Fornari (1974), and others.

Glover sees great similarity in the sexual symbolism of weapons and the sexual symbolism of everyday life. War gratifies masochistic needs that are

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necessary to overcome unconscious conflicts in men. Even though he sees the human mind in war as similar to the everyday mind, he still analyzes the group aspect and describes war as a "mental disorder of the group mind." Thus, war is comparable to an individual psychotic episode. Obviously, Glover views the aggressor and the defender as both attempting to gratify their sadistic needs and trying to resolve their unconscious conflicts and guilt.

In 1938, M. Durbin and J. Bowlby wrote "Personal Aggression and War," a paper basaed on their observation of adults, children, and apes. They view repression of aggressive impulses as an important factor in understanding war. According to Durbin and Bowlby, libidinal energy is transformed through displacement and projection. The immediate mottive of both mechanisms is the reduction of anxiety and the resolution of the conflicts of ambivalence and guilt. They claim that the primary incentive of both aggressive behavior and peaceful cooperation lies in the structure of the id. They describe children's aggressiion as a response to any frustration, usually expressed in naughtiness that is eventually punished. This punishment presents the child with a radical conflict: whether to express

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aggression or to control it. In other words, the child's conflict is between expressing a fundamental resentment of frustration and controlling it to avoid punishment. The former might lead to the loss of love and the latter to additional psychic pressure. The child usually attempts to resolve the conflict through repression. This frustration expresses itself eventually in other behavior. The child develops an ambivalent attitude toward his or her parents, who are the source of love and the cause of frustration. This ambivalence adds tension to the child's emotional life. Fantasies of hurting the parents, which result from the frustration, produce feelings of guilt.

Durbin and Bowlby conclude that the two mechanisms of displacement and projection are responsible for individual and group aggressiv behavior, including war. They view the repressive effect of parents and other socializing agents as the source of later aggressive behavior. Society, according to them, condemns and punishes individual or group aggression. In its own service, society rationalizes and transfers the impulses of men to "their last remaining and freest outlet--war." Even though their theory on the transformation of libidinal energy has a psychosexual basis, Durbin and

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Bowlby go beyond the psychosexual by analyzing the relationship between the child and the parents within a limited cultural context.

Money-Kyrle, in his essay "The Development of War" (1937), describes the process through which the child internalizes bad objects and threatening figures. Once all enemies are internalized, the child feels identified with the internalized bad object, the enemy, and might experience a manic sense of strength. Money-Kyrle calls it "the manic process" and views it as the prototype of war psychology in adults. He calls his theory a "paranoiac theory of war." He draws parallels between individual psychodynamics and the group dynamic that leads to war. Wars, according to this theory, brak out because real difficulties and differences are dealt with in a paranoiac or psychotic manner. It is not so much the aggressive drives that escalate the conflict as a sort of "innate madness" or psychotic disposition rooted in the infant's earliest relationship with the environment. Money-Kyrle sees political leaders as chosen by the people when they are ready to act on their paranoia. By the time the leader activates these psychotic dispositions, the motives of war are progressively desexualized, rationalized, and moralized.

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The Italian psychoanalyst, F. Fornari, elaborates and clarifies Money-Kyrle's and Glover's theories. In his book, The Psychoanalysis of War (1974), he states that war "represents a social institution, the aim of which is to cure the paranoid and depressive anxieties existing in every man" (p.14). Fornari sees the enemy as comparable to the "terrifier" who appears in nightmares. War, in this context, is seen as a "security organization," not because it permits a defense against an external flesh-and-blood enemy, but because it succeeds in finding or inventing a real object that can be killed and destroyed. With no wars, men are defenseless before the emergence of the "terrifier" as a purely internal foe.

Freud described the process of the deflection of the death instinct outward by projecting it onto someone else. In this light, Fornari's war is a kind of institutionalized process that helps the ego defend itself against internal bad objects. Later, Fornari coins the term the process of paranoid elaboration of mourning, and describes it as "the group of maneuvers in which the internal depressive terrifier, emerging in the form of a sense of guilt for the death of the love object, iseluded in an ambiguous manner" (Fornari, 1974,

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p. 18). In other words, people imagine that the love object has died not because of their own sadistic attack against it, but because of the evil magic of the enemy. The experience of mourning then becomes not sorrow for the death of the loved person, but the killing of the enemy who is falsely thought to be the destroyer of the loved object. The "security organization" of war is actually a defense against psychotic anxiety, which might derive from guilt.

Glover, Durbin and Bowlby, Money-Kyrle, and Fornari all expand on Freudian theory. Still, like Freud's approach, their approach is essentially biological and predeterminant. They focus on the importance of early interactions with the infant.

Glover believes very little can be done to control the sadistic instinct or the "inner madness." What can be done is to acknowledge these impulses more openly and to reduce the amount of internalization in Western culture, which is partly responsible for the destructiveness of modern wars. Durbin and Bowlby urge less repression in child-rearing practices in order to reduce repression and conflicts in the child. In this way, repressed frustration, which is later transformed to aggressive behavior in everyday life and in war, is

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reduced. The adopting of less oppressive childrearing practices as a means of preventing aggression is incongruent with psychoanalytic thinking, which views the first years, when the child interacts with love and hate object or with significant objects, as the most important period. According to this, less oppressive child-rearing, which permits ventilation of aggresssion, will result in less built-up pressure of the death instinct. Glover (1946) suggests intervening on the child-rearing level by allowing more sadistic games or fantasies. Fornari (1974) suggests allowing children to play with toy weapons and eliminating the absolution domination of children by parents. Neither Glover and Fornari nor Durbin and Bowlby are specific when they describe steps that reduce aggression.

Glover (1946) suggests another way to reduce aggression. His idea is that war serves as a "collective destructive orgasm" and results from continued sexual frustration. Allowing more discharge of the sexual drive will diminish the need for socially approved collective destruction experienced through war. Money-Kyrle and Fornari, even though they express their deep concern about nuclear war, see very little hope for the attempt to resolve the conflict arising from the

internalization of the bad object. In some of their writings, they suggest that massive psychoanalysis might be a potential solution for the problem of preventing war (Fornari, 1974).

As in the case of the drive theory, the theories of Glover, Durbin and Bowlby, Money-Kyrle, and Fornari are in essence biological. The conclusion of these psychoanalysts is limited and does not acknowledge any potential meaningful social impact on the making of intrapsychic structure and the making of war.

War as a Deferred Act of Infanticide

Certain theoreticians define war as a deferred infanticide. This group defines the Isaac syndrome, or Medea complex, as the basic dynamic, which operates simultaneously with and counteracts the Oedipal pressure.

Charney (1973), Corelis (1980), Shoham (1976), and Wellisch (1954) describe the cross-cultural, widespread custom of killing, sacrificing, or mutilating sons, usually first-born sons, by their parents. The slaughter of offspring by their parents is a recurring theme in Greco-Judaeo-Christian tradition. Abraham is a famous example of the willingness of the father to kill his son, who also accepted his fate; nor did Sarah, the

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bystander, object. It was God's will that Abraham's first and only son be killed. Cronus devours his children as they are born, Agamemnon must sacrifice Iphigenia before his army can sail, Herakles, in madness, kills his children, Medea murders her children, Christ mounts the cross at God's will, and generations of child martyrs go joyfully to horrid deaths with utter confidence in their heavenly fathers. Similar themes are found in Indian myths and other cultures (Corelis, 1980).

The Oedipal pressure and the Isaac syndrome are two vectors inherent in the dialectic of socialization and normative indoctrination. The Isaac syndrome, unlike the Oedipal pressure, is a separate dynamic. The father inflicts pain and pushes his son out of the family into the world, and the mother does not interfere. The son, the victim, accepts the burden of pain and separation willingly and often enthusiastically. Circumcision and many forms of rites of passage for boys are examples of this dynamic, according to this theory. The son counters the pressure of separation by Oedipal rejection of the authority of the father and desires to regain the mother's closeness and love.

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The pressures are not resolved but kept in a dialectical balance. The direct social implication of the Isaac syndrome is that authority, rules, and laws are internalized and accepted by young people. The son learns, the hard way, that it is better to obey than to reject authority. At the level of ideology, the son learns to be proud of the option of sacrificing himself for the "fatherland," the "party," or the "cause." The sons are socialized to devote themselves to ideals and group goals. These goals and other norms, if internalized successfully by the sons, may often be the direct cause of their own destruction. In the past, in many different cultures, the first-born son was sacrificed. Later in history the first male ram or calf was sacrificed in his stead. The modern equivalent mightbe the attitude that, during wars, the "best die first" or the "good die young."

Denton and Phillips' (1968) statement that there is an average of 21 or 25 years between wars is significant in this context. This period corresponds to the time during which a generation matures and questions or threatens the norms and the authority of its elders. It is sufficient to recall the fury of the parents' generation toward the younger generation for rejecting

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the draft in the 1970s. Corelis (1980) reports the disappointment of some parents of survivors of the Kent State incident. This writer recalls the tremendous pressure to join the armed forces in Israel, and the glory the wounded or dead heroes and their families received.

According to Charny (1973), Shoham (1976), and others, war can be viewed as a socially accepted institution by which parents are allowed to project their unconscious hostility toward their sons onto the enemy, who in fact kills the sons. The youngsters are eager to go to battle and to risk their lives for the cause they believe in. They have internalized the norm set by their parents' generation, and the best of the youngsters, who have possibly done the best job of internalizing, may die first.

Shoham and Charny urge the recognition, but not necessarily the acceptance, of war as well as peace as products of a familial and societal dynamic in which the individual takes an active role as aggressor, victim, or bystander. This recognition might offer the hope of acknowledging and controlling cruelty.

This approach is different from Freud's and Jones's theories. It describes a family dynamic that

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can also be analyzed at the societal level. It is an interpersonal dynamic that can change as the participants change. Any change in the behavior of the aggressor (father, Abraham), the victim (child, Isaac), or the bystander (mother, Sarah) will involve a different dynamic. Perhaps the recent antiwar movement during and since the Vietnam war was a turning point at which the heroic image of the warrior-victim changed. The victims from now on might not let themselves be sacrificed as willingly as before. The "women for peace" movement might also indicate that in the future bystanders will not be as passive as Sarah.

Proponents of the Isaac syndrome view child abuse, infanticide, and war as an outcome of the same dynamic. No researcher alludes to the fact that there are available data on child abuse and child-rearing practices that, according to this model, should have had a great effect on the practices of infanticide and war but has not. The evolution toward more progressive, less violent child-rearing practices documented by Demause (1982) should signal a simultaneous reduction in militarism and war. Most data, however, indicate increased violence and destructiveness in the modern world (Nagler, 1982; Fromm, 1973), in spite of changes

in child rearing. None of the above researchers suggest concrete measures to change the dynamics of the aggressor, bystander, and victim.

Although this approach is reductive--attributing such disparate and complex behaviors as war, rites of passage, circumcision, and the like to the balance between Medea and Oedipal pressures, it offers another way to analyze some of the phenomena that happen during and as a result of war. Because it promises the possibility of changeand the prevention of war, it deserves further investigation.

Studies of Attitudes Toward War by
Social Psychologists

The following survey addresses the study of attitudes toward war, mostly by social psychologists. This survey concentrates on those studies that explore attitudes toward war in general. It does not cover attitudinal studies toward specific wars, which are much more frequent than studies of attitudes toward war in general. In the first part of the review, six different scales for measuring attitudes toward war are described. The second part is a survey of the literature on attitudes toward war as correlated with educational level, religion, I.Q., occupation, and other indices.

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Most of these studies use the scales described in the first part of this survey. The third part critiques the scales and studies.

Scales Measuring Attitudes Toward War

The current literature of sociology and psychology describes six established scales that measure attitudes toward war with different degrees of validity and reliability. No cross-validation among these scales has yet been established. These scales all attempt to measure attitudes toward war in general, not attitudes toward specific wars.

Droba Scale. D. D. Droba published the first scale to measure attitudes toward war in 1930. Later Droba published a modified form under the title, "A Scale of Militarism-Pacifism" (1931). Droba qualifies his scale: "In a very broad sense, it denotes a predisposition to act with reference to the issue of war versus peace. . . . The statement in the scale covers the following topics in this scale: causes of war, purpose of war, results of war and peace, what is to be done at present about war and peace, what is to be done in case of war, and general judgments about peace and war" (p. 96). To construct a scale of militarism-pacifism with 21 equal steps on the scale (Thurstone's

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method of equal intervals), Droba started with a set of
130 statements expressing various degrees of militarism
and pacifism. Three hundred students were instructed to
divide these statements into 11 categories, from
extremely pacifistic to extremely militaristic. After
conducting a statistical analysis, Droba selected 44
statements representing 21 equal steps. Each step is
represented by a pair of statements. The 21 steps
represent a range of extreme militaristic statements
("Might is right"; "There is no progress without war")
to extreme pacifistic ones ("It is the moral duty of the
individual to refuse to participate in any way in any
war, no matter what the cause"; "There is no conceivable
justification for war"). The subjects were given the set
of 44 statements and asked to mark plus signs next to
the statements with which they agreed and minus signs
next to the statements with which they disagreed.

The reliability of the scale was calculated by the
method of form comparison. To correlate two forms, each
with 22 items, the product moment coefficient of
correlate was used. The correlation was found to be
.83. The Spearman-Brown reliability of this scale was
.90.

Porterfield Scale. Porterfield (1937) developed a

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scale of opinions about war. It consisted of a hypothetically graded series of eight situations in which war might be justified. The first two statements are: "War is justifiable as a chief cause of human progress" and "War is justifiable when waged by a nation to extend its territory or to acquire raw materials because of pressure of population" (p. 252). The last two statements are: "Although I justify war for none of these motives, I still believe that one should, in case of invasion, support with his life whatever method of resistance his nation chooses" and "I believe that no one should, under any circumstances, take part in war" (P. 253).

The items in this scale were not statistically weighted by Thurstone's equal-appearing intervals technique or any other technique. It was assumed that a subject who responded unfavorbly to the justification of war in one situation, regardless of the number of the item, had excluded one-seventh of the motives for war. Even though at least a third of the subjects reversed the items--for example, they approved item 7 and disapproved items 4 and 5--only the number of approvals and disapprovals was calculated without regard to order. In his analysis of different groups, the author departs

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from his initial terminology of different motives and degrees of justification of war and concludes, for instance, "it thus appears that Y [YMCA] members are less warlike than church members" (p. 259). The validity tests were conducted by comparing responses of National Guardsmen with responses of university students.

Stagner Scale. R. Stagner (1942) constructed another scale of attitudes towards war. In this scale, 27 statements are presented to the subject. The statements elicit perceptions of causes of war, ways to prevent war, and the subject's willingness to fight in a war. The subjects are instructed: "Consider each of the statements below. Regardless of your own opinion, mark it as to whether you consider it to be favorable to war or to peace. Let '5' be the statement most favorable to war and '1' the most favorable to peace" (p. 132).

In a variation of the Thurstone scale-construction technique, items were rated by judges instructed to apply absolute judgment on a 5-point scale. The items that represent most favorable attitudes toward war were "War brings out the best qualities in men" and "War is often the only means of preserving the national honor." The items considered least favorable to war were, "War

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breeds disrespect for human life" and "It is good judgment to sacrifice certain rights in order to prevent war."

A correlated split-half reliability coefficient of .58 was reported. Test-retest reliability of a short form of this test (15 items out of 27) was .83 on 93 students. In one test of validity, it was found that military training groups and veterans' groups scored significantly higher than men with no military training. In another test of validity, differences in responses by Dartmouth students and by members of the Young People's Socialist League were significant.

Droba and Quackenbush Scale. Droba and Quackenbush became dissatisfied with Droba's original scale (1931), and constructed a new scale which they called "Attitudes Toward Defensive, Cooperative and Aggressive War" (1942). Reviewing the literature of the studies of attitudes toward war, they conclude:

> In the above studies the term "war" was used in its usual general sense. No distinction was made between the various types of wars, although it is quite conceivable that an individual might be favorable to one type of war but be opposed to war of a different sort. In the present study a distinction is made between three types of wars, namely, a defensive war, a cooperative war, and an aggressive war. An aggressive war is one waged by an imperialistic country for the purpose of defending the United States in

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case of an attack, while a cooperative war
would be illustrated by an active cooperation
with the democratic countries of Europe for
the defense of a common cause such as
democracy. (pp. 12-13)

The final form of the scale has 13 agree-disagree
items on war in general, each of which is to be answered
by reference to defensive, cooperative, or aggressive
war. The scale was constructed by Thurstone's method of
equal-appearing intervals: the distance between each of
the 13 steps is approximately equal. The individual
score is the average of the scale value endorsed by the
respondent. Low values indicate favorable attitudes
toward war; high values, unfavorable attitudes. Split-
half reliability was reported to be .87 for defensive
war, and .80 for cooperative war and for aggressive war.
No data on validity were reported. In a sample of 326
male students at the University of Mississippi in 1938-
1939, the students as a whole were strongly in favor of
cooperative war and slightly unfavorable to aggressive
war. The significance of the findings on cooperative
wars was not interpreted in light of students' majors.

Crown's War-Minded Scale. Crown (1950) described
a scale of warmindedness, which he developed with
Eysenck. The scale consists of eight items, selected
with Thurstone's equal-appearing interval technique.

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Examples of Crown's non-warminded items are: "In war, even the winner loses more than he can gain" and "There is no such thing as a righteous war." More warminded items are, "War is a glorious advanture" and "War is an imporant factor in progress, eliminating the unfit" (p. 139).

The split-half reliability correlated for length by the Spearman-Brown formula was .28. Recalculation using different items brought reliability up to .70.

Putney and Middleton. Putney and Middleton (1962) attempted to measure attitudes toward war on four scales: a) Pacifism Scale, where pacifism is defined as "a tendency to regard war as inherently unacceptable in the modern world"; b) Level of Provocation Scale, measuring the degree of provocation seemed necessary to justify the United States' use of nuclear weapons against an enemy; c) Maximum Fatalities Scale, measuring the number of tolerable fatalities to be incurred during a nuclear war; and d) Nuclear Information Scale, measuring knowledge of nuclear weapons. Only the first two scales are relevant to this review which deals with the concept of war behavior.

The Pacifism Scale is a Guttman scale of seven 5-point Likert-type items. "Disagree" responses to items

1, 3, and 7 and "agree" responses to the remaining items were coded as pacifistic. The Provocation Scale consists of a single Guttman-type item of seven responses, which, however, did not meet normal Guttman scale criteria.

The population sample consisted of 1100 students in 16 American colleges and universities in 1961. The sample was mostly undergraduates, 58 percent male and 55 percent freshmen and sophomores. The authors cautioned against generalizing the results to all American college students, since the sampling involved the selection of classes rather than individuals.

The test-retest reliabilitycoefficient for the Pacifism Scale was .91.

Studies of Attitudes Toward War

Many studies use the described scales to learn how groups differ in their attitudes toward war. In the following, I will describe the studies according to how several factors correlated with attitudes toward war. These factors are educational level, professional status, I.Q., military training, religious affiliatioin, age, and other factors. The relation between sex and attitudes toward war will be discussed in a separate Part V of this review.

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Using the Droba War Scale, Jones (1970) studied students' changing attitudes toward war during four years in college. He found a statistically reliable change in the direction of pacifism in a group of 77 students tested as freshmen and again as seniors. Similarly, Farnsworth (1937) tested 312 freshman males in 1932. Fifty-five of these were retested in 1933, 50 others in 1934, and 50 in 1936. Only a slight change was manifested in the 1934 and 1936 retests. Smith (1937) gave the Droba War Scale to 282 students in nine classes at the beginning and end of a semester in 1932, 1933, 1934, and 1936. Each of the classes heard one or more sociology lectures on the subjects of causes of war and war phenomena. For all subjects, the average scale value changed minimally from 6.5 to 7.1, which Smith interpreted as evidence that education engenders pacifism. Porterfield (1937), Barkley (1953) and Droba (1931) found results congruent with the above. Greater education correlates with reduced readiness to justify wars.

Stagner et al. (1942) correlated relative militarism or pacifism with educational level and with the additional factor of professional status (that is, among professionals and lay persons). They found that

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"the expert is significantly less militaristic, less favorable to patriotic education, and less ready to blame the outgroup communists for all evil" (p. 120). Stagner (1942) and Porterfield (1937), using their own scales, concluded that professional men were consistently more pacifistic than clerical workers and businessmen.

Most of the researchers assume that people with military training and veterans' groups would score higher on militarism. Some researchers validated their scales by comparing military trainees or veterans with other groups (Stagner, 1942; Porterfield, 1937).

Porterfield (1937) also researched the correlation between the I.Q. of his subjects and their relative militarism. He found that people with I.Q.'s lower than 100 seem to justify war more easily than people with higher i.Q.'s. Consistent with these results, he also found that higher than average grades are consistent with less warlike attitudes. He concludes: "It is proved elsewhere that . . . groups with greater capacity for logical analysis, with higher intelligence, and more reflective habits, manifested by better grades, and those on a higher educational level are less warlike, as is indicated in the study here reported; we then may ask

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of those who fear the "indoctrination" of "pacifism" just how does it happen that this is the particular section of the population that is being indoctrinated? Finally, we may ask this question: To what extent can intelligence be trusted to establish the aim of education" (Porterfield, 1937, p. 264). Unlike Porterfield (1937), Droba (1931), in his original scale, found only a slight correlation, not statistically significant, between pacifism and education.

Many researchers have attempted to use these scales to study the effect of religious institutions on attitudes toward war. These researchers view the religious institutions as agents of socialization that have traditionally transmitted to younger generations a greater or lesser willingness to accept war. The terms just war and religious wars used by several established religions, imply some acceptance of war behavior (Lewis, 1975). Some religions, such as those of the Quakers and Mennonites, seem to be pacifist in their essence. Starr (1975) used Putney and Middleton's (1962) scale and found that religious preference correlates negatively with opposition to war, regardless of sex, age, attendance of religious activities, and socioeconomic status. He also found that those who are affiliated

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with no formal religious organizations are most opposed to war, followed closely by Jews. Protestants and Catholics are close in their degree of opposition to war, but rank well below Jews and the non-religious. Droba (1931), using his original scale, found that Catholics, Lutherans, and Episcopalians seem to be the least pacifistic churches of the ten religions he compared. He found that Disciples of Christ, Baptists, and Jews appeared to be more peaceful.

Using his own questionnaire, Lewis (1975) studied subjects from a large public university, a small church-related college, and a conservative theological seminary. He attempted to identify religious correlates of students' attitudes toward war. He found that the more traditional students were in their religious practices and beliefs, the more accepting they were of war in general. Cross data among different religions suggest that a traditional orthodox theology was more associated with positive attitudes toward war than was either religious identification or attendance at religious services. Stagner et al. (1942) did not find any statistical difference between religious and non-religious except for the noted pacifism of Jews.

A few researchers have attempted to study the

correlation between age and attitudes towards war, and the consistency of attitudes within a certain group over time. There are two methods to study these correlations--one may either study the same subject over a long period or study different age groups simultaneously. Most researchers are extremely tentative in their conclusions,due to the fact that over the last four dozen years there have been at least four major wars whose impact is not easily detected or speculated upon. Also, the impact of the threat of thermonuclear war is hard to predict. The fact that men above 40 years old are also not draftable might be significant.

Caffrey and Capel (1969) used Droba's scale (1930) to study attitudes toward war over a period of 30 years. They did not find specific trends in attitudes towared war over this long period. They conclude that attitudes such as militarism and pacifism are formed later in life and are subject to many changes, which they did not explain. Stagner (1942) found that men above 40 were slightly more militaristic than younger men, but college freshmen scored as high as older men. As was reported earlier, freshmen have more warlike attitudes than seniors (Stagner, 1942).

Putney and Middleton (1962) measured attitudes toward war. using their own scale, they classified their college student respondents as well or as poorly informed about nuclear weapons. They found that students who were well informed about nuclear weapons were also more accepting of war. One has to keep in mind that no attempt was made in this study to evaluate the knowledge of subjects on broader aspects of defense and foreign policy.

The weight of the evidence indicates that the factors of education, age, professionalism, and lack of religious affiliation correlate positively with pacifism, even though no researcher has attempted to include them in one theoretical framework. It is significant that none of these researchers describes the term war. Devising such a scale without an operational definition of war calls the validity of the scale into question because there is no way to know what the scale measures besides its own results.

Droba and Quackenbush (1942) distinguish between three types of war--defensive, aggressive, and cooperative--and give examples of each to clarify their distinctions. Still, they do not arrive at a definition of war behavior. My sense is that they did not attempt

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to establish an operational definition because the distinctions they draw are invalid. Every war has defensive and aggressive elements. In all wars, all parties feel that they are defending themselves. The common belief is that a decent, respectable person will fight or support only "just" and "defensive" wars. An excerpt from the <u>San Francisco Chronicle</u> of April 26, 1983 illustrates this myth:

> Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said yesterday America's strategy of nuclear deterrence has maintained world peace and is "consistent with many principles of Catholic teachings on war. Together we reject 'offensive war of any kind,'" he said, but stressed,"Together we acknowledge that 'every nation has a right and duty to defend itself against unjust aggression.'"

The idea that we all fight only defensive or "just" wars is reflected in the names of the departments that run the armies and conduct wars: in the United States, the Department of Defense; in Israel, the Ministry of Security; indeed, in Israel the army is called "The Israeli Defense Forces." Wars sometimes are "justified" by their expected effect. For instance, it was widely believed by most democracies after World War I that the justification for the carnage was that the "great" war was "the war to end all wars" (Demause, 1982). Ronald Reagan has revived this myth. In a

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recent speech to gain support for the invasion of Grenada, he said:

> Now there was a time when our national security
> was based on a standing Army here within our
> own borders and shore batteries of artillery
> along our coast, and of course a Navy to keep
> the sea lanes open for the shipping of things
> necessary to our wellbeing. The world has
> changed. Today our national security can be
> threatened in faraway places. (Newsweek,
> November 11, 1983)

The defensive claim is seen by most psychoanalysts as almost a prerequisite to the proclamation of war by any group. Displacement and projection of the aggressive drive (or of the death instinct, as others describe it) is the reason for this split between us-them and good-evil. (See first Section of this review.)

The defensive and aggressive elements are inseparable, as a letter to the editor of the San Francisco Chronicle on October 20,1983, expresses:

> Editor: What's the difference between a
> peacekeeping force and an occupying army?
> What's the difference between restoring
> democracy and installing a friendly regime?
> Between intervention and invasion?

Another drawback of the literature reviewed is the simplistic and indiscriminate nature of the questions and the scales. For example, the Canadian Peace Research Institute, the American Institute of Public Opinion, and the Gallup Polls administered questions on

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the issues of deterrence, nuclear weapons, international relations with Communist countries, and conflict resolution. The broad and complex concepts of war, security and defense cannot be plumbed in a yes-no question. Such questions satisfy only the ignorant and arrogant. As my definition of war indicates, war behavior is a complex phenomenon with many characteristics, which reflect a variety of human experiences. The questions in the scales (e.g., "Are you for or against the following statement? War breeds disrespect for human life," [Stagner, 1942] and "I would refuse to participate in any way in war" [Droba and Quackenbush, 1942]) do not reflect the complexity of the phenomenon.

A faulty assumption most writers make is that war and peace are the two extremes of a continuum. They try to distinguish between those who are "for war" and those who are "for peace." Most researchers equate being against war with peace. Needless to say, almost none defines peace, either. Attitudes against war can be clearly differentiated from attitudes for war or for peace only if peace and war are clearly defined. The definition of peace as nonviolent coexistence between different countries or different social systems reflects

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the idea that the opposite of war is not a conflict-free
atmosphere but an atmosphere where there is commitment
to resolve conflict by negotiation and not by armed
operations. Nonviolent coexistence will not eliminate
differences, tensions, and conflicts, but it might
provide a context for conflict resolution.

Another significant lack of all these studies and
scales is that no cross-validation among the scales has
been established. Most of the validity studies assume
that soldiers and veterans are more militaristic than
civilians who nevr served in the army. The lack of
cross-validation is accompanied by a consistent lack of
a theoretical basis. With the exception of Lewis (1971,
1975) none of the above researchers offer a theoretical
context for their findings or hypotheses.

There is greater theoretical grounding in the
studies of attitudes toward Vietnam, Korea, and World
War II. Around the Vietnam era, for example, several
researchers attempted to use theory to explore and
predict attitudes. For instance, Notz et al. (1971)
explored how the dissonance theory could be used to
predict attitudes towards troop withdrawal from
Indochina as a function of draft number. Lau et al.
(1978) reviewed and tested three different social

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theories and their ability to predict attitudes of
"self-interest" civilians (those whose children served
in Vietnam) toward the Vietnam war.

I believe the lack of a theoretical basis and the
absence of a definition of war are the main drawbacks of
these studies. The next section reviews another
approach to the study of attitudes in general, which can
be extrapolated to the study of attitudes toward war as
well: the authoritarian personality theory.

The Application of Authoritarian Personality
Theory to Attitudes Toward War

The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950)
and Left and Right (Tomkin, 1963) laid a workable
theoretical framework for the study of attitudes.
Unlike the scale studies just described, these studies
were grounded in a lucid theoretical framework linking
behavior, attitudes, and personality. This theory
claims that ideas and feelings, ideology and
personality, fit together because they are rooted in the
psychological makeup of the individual. Research in
this field is generally limited to testing one or
another specific hypothesis, often derived from Adorno's
studies of the authoritarian personality.
Authoritarianism is defined as a configuration of traits

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such as (a) submission to, and respect for, strong leadership; (b) rigid and stereotyped thinking; and (c) glorification of one's own group at the expense of others. Some of these studies also explore the relation of social background factors to attitudes. Of these factors, group membership and reference group orientation are most often taken into account.

Christiansen (1959), using applicants to and students at Norwegian military academies, tested several hypotheses about the relationship between personality and attitudes toward international affairs. Some of the hypotheses examined were 1) that a person's reactions to everyday conflicts will be generalized to international situations (some relationships were reported); and 2) that latent or unconscious attitudes are an important variable in this field. He found that people with relatively minor personality conflicts tend to want their own country to take the initiative in solving international conflicts aggressively.

Adorno et al. (1950) established links between personality and authoritarianism, ethnocentricity, and political-economical ideology. Sampson (1967) established correlates with conservatism, and Rokeach (1957) established correlates with dogmatism. Levinson

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(1957) extended the work of his colleagues to find further correlation between authoritarianism and conservative attitudes toward foreign policy. Similar studies have been carried out by Farber (1955) and Janowitz and Marvick (1953). However, none of these studies investigates directly how attitudes toward war correlate with personality. Adorno and his colleagues did correlate anti-democratic or fascist trends with strong pro-war or militaristic attitudes, but they did not attempt to deal with it directly.

The next group of studies attempt to bridge studies of personalities and studies of attitudes toward war. A number of studies, mainly in the 1960s and 1970s, probed into the familial socialization of students who protested for peace. Flack (1967) reported that the family backgrounds of student activists were disproportionately urban, highly educated, affluent, professional, and either Jewish or nonreligious. The parents were characterized as permissive in child raising and neither authoritarian nor restrictive. Similar configurations have been reported by Westby and Braungart (1966), Cavalli and Martinelli (1967), and Watts et al. (1969). The effect of socialization and family climate is most likely complementary to child-

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rearing practices. This is suggested by the finding
that peace activists were found to be in more agreement
with their parents on political issues than were
supporters of the war (Watts et al., 1969).

Eckhardt et al. (1967) conclude their study of
militarism in our culture this way: "The following
variables appear to be associated with faith in military
deterrence in the American mind: anticommunism,
antiwelfarism, laissez-faire capitalism, conservatism,
antidemocracy, authoritarianism of the right, anti-
intellectualism, nationalism, paternalism and religious
orthodoxy" (p. 534). A year later, Eckhardt (1968)
combined the above study with his earlier study of 1956,
in which he analyzed public speeches and writings of
political leaders. He concludes that value analysis of
political speeches and writing have established the
following four kinds of verbal behavior distinguishing
war propaganda from other kinds of propaganda: 1)
denouncing the enemy for not wanting or respecting
certain values; 2) discussing aggression as a means of
defending these values; 3) emphasizing military strength
as the only language which the enemy can understand; and
4) devaluing labor, health, education, and welfare for
all men. Conversely, peace propaganda was characterized

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by: 1) accepting the enemy as having legitimate values
different from one's own; 2) renouncing aggression as a
means of resolving value conflictrs; 3) committing
oneself to nonviolent methods of actualizing one's own
value; and 4) emphasizing the values of labor, health,
education, and welfare for all. This distinction
between war-minded and peace-minded personalities is
distinct and sensitive to nuances, unlike the general
approach of most researchers, who see peace and war as
simply equated with antimilitarism and promilitarism.

Eckhardt and Alcock (1970) replicated and extended
some of the studies of the "love affair" between
ideological beliefs and human feelings. They
administered a 470-item questionnaire derived from 71
scales whose reliability and validity was established by
previous research. They found that personality traits
of compulsion, punitiveness, and irresponsibility were
most closely related to militarism. Consistent with the
conclusions of Adorno et al. (1950), Eckhardt and
Alcock's conclusions find high correlation among
militarism, nationalism, conservatism, and religiosity.
Personality factors such as strict childhood discipline,
neurosis, and extroversion were also correlated with the
above.

An early but poorly validated study by Crown (1950) attempts to link personality and attitudes toward war. Crown found that, unlike neurosis as measured by Eysenck (1947), which is closely related with anti-Semitism, warmindedness is not related to either. Crown's scale for measuring warmindedness was, however, unreliable and poorly constructed.

Lewis (1971) studied attitudes toward war in general and toward the Vietnam war and their correlation to family background and values, relationship with parents, and familial contact. He found a correlation between pro-war sentiments and authoritarianism, as defined by the F-scale of The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950). Lewis concludes: "Not only were all of the results out of association large, but all were statistically significant at the .001 level. As such, this association gives strong confirmation to the hypothesis that authoritarian personality would be more evident for those who had adopted hawkish attitudes toward the use of war" (Lewis, 1971, p. 707). Lewis, in his unique paper, used Putney and Middleton's (1962) measure for attitudes toward war. The use of this unreliable, unvalidated scale is a major drawback of this important study.

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Starr (1975), like Lewis, used Putney and Middleton's (1962) scale and found religious preference correlated significantly with opposition to war. Even when controls are applied for frequency of attendance at religious services, sex, father's education, and family income, those with no religious preference are most opposed to war. Like Eckhardt and Alcock (1970) and Lewis (1971), Star links personality and attitudes. Using Allport and Ross's (1967) studies of prejudice, Starr formulates a distinction between "persons with an extrinsic religious motivation, who use religion to achieve their ends, such as security, solace, sociability and distruction, status and self-justification; and those with an intrinsic motivation, who internalize and live their religion so that all needs are subject to an overarching religious commitment" (Starr, 1975, p. 325).

It is extremely important to note that, not surprisingly, neither the authors of The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, 1950), Eckhardt and Alcock (1970), Lewis (1971), nor Starr (1975) draw any relation between gender and ideology or personality. Consistent with their theory, statistical analyses show no significant differences between the sexes. Their assumption that

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men and women have basically the same personality structure is consistent with Freud's theory and many theories since his time.

Gilligan's Model for Gender Differences

Following is a detailed description of C. Gilligan's model of human development as appears in her book, In a Different Voice (Gilligan, 1982). Also described is N. Chodorow's work, which provided the basis for Gilligan's model. This model supplies the theoretical base for this dissertation and its hypothesis.

Nancy Chodorow, in an article called "Family Structure and Feminine Personality" (1974) and later in her book The Reproduction of Mothering (1978) describes a new model for the different dynamics of male and female development. Attempting to account for the universal differences that characterize masculine and feminine personality and roles, she attributes these differences not to anatomy but rather to the fact that women, universally, are largely responsible for early child care. Early psychosocial environment differs for boys and girls. While boys spend childhood relying on someone of the opposite sex, girls spend it with someone of their own sex. Female identity formation takes place

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in the context of ongoing relationships, since mothers tend to experience their daughters as more like and continuous with themselves. Correspondingly, girls identify themselves as female, like their mothers. The process of identification and attachment is fused. Unlike girls, boys, in order to identify themselves as males, need to separate themselves from their mothers, or to place her in contrast to themselves. Consequently, male development entails a more emphatic individuation and firmer ego boundaries, unlike female development, where issues of differentiation are linked more closely to sexual issues.

In a later article entitled "Oedipal Asymmetries and Heterosexual Knots" (1981), Chodorow describes how development throughout the Oedipal phase continues to be different for girls than for boys. For a girl, the first love object is her mother, a person of the same sex. As her heterosexual orientation develops, she makes her father her primary sexual object. The father is often either invisible or unavailable emotionally or physically. This implies that the girl emerges from the Oedipal phase oriented toward her father as a primary erotic object, while her mother is the primary emotional object. Being attracted sexually to the absent father

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and identifying with the mother enables the girl to stay close to her mother, to get emotional support from her, and to imitate her womanhood.

Unlike the girl, the boy's primary sexual object, as well as the main source of emotinal and physical support, is the mother. To emerge from his Oedipal phase, the boy has to separate himself from his mother. In doing this, he cuts himself off from her emotional support and has to repress his emotional ties with her. This part, according to Chodorow, is crucial to the boy's development.

Negating Freud's theory, which holds that women have weaker superegos than men and are more prone to psychosis, Chodorow writes that instead "girls emerge from this period with a basis of empathy built into their primary definition of self in a way that boys do not" (Chodorow, 1974, p. 167). Chodorow replaces Freud's negative description of the lacks, deprivations, and envies of the female psyche with the following description:

> Girls emerge with a stronger basis for
> experiencing another's needs or feelings
> as one's own, or of thinking that one is
> so experiencing another's needs and feelings.
> Furthermore, girls do not define themselves
> in terms of the denial of pre-Oedipal
> relationship modes to the same extent as do
> boys. Therefore, regression to these modes

tends not to feel as much of a basic threat
to their ego. From very early, then, because
they are parented by a person of the same
gender . . . girls counterexperience
themselves as less differentiated than boys,
as more continuous with and related to the
external object-world, and as differently
oriented to their inner object-world as well.
(1974, p. 167)

Consequently, relationships, and particularly
issues of dependency, are experienced differently by
women than men. For men, separation and individuation
are critically tied to gender identity, since separation
from the mother is essential for the development of
masculinity. For women, issues of femininity or
feminine identity do not depend on separation from the
mother, or the progress of individuation. Since
masculinity is defined through separation, while
femininity is defined through attachment, male gender
identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender
identity is threatened by separation. Thus, males tend
to have difficulty with relationship, while women tend
to have problems with individuation. The quality of
embeddedness in social interaction and personal
relationship that characterizes women's lives is in
contrast to men's. However, this becomes not only a
descriptive difference but also a developmental
liabilibity when the milestones of childhood and

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adolescent development described in the psychological literature are markers of increasing separation. Women's failure to separate then becomes, by definition, a failure to develop.

The new developmental model of women introduces a new terminology to the field of sex differences. The term _different_ replaces the term _better_ or _worse_. In most sciences, there is an attempt to construct a single scale of measurement. This scale has generally been derived from and standardized on the basis of man's viewpoint, man's understanding, and hence, interpretation. This has led psychologists to regard male behavior as the norm, and to describe female behavior as deviant. The most famous examples are Freud's concept of femininity (Freud, 1931/1961) and Kohlberg's finding of the lack of morality among adult women (Kohlberg, 1973).

In a longitudinal study, Gilligan (1982) attempts to use Chodorow's new model and to reinterpret Kohlberg's findings. Gilligan critiques Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment development as based on a study of 84 boys whom Kohlberg has followed for 20 years. Women, according to Kohlberg, have deficits in moral

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development and have been "stuck" in the third stage of his six-stage sequence. Morality is conceived in interpersonal terms at this stage, "goodness" being equated with helping and pleasing others. Kohlberg believes this to the fact that this is a "functional" type of morality in the life of mature women, insofar as their lives take place in the home. He also implies that only if women enter the traditional arena of male activity will they recognize the inadequacy of this moral perspective and thereby progress, like men, toward higher stages, where relationships are subordinated to rules (stage four) and rules to universal principles of justice (stages five and six).

However, according to Gilligan, here lies the paradox, since the very traits that have traditionally devined the "goodness" of women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that mark them as deficient in moral development. This version of moral development, however, conceives of maturity as being derived from the study of men's lives and reflects the importance of individuation in their development. Piaget (1970), challenging the common impression that a developmental theory is built like a pyramid from its base in infancy, points outthata conception of

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development hangs, instead, from its vertex of maturity, the point toward which progress is traced. Therefore, a change in the definition of maturity does not simply alter the description of the highest stage, but recasts the understanding of development, changing the entire account.

Gilligan (1982) claims that when one studies women's lives and derives conclusions from them a sense of moral conception different from those described by Freud, Piaget, or Kohlberg begins to emerge and leads to a different description of development. In this new conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibility rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract, as will be explained later on. This conception of morality, concerned with the activity of care, centers moral development around the undestanding of responsibility and relationship, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules.

Gilligan sees the different construction of moral problems by women as the critical reason for the failure to develop within the constraints of Kohlberg's system.

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She claims that, regarding old constructions of responsibility as evidence of conventional moral understanding, Kohlberg defines the highest stages of moral devlopment as deriving from a reflective understanding of human rights and that the morality of rights differs from the morality of responsibility in its emphasis on separation rather than connection, in its consideration of the individual rather than the relationship as primary (Gilligan, 1982).

Following are two responses to interview questions about the nature of morality. The first comes from a 25-year-old man, one of the participants in Kohlbrg's study:

> [What does the word morality mean to you?]
> Nobody in the world knows the answer. I
> think it is recogn.zing the right of the
> individual, the rignts of other individuals,
> not interfering with those rights. Act as
> fairly as you would have them treat you. I
> think it is basically to preserve the human
> being's right to existence. I think that is
> the most important. Secondly, the human
> being's right to do as he pleases, again
> without interfering with somebody else's
> rights.
>
> [How have your views on morality changed
> since the last interview?] I think I am
> more aware of an individual's rights now.
> I used to be looking at it strictly from
> my point of view, just for me. Now I think
> I am more awre of what the individual has
> a right to. (Gilligan, 1982, p. 19)
>
> Kohlberg (1973) cites this man's response as an

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illustration of the principled connection of human rights that exemplifies his fifth and sixth stages. Commenting on the response, Kohlberg says: "Moving to a perspective outside of that of his society, he identifies morality with justice (fairness, rights, the Golden Rule), with recognition of the rights of others as these are defined naturally or intrinsically. The human being's right to do as he pleases without interfering with somebody else's rights is a formula defining rights prior to social legislation" (pp. 29-30).

The second response comes from a woman who participated in Gilligan's rights and responsibilities study. She also was 25 and, at the time, a third-year law student:

> [Is there really some correct solution to moral problems, or is everybody's opinion equally right?] No, I don't think everybody's opinion is equally right. I think that in some situations there may be opinions that are equally valid, and one could conscientiously adopt one of several courses of action. But there are other situations in which I think there are right and wrong answers, that sort of inhere in the nature of existence, of all individuals here who need to live with each other to live. We need to depend on each other, and hopefully it is not only a physical need but a need of fulfillment in ourselves, that a person's life is enriched by cooperating with other people and striving to live in harmony with

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everybody else, and to that end, there are
right and wrong, there are things which
promote that end and that move away from it,
and in that way it is possible to choose in
certain cases among different courses of
action that obviously promote or harm that
goal.

[Is there a time in the past when you would
have thought about these things differently?]
Oh, yeah, I think that I went through a time
when I thought that things were pretty relative,
that I can't tell you what to do and you can't
tell me what to do, because you've got your
conscience and I've got mine.

[When was that?] When I was in high school.
I guess that it just sort of dawned on me that
my own ideas changed, and because my own
judgment changed, I felt I couldn't judge
another person's judgment. But now I think
even when it is only the person himself who
is going to be affected, I say it is wrong to
the extent it doesn't cohere with what I know
about human nature and what I know about you,
and just from what I think is true about the
operation of the universe, I could say I
think you are making a mistake.

[What led you to change, do you think?]
Just seeing more of life, just recognizing
that there are an awful lot of things that
are common among people. There are certain
things that you come to learn promote a
better life and better relationships and
more personal fulfillment than other things
that in general tend to do the opposite, and
the things that promote these things, you
would call morally right. (Gilligan, 1982,
pp. 20-21)

This response also represents a personal

reconstruction of morality following a period of doubt

and questioning, but the reconstruction of moral

understanding is based not on the primacy and

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universality of individual rights, but rather on what
the young woman describes as a "very strong sense of
being responsible to the world." The moral dilemma
changes within this construction from how to exercise
one's rights without interfering with the rights of
others to how "to lead a moral life which includes
obligations to myself and my family and people in
general." The problem then becomes one of limiting
responsibilities without abandoning moral concern. When
Gilligan asked this young woman to describe herself, she
says that she values "having other people that I am tied
to, and also having people that I am responsible to. I
have a very strong sense of being responsible to the
world, that I can't just live for my enjoyment, but just
the fact of being in the world givs me an obligation to
do what I can to make the world a better place to live
in, no matter how small a scale that may be on"
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 21). Thus, while Kohlberg's subject
worries about people interfering with each other's
rights, Gilligan's subject worries about "the
possibility of omission, of your not helping others when
you could help them."

Another example of the different morality of boys
and girls is the following example given by Gilligan

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(1982) of two bright and articulate 11-year-old children, Amy and Jake. Resisting any easy categorizing of sex-role stereotyping, Amy's aspiration was to become a scientist, while Jake preferred math. The following analysis both portrays Gilligan's model of gender differences in moral development and critiques Kohlberg's interpretation:

> The dilemma that these eleven-year-olds were asked to resolve was one in the series devised by Kohlberg to measure moral development in adolescence by presenting a conflict between moral norms and exploring the logic of its resolution. In this particular dilemma, a man named Heinz considers whether or not to steal a drug which he cannot afford to buy in order to save the life of his wife. In the standard format of Kohlberg's interviewing procedure, the description of the dilemma itself--Heinz's predicament, the wife's disease, the druggist's refusal to lower his price--is followed by the question, "Should Heinz steal the drug?" The reasons for and against stealing are then explored through a series of questions that vary and extend the parameters of the dilemma in a way designed to reveal the underlying structure of moral thought.

> Jake, at eleven, is clear from the outset that Heinz should steal the drug. Constructing the dilemma, as Kohlberg did, as a conflict between the values of property and life, he discerns the logical priority of life and uses that logic to justify his choice:

>> For one thing, a human life is worth more than money, and if the druggist doesn't make $1,000, he is still going to live, but if Heinz doesn't steal the drug, his wife is going to die. [Why is life worth more than money?] Because the

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> druggist can get a thousand dollars later from
> rich people with cancer, but Heinz can't get
> his wife again. [Why not?] Because people are
> all different and so you couldn't get Heinz's
> wife again. (Gilligan, 1982, pp. 25-26)

When asked whether Heinz should steal the drug if he does not love his wife, Jake replies that he should, saying that not only is there "a difference between hating and killing," but also, if Heinz were caught, "the judge would probably think it was the right thing to do." Jake says, when asked about the fact that Heinz would be breaking the law by stealing, "the laws have mistakes, and you can't go writing up a law for everything that you can imagine."

Thus, while taking the law into account and recognizing its function in maintaining social order (the judge, Jake says, "should give Heinz the lightest possible sentence"), he also sees the law as man-made and therefore subject to error and change. Yet, like his view of the law as having mistakes, his judgment that Heinz should steal the drug rests on the assumption of agreement, a societal consensus about moral values that allows one to know and expect others to recognize what is "the right thing to do."

Gilligan continued her analysis and indicates that, fascinated by the power of logic, this eleven-

year-old boy locates truth in math, which, he says, is "the only thing that is totally logical." Considering the moral dilemma to be "sort of like a math problem about humans," he sets it up as an equation and proceeds to work out the solution. Since his solution is rationally derived, he assumes that anyone following reason would arrive at the same conclusion and thus that a judge would also consider stealing to be the right thing for Heinz to do. However, he is also aware of the limits of logic. Jake replies, when asked whether there is a right answer to moral problems, that "there can only be right and wrong in judgment," since the parameters of action are variable and complex. Illustrating how actions undertaken with the best of intentions can eventuate in the most disastrous of consequences, he says, "like if you give an old lady your seat on the trolley, if you are in a trolley crash and that seatgoes through the window, it might be that reason that the old lady dies."

Theories of developmental psychology illuminate well the position of this child, standing at the juncture of childhood and adolescence, at what Piaget describes as the pinnacle of childhood intelligence, and beginning through thought to discover a wider universe of possibility. The moment of preadolescence is caught by the conjunction of formal operational thought with a description of self still anchored in the factual parameters of his childhood world--his age, his town, his father's occupation, the substance of his likes, dislikes, and beliefs. Yet as his self-description radiates the self-confidence of a child who has arrived, in Erikson's terms, at a favorable balance of industry over inferiority--competent, sure of himself, and knowing well the rules of the game--so his emergent capacity for formal thought, his ability to think about thinking and to reason things out in a logical way, frees him from dependence on authority and allows him to find solutions to problems by himself.

Gilligan claims that this emergent autonomy follows the trajectory that Kohlberg's six stages of moral development trace, a three-level progression from an egocentric understanding of fairness based on individual need (stages one and two), to a conception of fairness

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anchored in the shared conventions of societal agreements (stages three and four), and finally to a principled understanding of fairness that rests on the freestanding logic of equality and reciprocity (stages five and six). While this boy's judgments at eleven are scored as conventional on Kohlberg's scale, a mixture of stages three and four, his ability to bring deductive logic to bear on the solution of moral dilemmas, to differentiate morality from law, and to see how laws can be considered to have mistakes points toward the principled conception of justice that Kohlberg equates with moral maturity.

By contrast, Gilligan's description of Amy's response to the dilemma conveys a very different impression, an image of development stunted by a failure of logic, an inability to think for herself. Asked if Heinz should steal the drug, she replies in a way that seems evasive and unsure:

> Well, I don't think so. I think there might be other ways besides stealing it, like if he could borrow the money or make a loan or something, but he really shouldn't steal the drug—but his wife shouldn't die either. (Gilligan, 1982, p. 28)

Asked why he should not steal the drug, she considers neither property nor law but rather the effect that

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theft could have on the relationship between Heinz and his wife:

> If he stole the drug, he might save his
> wife then, but if he did, he might have
> to go tojail, and then his wife might get
> sicker again, and he couldn't get more of
> the drug, and it might not be good. So,
> they should really just talk it out and
> find some other way to make the money.
> (Gilligan, 1982, p. 28)

Seeing in the dilemma not a math problem with humans but a narrative of relationships that extends over time, Amy envisions the wife's continuing need for her husband and the husband's continuing concern for his wife and seeks to respond to the druggist's need in a way that would sustain rather than sever connection. Just as she ties the wife's survival to the preservation of relationships, so she considers the value of the wife's life in a context of relationships, saying that it would be wrong to let herdie because, "if she died, it hurts a lot of people and it hurts her." Since Amy's moral judgment is grounded in the belief that, "if somebody has something that would keep somebody alive, then it's not right not to give it to them," she considers the dilemma to arise not from the druggist's assertion of rights but from his failure of response.

Amy's answers remain essentially unchanged as the interviewer proceeds with the series of questions that

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follow from Kohlberg's construction of the dilemma, the various probes serving neithr to elucidate nor to modify her initial response. Whether or not Heinz loves his wife, he still shouldn't steal or let her die; if it were a stranger dying instead, Amy says that "if the stranger didn't have anybody near or anyone she kne," then Heinz should try to save her life, but he should not steal the drug. But Amy's confidence begins to diminish as the interviewer conveys through the repetition of questions that the answers she gave were not heard or not right, and her replies become more constrained and unsure. Asked again why Heinz should not steal the drug, she simply repeats, "Because it's not right." Asked again to explain why, she states again that theft would not be a good solution, adding lamely, "if he took it, he might not know how to give it to his wife, and so his wife might still die." Failing to see the dilemma as a self-contained problem in moral logic, she does not discern the internal structure of its resolution; Kohlberg's conception completely evades her as she constructs the problem differently herself.

Instead, seeing a world comprised of relationships rather than of people standing alone, a world that coheres through human connection rather than through

systems of rules, she finds the puzzle in the dilemma to lie in the failure of the druggist to respond to the wife. She assumes that if the druggest were to see the consequences of his refusal to lower his price, he would realize that "he should just give it to the wife and then have the husband pay back the money later," saying, "it is not right for someone to die when their life could be saved." Thus, she considers the solution to the dilemma to lie in making the wife's condition more salient to the druggist, or, that failing, in appealing to others who are in a position to help.

Just as Jake is confident the judge would agree that stealing is the right thing for Heinz to do, so Amy is confident that, "if Heinz and the druggist had talked it out long enough, they could reach something besides stealing." As Jake considers the law to "have mistakes," so Amy seesthis drama as a mistake, believing that "the world should just share things more and then people wouldn't have to steal." Both children thus recognize the need for agreement but see it as mediated in different ways--she personally through communication in relationship, he impersonally through systems of logic and law. Just as he relies on the conventions of logic to deduce the solution to this dilemma, assuming

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these conventions to be shared, so she relies on a process of communication, assuming connection and believing that her voice will be heard. Yet while his assumptions about agreement are confirmed by the convergence in logic between his answers and the questions posed, her assumptions are belief by the failure of communication, the interviewer's inability to understand her response.

Gilligan (1982) continues her analysis and claims that although the frustration of the interview with Amy is apparent in the repetition of questions and its ultimate circularity, the problem of interpretation is focused by the assessment of her response. Her moral judgments appear to be a full stage lower in maturity than those of Jake's, when considered in the light of Kohlberg's definition of the stages and sequence of moral development. Scored as a mixture of stages two and three, her responses seem to reveal a feeling of powerlessness in the world, a reluctance to challenge authority or to examine the logic of received moral truths, an inability to think systematically about the concepts of morality or law, a failure even to conceive of acting directly to save a life or to consider that such action, if taken, could possibly have an effect.

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As her reliance on relationships seems to reveal a continuing dependence and vulnerability, so her belief in communication as the mode through which to resolve moral dilemmas appears naive and cognitively immature.

Yet Amy's description of herself conveys a markedly different impression. Once again, the hallmarks of the preadolescent child depict a child secure in her sense of herself, confident in the substance of her beliefs, and sure of her ability to do something of value in the world. Describing herself at eleven as "growing and changing," she says that she "sees some things differently now, just because I know myself really well now, and I know a lot more about the world." Yet the world she knows is a different world from that refracted by Kohlberg's construction of Heinz's dilemma. Her world is a world of relationships and psychological truths where an awareness of the connection between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another, a perception of the need for response. Her understanding of morality as arising from the recognition of relationship, her belief in communication as the mode of conflict resolution, and her conviction that the solution to the dilemma will follow from its compelling representation, seen in this light, seem far

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from naive or cognitively immature. Instead, Amy's judgments contain the insights central to an ethic of care, just as Jake's judgments reflect the logic of the justice approach. Her incipient awareness of the "method of truth," the cental tenet of nonviolent conflict resolution, and her belief in the restorative activity of care, lead her to see the actors in the dilemma arrayed not as opponents in a contest of rights but as members of a network of relationships on whose continuation they all depend. Consequently her solution to the dilemma lies in activating the network by communication, securing the inclusion of the wife by strengthening rather than severing connections.

But the different logic of Amy's response calls attention to the interpretation of the interview itself. Conceived as an interrogation, it appears instead as a dialogue, which takes on moral dimensions of its own, pertaining to the interviewer's uses of power and to the manifestations of respect. With this shift in the conception of the interview, it immediately becomes clear that the interviewer's problem in understanding Amy's response stems from the fact that Amy is answering a different question from the one the interviewer thought had been posed. Amy is considering not _whether_

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Heinz should act in this situation ("<u>should</u> Heinz steal the drug?") but rather <u>how</u> Heinz should act in response to his awareness of his wife's need ("Should Heinz <u>steal</u> the drug?"). The interviewer takes the mode of action for granted, presuming it to be a matter of fact; Amy assumes the necessity for action and considers what form it should take. In the interviewer's failure to imagine a response not dreamt of in Kohlberg's moral philosophy lies the failure to hear Amy's question and to see the logic in her response, to discern that what appears, from one perspective, to bean evasion of the dilemma signifies in other terms a recognition of the problem and a search for a more adequate solution.

Thus these two children see two very different moral problems in Heinz's dilemma—Jake a conflict between life and property that can be resolved by logical deduction, Amy a fracture of human relationship that must be mended with its own thread. Asking different questions that arise from different conceptions of the moral domain, the children arrive at answers that fundamentally diverge, and the arrangement of these answers as successive stags on a scale of increasing moral maturity calibrated by the logic of the boy's rsponse misses the different truth revealed in the

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judgment of the girl. Kohlberg's theory provides a ready response to the question, "What does he see that she does not?", manifest in the scoring of Jake's judgments a full stage higher than Amy's in moral maturity; Kohlberg's theory has nothing to say to the question, "What does she see that he does not?" Since most of her responses fall through the sieve of Kohlberg's scoring system, her responses appear from his perspective to lie outside the moral domain.

Another example of the shift in the formulation of the moral problem and the concomitant change in the imagery of relationship appeared in the responses of the two eight-year-old children, Jeffrey and Karen, who are asked to describe a situation in which they were not sure what was the right thing to do. Gilligan (1982) reports the following responses: Jeffrey: "When I really want to go to my friend's and my mother is cleaning the cellar, I think about my friends, and then I think about my mother, and then I think about the right thing to do. [But how do you know it's the right thing to do?] Because some things go before other things" (Gilligan, 1982, pp. 32-33). Karen, the same age as Jeffrey, responded differently: "I have a lot of friends, and I cannot always play with all of them, so

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everybody's going to have to take a turn, because they are all my friends. But like, if someone's all alone, I'll play with them. [What kinds of things make the decision?] Um, someone all alone, loneliness." Again, Gilligan demonstrates her point. While Jeffrey sets up a hierarchical ordering to resolve a conflict between desire and duty, Karen describes a network of relationships that includes all of her friends. Both children deal with the issues of exclusion and priority created by choice, but while Jeffrey thinks about what goes first, Karen focuses on who is left out.

The constructing images of hierarchy and network in children's thinking about moral conflict and choice illuminates, according to Gilligan, two views of morality which are complementary rather than sequential or opposed. But this construction of differences goes against the bias of developmental theory towards ordering differences in a hierarchical mode. The correspondence between the order of developmental theory and the structure of boy's thoughts contrasts with the disparity between existing theory and the structure manifested in the thoughts of girls.

In an article entitled "Images of Violence in Thematic Apperception Test Stories," Pollock and

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Gilligan (1982) continued along the same line of thinking described above. They studied sex differences on the perception of the relationship between self and others. They found that there were greater incidences of violent imagery in men's fantasy stories in response to TAT cards that suggested a situation of affiliation. Women's violent fantasies seemed to appear more often in response to situations of achievement. They concluded that men and women perceived danger in different contexts. Following the line of thought in Chodorow and Gilligan's moral development model, they conclude that fear of intimacy for men may be the corollary to the fear of success in women.

Studies preceding Gilligan's final presentation of her book, In A Different Voice, were conducted at Harvard. This series of studies attempted to bring the complexity of sex differences to light. Matina Horner (1968) studied sex differences in achievement motivation and performance in competitive and non-competitive situations. Horner reports that women used bizarre or violent imagery when completing stories beginning, "After the first term final, Ann finds herself at the top of her medical school class . . . " Often, women fabricated bizarre stories detailing how this women is

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physically beaten and maimed for life by jealous classmates. Horner, a student of McClelland, coined a term analogous to men's "fear of failure" (McClelland, 1975)--women's "fear of success." Horner reports that when success is likely or possible, young women, threatened by the negative consequences they expect to follow success, become anxious and their striving for positive achievement is thwarted (Horner, 1968). Success conveys a threat of social rejection, isolation and/or loss of femininity. Isolation, as Chodorow discusses, is alien to the female psychological make-up and is a further cause of anxiety.

This new model of psychological and moral development offers a new understanding of differences in the sexes. Unlike most models, which explain differences by using the "nature" or "nurture" argument, this model views the mother as the basis for psychological differences in the sexes. These differences are ultimately reflected in sex roles in our society. This model offers a rare opportunity to understand the phenomenon of war from a new perspective. As a first step towards this understanding, this model may explain how women and men might experience different aspects of war differently. My goal in this study is to

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extent Chodorow's and Gilligan's model to the context of war.

Gender and War

War is a unique dynamic that separates the population mainly along gender. This split intensifies traditional sex roles as well as general sex differences (Bar-Yosef & Padan-Eisenstark, 1977; Lipman-Blumen, 1973). Man, in this context, is viewed as a warrior, protector, and aggressor while woman is viewed as a protected and passive member, caretaker, and peace-loving being. The common myth that war is a male institution and that females are traditionally against war informs the view many laypeople and scientists take of the issue of war and gender.

The warrior was traditionally represented by the sun, ascending and descending from afar, yet spreading his destructive heat in midsummer. The concept is almost always masculine. In many cultures, the sun was the god of war and the expression of the ideal warrior (Burland, 1974). In Chinese cosmology, yang represents the sky and is firm, bright, exuberant, and masculine; whereas yin represents earth and is yielding, dark, emotional, warm, and feminine. The male, according to this cosmology, is concerned with boundaries outside the

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family and protects the society. The female, according to this mythology, is concerned with boundaries inside the family and nurtures it (Calman & Calman, 1981). A complementary myth concerns the protector and the protected. Men, according to this myth, are strong, unemotional, competent, and capable of protecting the passive, weak, incapable females (Stiehm, 1982). Similarly, one myth couples the Just Warrior and the Beautiful Soul as an archetypal interdependent pair (Elshtain, 1982). The Just Warrior fights the defensive struggle for the Beautiful Soul--a regrettable but necessary act of violence to prevent the Beautiful Soul from experiencing pain. The Just Warrior relies on the Beautiful Soul, who must be isolated from violence so she can maintain her goodness and purity. She is unrealistic, idealistic, pacifistic, and passive. Still, she supports the Just Warrior spiritually and enables him to continue fighting, thus keeping her pure and beautiful.

There are two main approaches to the study of the relation between gender and war. The first, as epitomized by the warrior myth, views war as the sole responsibility of males. The second approach views war as a social phenomenon resulting from an interaction

between the sexes. The latter approach emphasizes the importance of the inteaction between the protector and the protected.

A critical literature review of theories supporting each of these two approaches follows. Another section reviews the of studies by social psychologists of men's and women's attitudes toward war. The chapter ends with an attempt to apply Gilligan's model to the context of war.

War as the Responsibility Solely of Males

The notion that men are solely responsible for war due to their aggressiveness is widely accepted and documented in myth, literature, and science. The myth of the male warrior was described before. Virginia Woolf wrote in Three Guineas, "We can say that for educated men to emphasize their superiority over other people, either in birth or in intellect, by dressing differently, or by adding titles before, or letters after, their names, are acts that arouse competition and jealousy. Emotions, which, as we need scarcely draw upon biography to prove, nor ask psychology to show, have their share in encouraging disposition towards war" (Woolf, 1938, p. 21). Porterfield, a sociologist, observed greater warlikeness in males than in females

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(1931), and the Biblical God in Exodus described as the Lord is a man of war. Females, by contrast, are the traditional peacemakers and the victims of males' wars. She'll fight only for her children. Aristophanes' <u>Lysistrata</u> is an ironic look at how women will stop war (in Eberhart & Rogman, 1945, p. 25). Another example of this traditional view of women is given in the journal <u>Women's</u> <u>Studies</u> <u>International</u> <u>Forum</u>, which devoted an issue to "Women in Men's War" (Vol. V, No. 34, 1982).

Male aggressiveness is often linked to male sexuality. The killer hero in literature, from "saggy breasted" Achilles to sexy James Bond, links sexuality and aggression. The Amazon myth, regardless of its validity, is the exception that proves the rule.

The belief that men are more aggressive and more violent than women, waging war as an outlet for these tendencies, received considerable support from human behavior theorists. Environmentalists and behaviorists, on the one hand, and biologists and physiologists, on the otherhand, all support this notion, though ascribing different causes for it.

The main support for physiologically based aggressivenesws in males comes from the study of laboratory animals. Many researchers point out the

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relationship between male sex hormones and aggressive behavior. These studies emphasize the biological mechanisms controlled by the brain and the central nervous system. Young mice, for example, cannot be made to fight until they are 30 to 40 days old, the age at which they start to produce sex hormones. Pre-pubertal castration of mice or other domestic animals increases their docility (Frank, 1982). Melvin Konner, a Harvard anthropologist, carried the flag of the biologists' and the physiologists' perception of male aggression. He claims that "the question is no longer whether hormones secreted by the testis promote or enable aggressive behavior, but how and also what else goes on in a like manner" (Konner, 1982, p. 58). The testosterone theory of male aggressiveness holds that regardless of social, psychological, and environmental factors, the two sexes have different brain controls over different reproductive systems. This results in the differences in violent behavior.

The link between sexuality and aggression was suggested by Freud (1920/1955). Both sex and aggression are basic motivational sources for human behavior. Freud's assumption was that inhibition of sexual activity results in increased violent behavior. The

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link between war and sexuality lies at the base of psychoanalysts' understanding of the tension between Thanatos and Eros. Glover, a psychoanalyst (1946), suggests along the line of Freud, Jones, and others that war serves as a means to reduce aggression inside the group by directing it outside. His idea is that war is like "collective destructive orgasm," and results primarily from continued sexual frustration. Along this line, he believes that more frequent discharge of the sexual drive diminishes the need for socially approved collective destruction experienced through war.

The hydraulic, or cathartic, psychoanalytic model was discredited by a series of experiments. Barclay and Haber (1965) generated hostile and aggressive feelings in male and female college students and then showed them TAT cards. The results revealed clearly that male students thus manipulated had more aggressive and more sexual imagery than the control group. In laboratory experiments, Feshbach and Jaffee (1970) found that reduction of anger was accompanied by a parallel decline in erotic fantasies. Clark (1952) found that the reverse is true as well--sexual stimulation increased aggressive behavior.

Thus, the psychoanalytic theory of the relation

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between sex and aggression has very little empirical support. This criticism applies to some notions of causes of war as well. For instance, it is commonly believed that the sexually frustrated soldier fights better. Yet killing and other aggressive acts by soldiers do not eliminate rape of enemy women (Gray, 1970). As experiments reveal, actions of violence and sexual aggression seem to stimulate each other.

All this does not suggest a causal relationship between sex and aggression. It does emphasize the relationship between aggressive behavior and male physiology. This link often engenders the notion that men need and create war because of a specific gender need.

Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward War

Studies correlating attitudes toward war and indices such as age and religion were presented in the second section of this review. Those same studies correlate attitudes toward war and gender, the subject of this section. Again, this section deals only with attitudes toward war in general, not gender differences in attitudes toward a specific war.

The notion that men are more militaristic than women is reflected in most of the studies of attitudes

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toward war. Porterfield (1937), using his own scale, observes the "greater warlike behavior, in general, of males than females" (p. 261). Stagner et al. (1942) report less favorable attitudes toward militarism among women than among men in any group they studied. In a later report, Stagner (1942) confirms his former finding, even though he used different techniques to measure attitudes toward war. He reports a tendency for women of all ages to be more anti-war and more pacifistic than men. Putney and Middleton (1962), using their own scale, summarize their findings as follows: " . . . males [are] far more likely to accept war . . . [and] more certain that nuclear weapons should be used" (p. 665). Rosenberg (1965), in his analysis of national and international images, notes that "perhaps the simplest among many findings, as well as one of the most commonly replicated, is that men are less prone to acknowledge apprehension over the riskof war than are women. Similarly, it has been found that they are more prone to accept the strategic use of the threat of war, and are more ready to credit the idea that under extreme circumstances actual recourse to war is acceptable or even desirable" (Rosenberg, 1965, pp. 305-306).

Greenstein's conclusions are consistent with the

above. He concludes: ". . . the most conspicuous point at which men and women have been found to differ in their political involvements are in their issue positions and candidate choice. Women are less willing to support policies they perceive as warlike or aggressive" (Greenstein, 1961, p. 354). Geddie and Hildreth, in their report on children's ideas about war (1944-5), found that most six-year-old boys and none of the girls preferred war pictures by picking them up. Both sexes had meager factual awareness of war at this age, according to the researchers.

Lewis (1971) is more tentative in his conclusions. Using several scales, including Putney and Middleton's scale, he studied socialization patterning during early years and familial correlations of "hawkish" attitudes toward war. He concludes that "these data imply that the acceptance of a warlike option for females was more closely related in their acceptance of familial views than for males." Lewis, unlike most other researchers, attempts to explain his finding. He attributes the differences to the possibility that females internalize familial values to a greater degree than men do. In later work, Lewis, this time studying the impact of religious beliefs on attitudes toward war, achieved

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similar results. He concludes: " . . . the association between religious correlates and war indices were larger for females than for males, suggesting that religious institutions may be more effective socializing agents for females than for males, informing attitudes towards war and peace" (Lewis, 1975, p. 64).

Although most researchers present their findings as if they needed no explanation, some attempt to acccommodate their results to a theoretical context. A common explanation of greater militarism among men and greater pacifism among women is offered separately by Rosenberg (1965), Putney and Middleton (1962), Kriesberg and Klein (1980), and others. They all claim that the source and meaning of the sex differences is a reflection of the traditional sex roles that inhere in our culture. Men, who are socialized to be more self-assertive, more aggresive, and more accepting of physical violence, tend, obviusly, to view war as an acceptable solutioin for conflict. Females, who are socialized to be sympathetic, compassionate, and self-sacrificing, tend to discard war as a solution for conflict. Greenstein (1961) agrees with this explanation and traces these political sex differences to the first years of life (age four). He stresses the

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importance of the "subtle but complex" sex role socialization during the firstyears at home. An identification with the parent of the same sex, as well as different opportunities and different systems of reward and punishment by parents, form at a very early age long-1sting political differences in boys and girls. These political differences are the reflection of the traditional and stereotypical sex roles in Western society.

Other researchers base their hypothesis on authoritarian personality theories, described earlier. According to this theory, attitudes in general as well as attitudes toward war correlate with personality structure and not with gender. Consistent with their theory, Connard and Sanford (1944), Eckhardt (1968), Eckhardt and Alcock (1970), Eckhardt and Newcomb (1969), and Crown (1950) either report no sex differences or do not attempt to analyse the data along gender lines.

Svalastoga (1951), in a random sample in the state of Washington, asked a single question: "Do you think there will always be war?" Analysis through gender did not yield significant results.

The following studies did not report or did not analyze their data along gender lines, and hence do not

mention any sex-related correlations: Barkley (1953) and Caffrey and Campbell (1969), although they used Droba's original scale (1931), which reported sex differences, report no analysis according to gender. Droba and Quackenbush (1942), in their revision of Droba's original scale, mention no sex analysis of their data. Granberg and Fay (1972) and Starr (1975), even though they used Putney and Middleton's scale, relate no sex differences. Farnsworth (1932) studied only males, and hence makes no analysis along gender lines.

The main criticism of these studies made at the end of the second section of this review applies to their treatment of gender as a correlate to attitudes toward war.

The consistent failure to describe the complexity and nuances of the war phenomenon leads either to total neglect of gender differences or, more likely, to the conclusion that men are more warlike than women. None of these studies attempt to study the potential appeals of war for women. The tacit assumption, as was noted earlier, is that war is equated with homicide and violence, and thus holds appeal only for males, who are violent by nature. No aspect of war appeals to women, according to these studies. This study attempts to

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challenge this unspoken assumption and to suggest more complexity in men's and women's attitudes toward war.

Toward a New Understanding of the Relationship between Gender and War

The author of this thesis views as one of the most important processes during war the unique dynamics that separate the population mainly along the lines of gender. The only comparable dynamics is childbirth. In both situations, one sex is traditionally excluded from a certain place, activity, or role. Women were traditionally excluded from the fighting forces and men were similarly kept out of the birth rooms or the birth huts.

The evolution of traditional sex roles has also been explained by the model of Chodorow and Gilligan. The link between psychological development and sex roles has been described before, and has been a major part of this dissertation. In the following, I would like to expand on the importance of the dynamics of sex-role socialization in the making of war, and also to describe other interpersonal aspects of war. In other words, I'll attempt to answer the question, how do men and women give birth to war.

One of the author's more influential experiences

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in the military was the realization that hundreds of combat men were ready to take any risk and to do all that they could in order to influence their superiors to throw them into the battlefield. The overt convern that was expressed among these frustrated warriors was that they were more concerned with coming home _without_ a "war story" than they were afraid of death, injury and hurt in battle. This vivid example brings up the interactional perspective or the systems view of war. According to this view, the outcome of social phenomena such as war is determined by all participants and the analysis should include them all as well.

The Warrior Myth, which was described earlier, is extended in this new analysis. The warrior becomes a half of an interdependent complementary pair, made up of the protector and the protected. The protector is similar to the warrior, but in this context, he is portrayed in an interaction that defines and determines both roles. The boy is what the girl is not, and vice versa. The male protector must defend his dependents, which represent identity, burden and expanded vulnerability. His role and identity are evaluated by his ability to provide physical and economic protection. A successful attack on his dependents is a demonstration

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of his failure. Often the protector controls the life of his dependents, in order to "protect them" (Stiehm, 1982). To demonstrate his capability to defend his protectees, the protected may overcome defeat, or fend off threats to the ones he protects. Such threats are essential for the role definition and identity formation of both the protector and the protected. The threat has projective and real components which are indistinguishable. In the case of nations, the protector is the military, from which women, the protected, are traditionally excluded. The danger of the threat is usually defined by the protector, who may exaggerate the threat in his own interests, and whose exaggeration may increase or provoke additional threats (Edelman, 1971). Often, the protected also needs the threat to test the protector and to enhance a sense of safety. The personal example given before seemed to be an illustration of this dynamic.

Another similar myth couples the just warrior and the beautiful soul as an archetypal interdependent pair (Elshtain, 1982). The just warrior fights the defensive struggle for the beautiful soul--a regrettable but necessary act of violence to prevent the beautiful soul from experiencing pain. The just warrior relies on the

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beautiful soul, who must be isolated from violence so she can maintain her goodness and purity. She is unrealistic, idealistic, pacifistic, and passive. Still, she supports the just warrior spiritually and enables him to continue fighting, thus keeping her pure and beautiful.

The question arises, how do men and women fall into these distinct roles? Unlike the biological approach described earlier, the author agrees with the environmentalists, sex role researchers, and behaviorists, who attribute male aggression to the environment, which consistently rewards boys for aggressive and at times violent behavior, but does not reward overt expression of aggressiveness in girls. Researchers in sex-role socialization patterns challenge the notion of "anatomy is destiny" and study sex-role socialization carefully. Taking into accountt sex differences in early life, these researchers trace the socialization process to the first "happy realization" of the new parents who cry, "It's a boy!" Beginning with the first second of life, boys and girls are socialized differently, regardless of their innate potentialities. Very early, the child develops gender identity. He or she learns fast what behavior is

appropriate for each sex, what is praised and what isn't. Later, imitation of the same-sex parent is an imiportant factor shaping gender differences. Regardless of gender-innate differences, this approach emphasizes that aggression in boys, unlike in girls, is learned and consistently encouraged (Mead, 1935). Aggression in boys is basically permitted. The form that aggression takes is socialized according to age, class, etc. Girls, howevr, receive no reward for any form of aggression. The opposite, dependency and passivity, is consistently encouraged and appropriately socialized (Bardwitch & Douvan, 1971).

Men, according to this theory, are socialized to become warriors. Military activity is seen in this context as a rite of passage from boyhood to manhood. Assertiveness, aggressiveness, courage to take new risks, lack of demonstrated emotions, and other behaviors encouraged in males all help the boy to become a good soldier.

The army and war fit into the socialization sequence. Eighteen-year-old boys are attracted to the military as a place where they will become a man. At 18 or 20, the potential draftees are still forming their masculine identities and are vulnerable to assault on

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their gender identity. Joining the army, where they are surrounded by men, reinforces their masculinity. Homosexuals, girls, and women are traditionally excluded. Often, not knowing what a man should do or be like, they are told its meaning by their officer--other men. Fighting, like a primitive rite of passage, often becomes the test of manhood.

The army also provides the young adult male with a new sense of family and security. It provides food, shelder, and above all, clear structure. Activities, time and space are all predetermined, mainly by tradition, routine, or specific orders. The young adult who is no longer part of his parent's home is now part of a surrogate family which supplies him with almost all his needs, including room, board, parental figures, economic securities, and above all, identity.

Viewing the army and the military as a unique context for male bonding brings Carol Gilligan's theory, sex-role theorists and Freud to a meeting point. Freud sees the function of war and armies as a structure in which group cohesion evolves through an identification with the leader and the incorporation of the leader as one's own ego-ideal. Another function of armies, according to Freud, is to provide a social context in

which desexualized (aim-inhibited) ties between members can evolve in a socially approved context. In Freud's words, the army and the church are structures in which the individual is "bound by libidinal ties on the one hand to the leader and on the other hand to the other members of the group" (1961/1920, p. 95). Freud used the army, and in other places the church, only as examples to illustrate his theory about group dynamics and group cohesion.

In Gilligan's terms, the army and war provide a unique context for men to loosen up their fear of ego boundaries among each other while simultaneously maintaining other boundaries, such as us-enemy, male-female, firm.

Both approaches agree that the army and war are contexts where male bonding is socially approved, a place wheremen can displace emotions and care with othermen without the fear of being labeled or identified as homosexual, women, or children. Men are drawn to war, not in order to ventilate aggression, as was suggested by Lorenz and other physiologists or psychoanalysts, but also in order to find friendships and camaraderie. In the presence of danger and minimal physical conditions, when men cooperate and have a

shared goal, then a camaraderie is experienced. There
is almost no equivalent to these experiences for men in
normal civilized life. Men are deprived of the intimate
feelings of loving and caring in their normal everyday
life, but experience these feelings as William James
(1910) put it in extremis in war.

The symbolic language used in war is another
indication of how, for men, war serves as a comparable
function for intimacy or relationship. In Hebrew, the
word, "lehizdaien," means to reach for arms and also to
make love.

In the U.S., there are millions of men still
recalling vividly their most exciting and meaningful
years in Europe during World War II. These were the
years when they felt connected to their buddies and
belonged to a group. Many are still trying to recapture
these feelings in their activities in veterans'
organizations.

G. Gray describes these feelings of connection
which emerge in battle in the following words:

> We feel earnest and gay at such moments because
> we are drunk with the power that union with our
> fellows brings. In moments like this, lives have
> been enlarged, and men feel how much they have
> missed by living in the narrow circle of family or
> a few friends. With the boundariesof the self
> expanded, they sense a kinship never known before.
> Their "I" passes insensibly into "we," "my"

becomes "our," and individual fate loses its
central importance. (Gray, 1970, p. 45)

It is a fascinating paradoxical dynamic that, on
the one hand, war splits the community, but on the other
hand it creates a unique context for men to experience
closeness and emotional ties with their fellow men.

J. Dubbert, in his book, _A Man's Place:
Masculinity in Transition_ (1979), stresses in his own
words the importance of the military in male gender
identity formation:

Nothing could be more manly, than actually
going into combat to fight for high principles.
The Civil War gave thousands of boys the right
to claim their true manhood because war always
tests the true strength of the nation's young
men. (Dubbert, 1979, p. 57)

Later on, Dubbert talks about how the post-war
societies and males deal with the absence of war.

In the South, the legacy of th war was unique,
if only because the South had lost. During
the war many Southern women were found capable
of doing jobs men had always done, proving that
women were not as dependent as men had always
thought. . . . Many Southern men sought
affiliation with organizations that restored
a sense of purpose and commitment to the South
and to their own lives. At the heart of those
organizations was the promise of the restoration
of masculine power and control. The Ku Klux
Klan became one of the most famous examples of
the type of organization that appealed to
defeated Southern males. Klan members were
required to demonstrate manly character and
courage. . . . The purpose of the KKK, which
surged to prominence after 1865, was ostensibly
to intimidate Negroes, but its more subtle

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> mission was to reclaim the South for Southern
> gentlemen. . . . In large measure, the same
> psychological attraction existed after 1920,
> when the Klan was revived. Men who had been
> in a war, the outcome of which was a shock,
> found their sense of manhood rehabilitated
> when given the opportunity to extend the noble
> fight for the Christian ideals professed by
> the Klan. . . . Viewed in this context, the
> Klan was the ultimate legacy of an idealism
> about manhood and war. (Dubbert, 1979, p. 88)

While manhood is partially related to the warrior role, womanhood is associated with opposition to and repulsion toward acts of aggression and violence. The complement of gender identification seen in boys going to the military will b the exclusion of women from the military.

War was described as providing males with a context to form their identity. Similarly for women, being excluded provides them with their own identity. Not being included in the armed forces places women clearly in the passive, defenseless, vulnerable position. It puts womeon at home with the elderly, disabled and children, for whom they are responsible solely in the absence of men. As boys' gender identity was defined by not being what their mothes are, similarly, later on, women and daughters' gender identity is partially formed by not being included as warriors. Women have a complementary role for men in

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relation to war. Being socialized to care, nurture and to carry the feelings of the family, females do so also in war. Houston (1982) gave a brilliant analysis of the role of women in war. She titled her article, "Tales of War and Tears of Women." Analyzing war narrative, she takes off from the Iliad, where Hector tells Andromache, "the men must see to the fighting." She continues her analysis by concentrating on women's role in war. She sees it as reactive and passive and not active. Women, according to her analysis of war narrative, fall into the following categories. They are either mothers, sweethearts, wives, sisters, or daughters. To add to their reactive role, she sees women in the literature as having two options for their tears. They are either in physical threat by the enemy or they are bereaving their dead beloved. In any case, women and tears are often linked together in the war narrative. In modern life, wars bring up or facilitate the reemergence of these tears as one expression of the traditional stereotypical sex role. An Israeli journalist wrote, right after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War:

> The war began and with one stroke all our
> consciousness of women's liberation and
> equality vanished. . . . The process was
> quick, we return to the time when the man
> went out to war to defend his tribe, while
> the woman stayed home, and when he came

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home she had nothing left but to give love,
care to his needs, and rely on his power to
defend her from all evil. . . . (Avidar,
"Maariv," October 16, 1973)

Most literature about war sees women as the
traditional peacefighters, as pacifists, and as the true
victims of war. As agrees with most social scientists
described earlier and opens her analysis of men's and
women's attitudes toward war with, "Women are victims in
all wars. . . . Men plan them, they train for them, and
they conduct them . . . as cannon fodder, women, work
and life intentions are disrespected and destroyed" (As,
1982, p. 355). As was described earlier, most social
scientists see women as opposed to war, unlike men, who
are for war. They vary in their reasons as to why it
splits along these lines. Unlike this belief, this
thesis insists on exploring the protector-protected
myth, and to bring out the question of the nature of the
interaction between them. A related way to probe into
this inteaction is to analyze the role of the passive
bystander. This interactive approach was recently used
to study the role of the wife-mother in households where
the father sexually abuses the daughter (Charney, 1972;
Shoham, 1977; Sheleff, 1970). Without assigning the
responsibility in these households to the fathe. or the

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mother, the systematic approach studies the interaction between all parties concerned. The tacit complicity inherent in such relationships figures in the myths of Abraham and Isaac. Sarah's role in the threatened sacrifice of her long-wanted son, though passive, is significant.

This study attempts to initiate a search for understanding the role of womeon in the making of war. Unlike the common belief that men are for and women are against war, the author attempts to explore more complexity in the way the genders differ in their attitudes toward war and complementarily contribute to it.

Gilligan's Model Applied to War

Gilligan's model supports sex-role socialization theories. In addition, the model promises the possibility of a new perspective of the relation between gender and war. According to Gilligan's model, men and women might perceive different aspects of war differently because of differences in their psychological makeup. Not the least of these is men's greater tolerance for separation, a result of their Oedipal development.

Implicit in war is the dynamic of separation. The

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declaration of war is always accompanied by
justifications. All nations believe they fight just,
usually defensive wars. This argument requires a clear
split between the aggressor and the defender, between
us--good and they--evil; us--trustworthy and they--
untrustworthy. The army, too, plays a role in the
separation dynamic, clearing the population by gender.
Similar separation takes place between those at the
front and those left behind, between the wounded and
able, and between the newly dead and the still fighting.
All these separation dynamics, according to Gilligan's
model, appeal less to women than to men, who experience
less anxiety with separation. The feminine personality
defines itself in relation and connection to other
people more than the masculine personality. Men, by
contrast, have firmer and less permeable ego boundaries
than women and are more tolerant of the split between
us-them, right-wrong, and good-evil. This implies that
males are more prone to justify war with rational and
legal formulations: "This is the war to end all wars"
or "All defensive wars are justified."

The separation dynamic comes into play in the
mechanics of war--killing, or violating the enemy.
These actions require the ability to dehumanize the

enemy (Gault, 1971). For instance, Orientals, during the Vietnam war, were regularly referred to as "gooks" and "dinks." They were perceived as strange and different. Dehumanizing and caricaturing the enemy are part of separation dynamics, easier for men than women. Women, for whom relatedness and interconnectedness is an important dynamic, might view the enemy as victim and therefore connected to them in some ways. Thus women are less able to tolerate the violation of the enemy than men, according to Gilligan's theory.

Another aspect of war is the tremendous sense of cohesion experienced after or before the outbreak of war (Bar-Yosef & Padan-Eisenstark, 1977; Frank, 1982). When war breaks out, all war tasks are given priority. A unified community, working together toward a clear and single goal, is formed instantaneously. Group psychologists see the main impact of war as an increase in group cohesion due to the diversion of aggression to the outside target. Social psychologists agree that an increase of group cohesion is experienced by the members when they are united in a common goal of aggression against members of an outside group (Sherif, 1956). War reinforces the self-image of the society, its courage, and its sense of honor (Frank, 1982). Both the men in

the front lines and noncombatants experience this cohesion. War also intensifies the relationship among the group members. It emphasizes their relatedness and their connectedness. All these qualities are extremely appealing to women's psyche, according to Gilligan.

Applying Gilligan's model to war further, I conclude that women support war by attempting to reduce anxiety caused by separateness. Women's support of war can be initially motivated by their attempts to maintain relationships and connectedness. This might take the form of renewed or intensified ties with children and elderly people or volunteer activities in support of husbands and lovers at the front. When women send flowers, letters, warm clothes, and cakes to care for their loved ones who are fighting, they also clearly support the war. Thus, the role of women during war is consistent with their stereotypical role during peace. They are concerned with personal and affective ties, and thus extend the role of mother and wife during war. At times they might support a military action which might bring their beloved men back home sooner.

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<div align="center">The Method</div>

Hypothesis

  The hypothesis of this thesis is based on the definition of war given in the introduction and on Gilligan's model for gender differences in moral and psychological development. Discarding the common conception that men are warlike and women peace-loving, I seek to discover complexities in the attitudes of the sexes toward war.

  Men view morality differently than women. While men formulate and perceive morality in abstract terms of right and wrong, legal or illegal, women see moral dilemmas in tems of conflicting responsibility. While men's dynamic is separative, women's dnyamic is affiliative.

  The three original hypotheses are:*

  A. Men are more prone than women to justify war according to legal and rational criteria.

  B. Women find it more difficult than men to accept, condone, or justify any acts of violence, killing and destruction.

*A fourth hypothesis was added later on. See Results Chapter.

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C.   Both men and women identify with stereotypical sex roles during wartime; e.g., men as warriors and protectors; and women as caretakers.

Because of differences in the morality, personality and psychological makeup of men and women, I expected to find differences between men and women on the items that reflect the first two hypotheses (A and B). I expected to find agreement on items that reflect the continuation during war of stereotypical sex roles (C).

I assume that men, using rational and abstract formulations, will be more prone than women to justify war according to rational and legal criteria. Using the same formulation, men will accept and justify killing more easily than women. In both situations, men will most probably be concerned with the legality and the rationality of war, and women with its interpersonal impact. Women will perceive the hurt inflicted on the enemy as partly inflicted on themselves and thus will be more prone than men to object to it. Men, concerned with war's legality, will accept socially approved violence, aggression and homicide more easily than women.

Males, according to Gilligan's model, have firmer

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and less permeable ego boundaries. They define themselves as males by separating themselves from their mothers. Thus separation elicits much less anxiety in men than in women. The first two hypotheses reflect separation dynamics. The first is separation of us-them, good-evil, innocent-untrustworthy; the second reflects a split between humans and a dehumanized enemy. The third hypothesis taps sex roles in our culture. The traditional sex roles fit Gilligan's description of the psychological makeup of men and women, e.g., men are individualistic, aggressive, and unemotional; and women are caring, nurturing, and emotional. War, because it splits the population by gender, intensifies these sex roles. I expect both men and women to identify with their traditional sex roles and to accept the stereotypical sex roles, which are intensified during war.

The Measurement and Data Analysis

The obvious procedure, if one wishes to know the attitudes of men and women toward certain aspects of war, is to ask them directly. However, this study attempts to tap into a more unconscious level than can be revealed through a single interview or a direct question. An even more important reason for not using

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direct or open-ended questions on the subject of war is
that this study attempts to discover some unpopular
attitudes toward war. As the authors of The
Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950)
carefully approached their subjects around the "touchy"
subjects of anti-democratic and anti-semitic trends, I
attempt to do the same around war. What the individual
consistently says in public is often consistent with
socially approved ideology. What he might express in a
context safe from criticism might be different.
Furthermore, an individual may not admit to himself,
much less to somebody else, what he feels and thinks
about certain emotionally charged subjects. A more
sophisticated device than a simple questionnaire is
needed to elicit both an individual's positive and
negative opinions, attitudes, and thoughts about war.
As Adorno et al. (1950), Sellitz et al. (1981) and other
researchers suggest, this study uses a Likert-type scale
in order to elicit and study these sensitive attitudes.

A new scale has been constructed in this research
because none of the existing scales of attitudes toward
war are suitable to test the hypotheses of this study.
The critique of the existing scales has been described
earlier. Furthermore, none of the existing scales

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reflects on the validity of the new scale. This is for the same reasons described in the critique of the existing measurements.

The Likert method of scaling is used to measure the intensity of opinions and attitudes by the subject, indicating the subject's degree of agreement or disagreement with each item (Likert, 1932). This type of scale makes it possible to adequately determine subtle group differences, as well as facilitating qualitative analysis of group trends. This method also makes it possible to cover wider aspects of the concepts being measured within each category (Sellitz et al., 1981). These characteristics of Likert scales make them particularly suited to the general theoretical approach of this research.

The procedures for scale construction and data analysis in this study are a combination of the procedures described in the original work of Likert (1932) and the more current work of Sellitz et al. (1981), Siegal and Kaemmerer (1978) and Adorno et al. (1950). The scale construction consisted of three steps:

In the first step the first questionnaire (Form I) of 95 items (34, 27 and 34 items for the three scales

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respectively) was administered to 71 subjects (Appendix B). The items from the three scales were randomly mixed. The complete form is attached in Appendix C. Statistical analysis of individual items determined which items discriminate between men and women on scales A and B, and which items on scale C indicate agreement between men and women.* Items were eliminated according to their ability to elicit different or similar response from men and women. Items also were judged according to their content, clarity and consistency of responses among the different groups. The exact procedure for elimination of items will be described later on.

The reliability of the scales will be calculated on the final form after the elimination of items which do not meet the criteria for inclusion in the scales.

The second step consisted of administering the second form (Form II) to a total of 71 more subjects. The third step consisted of administering the final form (Form III) to 37 more subjects. The construction of Forms II and III are described in the Results Chapter.

The Opinion-Attitude questionnaire used in this study was constructed in order to obtain quantitative

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*The criteria for Category C has been changed later on.

See Results and Discussion Chapters.

estimates of men's and women's attitudes toward the aspects or dimensions of war described earlier. This study operationalizes the three dimensions with three corresponding scales. Later on a fourth dimension and a corresponding scale was added. Each scale was designed as completely as possible to cover a certain area or aspect of war without too much redundancy, in order not to try the patience of the subjects. Thus duplication was minimized and each item was designed to express a different feature or nuance within one category only. The degree to which items within the scale inter- correlate gives evidence that a single, unified category or aspect of war is measured. There was no attempt to generate highly specific, statistically "pure" items. The item correlation with each other is expected to be high, but still lower than the correlation of each item with the total scale.

The albegraic summation of the individual responses to all items yields a score which represents his or her position on a scale measuring agreement or disagreement towards the dimension studied. The mean score of individuals within a group similarly represent the group position on a scale measuring agreement or disagreement.

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The rationale for using such a total score as a basis for placing individuals or groups on a scale seems to be along the following line of thought: The probability of agreeing with any one of a series of favorable items about an object or disagreeing with any unfavorable item varies directly with the degree of agreement, or favorableness, of an individual's attitude. Thus a subject with a favorable attitude will respond favorably to many items, which are phrased positively about the dimension studied, or to disagree with many items phrased negatively.

Triandis (1971) and Selltiz et al. (1981) indicate that many scales call themselves Likert-type only because they attempt to elicit responses on an agree-disagree continuum. Properly constructed Likert-type sacles have to be accompanied with the proper item analysis as is attempted by this study.

Several main advantages of the Likert-type scale were mentioned earlier. Other advantages of the scale over the "pseudo-similar" Thurstone scale (Thurstone & Chave, 1931) are its higher reliability for the same number of items (Tittle & Hill, 1967). It also permits a wide range of items within each dimension or category studied, which allows the researcher to explore more

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complex aspets of the dimension studied, and to tap into more subtle nuances of the phenomenon (Selltiz et al., 1981; Adorno et al., 1950).

The main disadvantage of the Likert-type scale is that while it makes possible the ranking of individuals in tems of the favorableness of their attitudes toward a certain subject, it does not provide a basis for saying how much more favorable one is than others. Along the same line the scale is not a good tool to measure the amount of change in attitude after some experience or experimental intervention. Another disadvantage is that the total score of an individual or a group has little meaning because the same score may be produced by many different patterns of responses.

The first disadvantage mentioned above is irrelevant for this study, because this study attempts only to compare two groups and to test a certain theory about these two groups. The absolute score of each group has no importance for this study; only their relative scores are of interest. The second disadvantage mentioned above will be overcome and eliminated by carrying out a careful data analysis which will be described later on.

The subject responses were converted into scores in

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such a way that high scores indicate high positive levels of the attitudes being measured. For the first category or on the first scale, high scores mean high approval of the justification of war according to rational and legal criteria. For the second category high scores mean a high level of approval of justification of violence and action in the context of war and battle. For the third category, high scores mean high approval and appeal to traditional sex roles during war.

The procedure used in this measurement is to allow six choices of responses for each item: slightly, moderate or strong agreement, and the same degrees of disagreement, with no middle or neutral category. The "don't know" category has been a source of difficulty and controversy in many fields of psychological research (Woodworth, 1938). In techniques which permit its use, it tends to be the most frequent choice (Adorno et al., 1950). Without it, the subject must take a stand, one way or the other, although the categories of slight agreement and slight disagreement permit him or her to be nearly neutral. It seems to me that in a questionnaire which attempts to discover unpopular or unconscious attitudes, it is more important to omit the

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neutral category so that the use of denial or avoidance can be minimized.

Generation of Items. Likert-type items were constructed to relate to each of the dimensions of war described above. The statements were collected from different sources: the literature about peace and war and statements generated by seven graduate students who were familiarized with the three categories. About 50 items were generated for each category. The items were rated in such a way as to permit a "judgment of value" rather than a judgment of fact on the part of the subjects. As expected from a Likert-type item, all items are presented in such a way as to allow the subject to take a position between two clearly opposed alternatives. After initial dropping of the redundant, awkward items, there were a total of 39, 38, and 38 items for the first three categories respectively.

Preliminary Testing of the Items and the Construction of Form I. A total of five graduate students and professors in psychology were selected to be judges. The judges were familiarized with the categories and none of them had seen the items before. The five judges were presented with the 115 items randomly arranged. They were asked to assign each item

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to one of the three original categories representing the dimensions of war, or to none, if not applicable. The complete instructions to the judges are presented in Appendix A. Only the items which had at least 80% judges' agreement as reflecting a certain category were selected.

After this elimination process the first three scales consisted of a total of 95 items, 34 items in scale 1, 27 items in scale 2, and 34 items in scale 3. The items, according to each scale or category, are presented in Appendix B.

The Questionnaire. The 95 items from the three scales were randomly arranged to form the first questionnaire (Form I) to be presented to the first group of subjects. The complete form, including the instructions and the items, is presented in Appendix C. Appendix B lists 95 items with an indication to which scale each item belongs.

Scoring. The responses were converted into scores by means of an a priori scoring schema. Higher scoring in the first two scales is interpreted as meaning agreement with the justification of war according to rational and legal criteria, and justification of violence and destructive acts during battle and war

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accordingly. High scores on the third scale expresses
approval of the traditional sex roles during war. All
responses were scored as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 points
accordingly. If items were phrased positively, like,
"defensive wars are justified" on scale 1, the responses
are scored as follows:

-3 = 1 point	+1 = 4 points
-2 = 2 points	+2 = 5 points
-1 = 3 points	+3 = 6 points

When items are phrased negatively, like:
"defensive wars are never justified," the responses are
scored as follows:

-3 = 6 points	+1 = 3 points
-2 = 5 points	+2 = 2 points
-1 = 4 points	+3 = 1 point

Data Analysis. Each individual's total score on
each scale was computed. Mean scores on each of the
scales were computed separately for males and females.
T-tests were performed on each of the items
administered to each group to determine which items
successfully discriminate between males and females.
Items which did not discriminate significantly between
men and women were eliminated from the first three
scales. Construction of the fourth category will be

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described later in the Results Chapter.

Reliability The internal consistency of the scales were determined by calclulating part-whole correlations, i.e. correlation of each item with the entire scale. This analysis was carried out only for items on the final form (Form III). Higher part-whole correlations indicate higher internal consistency. This analysis also allows for the ranking of items on the basis of the size of their correlation with the entire scale.

The reliability of the scale will further be evaluated using the Spearman-Brown formula.

The Subjects

The subjects of this study were students from six community colleges in and around the Bay Area. These subjects are describd in Table 1 (e.g., number of subjects, percentage of females, average age, date of administering the questionnaires and class title).

Community college students were chosen for this study because the represent a wider range of socio-economic status than do students attending costly private institutions or the highly selectiv Berkeley or San Francisco campuses of the University of California. This population is, presumably, more representative of the American population and is also available for being

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recruited for this study.

Groups 1 and 2 were administered Form I of the questionnaire, groups 3, 4 and 5 were administered Form II and groups 6 and 7 were administered Form III. All subjects were asked to volunteer for this study and only one student out of all seven groups chose not to participate.

A total of 179 subjects responded to the three questionnaires. There were 71 subjects (50% females) which responded to form I, 71 (55% females) to Form II and 37 (51% females) to Form III. (See next page.)

Procedure

The instructor of each class started the class by saying the following:

Today we have a guest who asked us to participate in a study about attitudes toward war. He is going to pass out a questionnaire. Please indicate your age and sex on the form. No names are needed. This questionnaire is anonymous. Start as soon as you get the forms. When you finish, please hand it to Mr. Zur. We will reconvene after we are finished for a brief presentation on the subject of war by Mr. Zur. Any further contact with Mr. Zur can be made through me.

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Table 1. The Subjects in the Different Groups

Group	No. of Subjects	% of Females	Average Age	Date of Admin.	Class Title	Form Admin.
1	31	45	20	1/16/84	Amer. Hist.	I
2	40	55	21	1/30/84	Amer. Hist.	I
3	16	64	26	2/14/84	Cross-Cult. Psych.	II
4	36	52	23	2/21/84	Econ.	II
5	19	53	23	2/28/84	Crea-tivity	II
6	22	45	23	4/3/84	Human-ities	III
7	15	60	22	4/3/84	Psych I	III

After the introduction, the questionnaires were given to each subject.

The first two questionnaires took 20-25 minutes to complete and the third questionnaire took around 15 minutes to complete.

RESULTS

Results – Form I

Statistical analysis of the items was performed within each category separately. The combined results for groups 1 and 2 are reported in Table 2 (see next page). These groups have been described earlier in the "Subjects" chapter. There were a total of 71 subjects (35 men and 36 women) who took Form I of the questionnaire.

The statistical significance level in the following chapters are given as one tail probability. In Tables 2, 3 and 4 they are given as were originally computed, as two-tail probability.

Within Category A men scored higher than women on seven items at the .05 level of statistical significance. Twelve items discriminated between men and women at a 0.10 level of significance and a total of 19 items at 0.25. These 19 items were chosen as best representative of Category A and were included in Form II of the questionnaire (Appendix D).

Examination of the items in Category A on which women scored higher than men reveals a clear theme: women scored higher on the four items in Category A which deal with issues of relationship or issues of

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Table 2. Analysis of Form I Items

Item No.	No. of Subjects*	Mean*	Standard Deviation	T Value	Degrees of Freedom	2-Tail Probability
1	35	4.2857	1.447	-2.21	68	0.030
	35	4.9714	1.124			
2	35	3.8571	1.556	-2.96	68	0.004
	35	4.8857	1.345			
3	34	4.2941	1.605	-0.19	68	0.851
	35	4.3714	1.800			
4	35	4.2000	1.641	-0.15	68	0.880
	35	4.2571	1.502			
5	35	3.6000	1.418	-0.66	68	0.512
	35	3.8286	1.485			
6	35	4.6571	1.056	-0.30	68	0.767
	35	4.7429	1.336			
7	34	4.0000	1.435	-0.85	67	0.399
	35	4.2857	1.363			
8	35	3.5714	1.685	-2.55	68	0.013
	35	4.4857	1.292			
9	34	4.3824	1.706	-1.66	67	0.102
	35	5.0000	1.372			
10	35	4.2000	1.623	-1.08	68	0.282
	35	4.6286	1.682			
11	35	4.0286	1.424	0.53	68	0.599
	35	3.8571	1.287			
12	34	3.9118	1.401	-0.74	66	0.462
	34	4.1765	1.547			

*The first number indicates the results for women and the second for men.

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Table 2. Analysis of Form I Items, cont.

Item No.	No. of Subjects*	Mean*	Standard Deviation	T Value	Degrees of Freedom	2-Tail Probability
13	35	2.6286	1.699	-1.01	68	0.318
	35	3.0571	1.862			
14**	36	4.1667	1.715	-0.72	69	0.476
	35	4.4286	1.335			
15	35	3.0286	1.445	0.17	68	0.864
	35	2.9714	1.339			
16	36	1.4167	1.079	0.63	68	0.532
	35	1.2857	0.622			
17	36	3.5556	1.539	-1.17	68	0.245
	34	4.0000	1.633			
18	35	3.0286	1.599	-0.69	68	0.491
	35	3.2857	1.506			
19	36	4.7500	1.296	-1.20	69	0.233
	35	5.0857	1.040			
20	36	3.7222	1.542	-0.05	69	0.959
	35	3.7429	1.788			
21	36	2.6667	1.586	2.57	69	0.012
	35	1.7714	1.330			
22**	36	4.2222	1.533	3.12	69	0.003
	35	2.9714	1.839			
23	36	2.6667	1.352	-1.76	68	0.083
	34	3.2941	1.624			
24	33	1.9697	1.185	-1.76	64	0.083
	33	2.5455	1.460			
25	35	3.2571	1.336	0.81	68	0.422
	35	3.0000	1.328			

**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest of the items in the scale. See Methods Section for examples and explanation.

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          Table 2.   Analysis of Form I Items, cont.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Item   No. of   Mean*   Standard    T     Degrees    2-Tail
 No.  Subjects*         Deviation  Value    of      Probability
                                          Freedom
--------------------------------------------------------------

26       35     2.9429   1.514    -1.30     68        0.197
         35     3.4000   1.418

27**     36     3.6389   1.743     2.59     69        0.012
         35     2.6000   1.631

28       36     4.0556   1.351    -1.66     69        0.102
         35     4.6000   1.418

29       36     2.3056   1.348    -1.46     69        0.150
         35     2.8000   1.511

30       35     4.3429   1.765    -0.73     68        0.470
         35     4.6286   1.516

31       36     3.9444   1.330    -2.23     68        0.029
         34     4.6471   1.300

32       36     3.1111   1.545     2.63     69        0.010
         35     2.1429   1.556

33       35     3.2847   1.506    -3.03     68        0.003
         35     4.3429   1.413

34       36     2.3056   1.261    -3.95     69        0.000
         35     3.6857   1.659

35       36     2.0833   1.273    -1.74     69        0.086
         35     2.6571   1.494

36       36     3.1944   1.261    -1.47     68        0.147
         34     3.7059   1.643

37       36     3.0556   1.453    -0.25     68        0.804
         34     3.1471   1.617
------------
**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest
of the items in the scale.  See Methods Section for
examples and explanation.
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Table 2. Analysis of Form I Items, cont.

Item No.	No. of Subjects*	Mean*	Standard Deviation	T Value	Degrees of Freedom	2-Tail Probability
38	35	3.9714	1.618	-1.77	68	0.080
	35	4.6286	1.477			
39	36	3.0000	1.474	2.95	68	0.004
	34	2.0294	1.267			
40	35	3.1143	1.231	-0.27	68	0.789
	35	3.2000	1.431			
41	36	4.0833	1.251	-1.48	69	0.142
	35	4.5429	1.358			
42	36	2.7222	1.523	-0.36	69	0.720
	35	2.8571	1.630			
43	36	2.8333	1.464	0.25	69	0.802
	35	2.7429	1.559			
44**	36	4.5278	1.748	0.40	69	0.802
	35	4.3714	1.573			
45	36	2.9722	1.444	-0.84	69	0.694
	35	3.2571	1.400			
46	36	3.1389	1.570	-1.18	69	0.243
	35	3.5714	1.520			
47	35	2.8286	1.485	-1.78	68	0.079
	35	3.4857	1.597			
48	36	3.3889	1.809	1.37	69	0.176
	35	2.8286	1.636			
49	36	1.9167	0.874	-3.96	69	0.000
	35	3.2000	1.729			

**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest
of the items in the scale. See Methods Section for
examples and explanation.

Table 2. Analysis of Form I Items, cont.

Item No. of   Mean*   Standard   T   Degrees 2-Tail
No. Subjects*   Deviation Value of   Probability
                                       Freedom
----

50   36   1.6111   0.871   -1.67   69   0.104
        35   2.0857   1.463

51   36   2.8611   1.743   -1.46   69   0.150
        35   3.4571   1.704

52**   36   3.5278   1.665   1.28   69   0.204
        35   3.0000   1.799

53   36   2.2222   1.333   -1.88   69   0.064
        35   2.8857   1.623

54   35   3.7717   1.536   -1.51   68   0.136
        35   4.3143   1.471

55   36   2.9444   1.286   -0.92   69   0.359
        35   3.2286   1.308

56   36   3.6111   1.644   -0.57   69   0.570
        35   3.8286   1.562

57   36   1.8889   1.260   -2.68   69   0.009
        35   2.8000   1.587

58   36   3.8889   1.508   -1.37   69   0.175
        35   4.3714   1.457

59   34   2.6765   1.273   -1.14   66   0.260
        34   3.0588   1.496

60   36   3.8611   1.515   1.17   69   0.248
        35   3.4571   1.400

61   36   4.8611   0.833   -1.04   69   0.302
        35   5.0857   0.981

**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest
of the items in the scale. See Methods Section for
examples and explanation.

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Table 2. Analysis of Form I Items, cont.

Item No.	No. of Subjects*	Mean*	Standard Deviation	T Value	Degrees of Freedom	2-Tail Probability
62	36	3.5556	1.157	-1.20	69	0.235
	35	3.9143	1.358			
63	36	4.5000	1.207	0.98	69	0.329
	35	4.2286	1.114			
64	36	1.8888	1.141	0.12	69	0.907
	35	1.8571	1.141			
65	36	2.0000	1.267	-3.44	69	0.001
	35	3.2857	1.840			
66	36	3.6944	1.411	-0.29	68	0.772
	34	3.7941	1.452			
67	36	2.3889	1.379	-3.62	69	0.001
	35	3.7429	1.755			
68	36	3.1389	1.313	-0.63	69	0.534
	35	3.3429	1.434			
69	36	1.7222	0.914	0.03	69	0.975
	35	1.7143	1.178			
70	36	4.0556	1.264	0.74	69	0.461
	35	3.8286	1.317			
71	35	2.7429	1.559	0.0	68	1.000
	35	2.7429	1.540			
72	35	4.6571	1.305	-0.45	68	0.651
	35	4.8000	1.324			
73	36	3.8333	1.404	-2.26	69	0.027
	35	4.6000	1.459			
74	36	2.2500	1.228	-1.09	69	0.277
	35	2.6000	1.459			
75	36	3.7222	1.701	-2.39	69	0.020
	35	4.6000	1.376			

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Table 2. Analysis of Form I Items, cont.

Item No.	No. of Subjects*	Mean*	Standard Deviation	T Value	Degrees of Freedom	2-Tail Probability
76	36	4.3333	1.219	-1.37	69	0.174
	35	4.7429	1.291			
77	36	2.1111	1.260	-3.51	68	0.001
	34	3.2647	1.483			
78	34	2.7941	1.343	-2.30	67	0.024
	35	3.6286	1.646			
79	36	2.6111	1.153	-2.17	67	0.033
	34	3.2941	1.467			
80	36	4.2500	1.131	2.29	69	0.025
	35	3.5714	1.357			
81	35	2.1714	1.424	0.17	68	0.862
	35	2.1143	1.323			
82	36	4.5556	1.275	-0.05	69	0.964
	35	4.5714	1.632			
83	36	2.5000	1.254	-2.31	69	0.024
	35	3.3429	1.765			
84	35	2.3714	1.262	-1.43	67	0.158
	34	2.8824	1.684			
85	36	2.9722	1.558	-2.38	69	0.020
	35	3.8286	1.465			
86	36	2.6944	1.431	-2.36	69	0.021
	35	3.5143	1.502			
87	36	2.5556	1.297	0.67	69	0.507
	35	2.3429	1.392			
88	36	2.1667	1.298	-2.37	69	0.020
	35	3.0000	1.645			

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Table 2. Analysis of Form I Items, cont.

Item No.	No. of Subjects*	Mean*	Standard Deviation	T Value	Degrees of Freedom	2-Tail Probability
89**	36	4.3056	1.451	2.01	69	0.049
	35	3.5143	1.853			
90	36	3.8611	1.246	-0.83	69	0.412
	35	4.1429	1.611			
91	36	4.1667	1.108	-1.82	69	0.073
	35	4.6571	1.162			
92	36	3.7500	1.461	-1.05	69	0.299
	35	4.1143	1.471			
93	35	3.5714	1.461	-1.12	68	0.266
	35	3.9429	1.305			
94	35	4.0571	1.056	1.20	67	0.234
	34	3.7059	1.360			
95	36	2.7222	1.717	-1.75	69	0.085
	35	3.4286				

**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest of the items in the scale. See Methods Section for examples and explanation.

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defense of others' lives, e.g. "Wars are justifiable when waged in defense of weaker nations" or "War is justifiable when waged to protect the property and lives of citizens on foreign soil when they are not engaged in seeking profit." Even though these items were included initially in Category A to reflect justification of war according to rational and legal criteria, closer analysis reveals that they represent, in fact, issues of personal relationship, to which women responded more favorably than men. As will be described later, a whole new category dealing with issues of relationship in war were included in Form II.

The statistical analysis of items from Category B of From I yields the following results: On 14 items men responded more favorably than women at the 0.05 level of statistical significance; 19 items discriminated between men and women at the .25 level of significance. These 19 best items were included in Form II of the questionnaire (Appendix D). Unlike Category A, in Category B there were no items to which women responded more favorably than men.

Statistical analysis of items from Category C

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revealed a much more complex structure than was initially expected. Careful review of the items showed that this category, in fact, can be easily divided into five subcategories.

The first subcategory includes items describing men's traditional and stereotypical sex roles as expressed during war. This subcategory includes items such as: "It is the role of the man to protect his family and his land"; "Men, being stronger and more aggressive, make better soldiers than women"; or, "Sports might be an alternative to war, because men can release their competitive and aggressive impulses." This subcategory consists of 10 items, to all of which men responded more favorably than women. Five items discriminate between men and women at the 0.05 level of statistical significance and a total of eight items discriminated at the 0.25 level. All 10 items were included in Category C of Form II.

The second subcategory is the female counterpart of the first subcategory: These items describe the traditional and stereotypical view of women as expressed in sex roles during war. This subcategory includes items such as "Women's role during war is to keep the society going economically and emotionally," or,

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"Women's aversion to direct violence makes them poor soldiers." To six of the eight items in this subcategory men responded more favorably than women. While five of the six items differentiate between men and women at the 0.10 level of statistical significance, none of the two items to which women responded more favorably discriminate below the 0.18 level of significance. All eight items were included as part of Category C of Form II.

The third subcategory includes items which reflect either on the social roles of men and women or on stereotypical interactions between men and women. This subcategory includes items such as "The knowledge that his wife takes care of the home and the children keeps the soldier free to concentrate on the fighting," or, "Men cannot replace women's stamina or their care for children and the elderly during war." This subcategory includes four items; on three of these items, men responded more favorably at the 0.12 level of statistical significance. Again, all four items were included in Category C of Form II.

The fourth subcategory consists of items which present the theme that women, more than men, are opposed to war. This theme is represented in the following

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items: "If women were to the fighters and men were to stay home, there would be no wars"; "Women are the traditional peace fighters"; and "If it were up to women, there would be no more wars." To all these items women responded much more favorably than men. On these three items women scored higher than men ($\underline{p}$ 0.08). These data support the established belief that women see themselves as peace fighters, i.e., more pacifistic than men. These items are not directly relevant to the hypotheses of this study and hence will be omitted from Form II. The importance of this finding will be discussed later.

The fifth subcategory consists of the theme that women are attracted to men in uniforms. It includes items such as "Men in uniforms are very handsome" or "There is something sexy about soldiers in uniforms." Review of these items revealed that they only tap heterosexual gender difference; that is, these items indicate only a higher probability that a heterosexual woman moreso than men will see something sexy about a man (with or without uniform) than a heterosexual man. Not surprisingly, women scored much higher than men on all four items of this category. These items, therefore, were omitted from Form II.

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The Construction of Form II and the Additional Hypothesis

Form II was designed after the results of Form I were analyzed. The first three categories were the same as Form I and included 19, 19 and 24 items in Categories A, B and C respectively.

Reviewing the hypotheses of this research in light of the data from Form I, it became apparent that a new category as well as a new hypothesis was needed in order to complete this study adequately. Examination of Form I revealed that there were almost no items which represent relational or interpersonal aspects of war. The new category consists of items expressing the theme of relationships, interconnectedness and group cohesion during war. This new category taps into issues such as: sense of community during war, sense of caring and intimacy between the fighting men and their sweethearts at the back lines. It also taps into the capacity of women to experience both sympathy and empathy for oppressed minorities and women, as well as children in foreign lands. The additional hypothesis developed from the new category asserts that women will respond at

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least as favorably as men to items which justify war on the basis of personal relationships between human beings during war. This hypothesis derives not only from the empirical results described above but also from Gilligan's model which describes men's morality as legalistic and abstract and women's morality as relational and situation specific.

Men and women are predicted to score similarly on many of these items even though they might use different reasoning for their responses. For example, for an item like "War is justified when waged in defense of an oppressed minority" it is hypothesized that men might endorse this item using their rational morality, which claims that oppression, in any form, is illegal and hence unjust, and should be eliminated. Women, on the other hand, might support the same statement because they feel somehow connected and hence protectiv of the people of an oppressed minority. Other examples of items which represent this aspect of the new hypothesis are "Aiding an attacked weak ally justifies war"; "It is important to stand up to any regime which shows disregard for basic human rights" or, "It would be justifiable for a country to respond with force if the Soviet Union or any other country shot down another

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civilian airliner." On other items within this new category, which stresses personal loyalty, empathy, intensification of personal relationship and the sense of group cohesion during war, women should score at least as high or higher than men but not lower. Items which represent this theme in the new scale are "The preparation for war is exciting because it brings people together," or, "War often intensifies group cohesion and gives the individuals a new sense of community."

Thirty-three items were generated for this new category in the same way that the previous items were generated. There are 20 items which represent the first theme described above and 12 items which deal with interpersonal and communal issues during wartime. These items appear in Appendix D under Category D.

The complete Form II consists of 95 items and includes four categories of 19, 19, 24 and 33 items each, respectively. The new items were randomly mixed in with the items which were selected from Form I to form the new questionnaire--Form II. Form II is presented in Appendix E.

Results of Form II and the
Construction of Form III

As in Form I, statistical analyses of the items

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were performed within each category. Analyses were performed on the first two groups of subjects who were administered Form I as well as the three additional groups who were administered Form II (Groups 3, 4, and 5). (These groups have been described earlier in the "Subjects" chapter.) Analyses were performed for each group individually as well as for the groups combined.

A total of 71 subjects (35 men and 36 women) responded to Form I and 71 subjects (32 men and 39 women) responded to Form II. The analyses of Categories A, B and C include a total of 142 subjects (67 men and 75 women) and the analyses of category D is based on 71 subjects (32 men and 39 women). The following section reports the combined results of all the subjects who responded to each specific category. The combined results for Form II are reported in Table 3 (see next page).

Men responded more favorably than women to all of the 19 items in Category A. Nine items differentiated between men and women at the $p < 0.05$ level and a total of 18 out of the 19 items discriminated at the $p \leqslant 0.145$ level. Reanalysis of the item content led to the elimination of redundant and unclear items. The remaining 12 items were chosen to represent Category A

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Table 3. Analysis of Form II Items

Item No. on Form I	Item No. on Form II	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Deg. of Frdm.	2-Tail Prob.
91	1	64 58	3.8281 4.5000	-2.49	120	0.014
75	2	64 59	3.6563 4.7458	-3.84	121	0.000
55	3	62 60	4.2742 4.2833	-0.03	120	0.976
26	7	63 60	3.8571 4.3333	-1.80	121	0.075
50	8	64 61	3.5000 4.1148	-2.21	123	0.029
1	12	63 59	4.0794 4.2881	-0.78	120	0.436
69	13	64 61	2.7500 3.1475	-1.35	123	0.179
63	15	73 66	3.1096 3.0758	0.15	137	0.881
72	17	65 59	3.6000 4.0000	-1.44	122	0.151
34	18	62 58	2.6613 2.9655	-1.10	118	0.275
51	19	65 60	4.7846 4.9333	-0.64	123	0.523
81**	22	73 64	4.4384 3.5625	3.01	135	0.003

*The first number indicates the results for women and the second for men.

**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest of the items in the scale. See Method Section for examples and explanation.

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Table 3. Analysis of Form II Items, cont.

Item No. on Form I	Item No. on Form II	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Deg. of Frdm.	2-Tail Prob.
66	23	64 59	2.7344 3.3390	-2.26	121	0.026
15	24	62 58	1.9839 2.3621	-1.56	118	0.122
5	25	74 64	2.9595 2.9254	0.15	139	0.122
59	26	64 60	3.0625 3.2667	-0.78	122	0.439
84**	27	65 58	3.6769 2.8276	2.75	121	0.007
31	28	65 61	3.7538 4.2131	-1.68	124	0.095
87	29	65 58	2.2615 2.6379	-1.43	121	0.156
88	31	65 57	3.7846 4.2105	-1.59	120	0.115
38	33	64 61	2.9375 4.1148	-4.41	123	0.000
80	34	73 63	2.2877 3.3968	-4.38	134	0.000
56	35	65 60	1.9846 2.5833	-2.40	123	0.018

* The first number indicates the results for women and the second for men.

**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest of the items in the scale. See Method Section for examples and explanation.

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Table 3. Analysis of Form II Items, cont.

Item No. on Form I	Item No. on Form II	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Deg. of Frdm.	2-Tail Prob.
90	36	65 57	2.8923 3.3509	-1.79	120	0.076
57	37	65 59	3.1077 3.0847	0.09	122	0.932
21	38	64 61	3.9063 4.2459	-1.23	123	0.222
7	41	63 60	4.0476 4.5000	-1.80	121	0.074
71	45	63 59	2.8095 3.1695	-1.43	120	0.156
64	46	64 59	2.8906 3.4407	-2.03	121	0.045
54	47	64 60	2.8906 3.3500	-1.70	122	0.092
8	49	75 67	1.9333 3.1791	-5.24	140	0.000
32	50	64 60	1.5938 2.0667	-2.25	122	0.026
27**	52	65 61	3.7385 3.4754	0.85	124	0.396
20	53	64 60	2.3281 2.6833	-1.38	122	0.169

*The first number indicates the results for women and the second for men.

**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest of the items in the scale. See Method Section for examples and explanation.

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Table 3. Analysis of Form II Items, cont.

Item No. of Form I	Item No. of Form II	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Deg. of Frdm.	2-Tail Prob.
53	54	64	3.8438	-0.83	122	0.410
		60	4.0667			
45	55	65	2.8769	-0.40	124	0.690
		61	2.9672			
18	56	65	3.6462	-0.44	124	0.659
		61	3.7705			
49	57	75	1.8400	-2.66	139	0.009
		66	2.4394			
43	58	65	3.7077	-1.81	124	0.073
		61	4.1803			
12	62	65	3.3385	-1.36	124	0.176
		61	3.6557			
3	63	65	4.6462	0.48	124	0.629
		61	4.5410			
68	65	65	2.0923	-4.25	123	0.000
		60	3.2000			
35	67	65	2.4000	-5.11	124	0.000
		61	3.8361			
47	70	65	4.0154	-0.15	123	0.881
		60	4.0500			
11	73	65	3.8462	-2.61	124	0.010
		61	4.5246			
40	74	65	2.2462	-1.27	124	0.207
		61	2.5574			

*The first number indicates the results for women and
the second for men.

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Table 3. Analysis of Form II Items, cont.

Item No. on Form I	Item No. on Form II	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Deg. of Frdm.	2-Tail Prob.
9	75	65 61	3.7231 4.6885	-3.44	124	0.001
61	76	65 60	4.0462 4.3500	-1.23	123	0.221
74	77	65 59	2.1077 3.2373	-4.26	122	0.000
78	78	63 58	2.7937 3.3276	-1.96	119	0.053
30	79	65 60	2.7846 3.2000	-1.63	123	0.107
60	82	65 60	4.5077 4.3500	0.60	123	0.552
13	83	65 61	2.5538 3.1803	-2.29	124	0.024
24	84	64 60	2.2813 2.5833	-1.16	122	0.250
92	85	65 58	2.9385 3.6034	-2.42	121	0.017
28	86	65 61	2.5077 3.4590	-3.49	124	0.001
89	87	65 58	2.3385 2.3448	-0.03	121	0.980
29	88	65 51	2.0154 2.9672	-3.70	124	0.000

*The first number indicates the results for women and
the second for men.

Table 3. Analysis of Form II Items, cont.

Item No. on Form I	Item No. on Form II	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Deg. of Frdm.	2-Tail Prob.
44**	89	65	4.5077	2.25	124	0.026
		61	3.8689			
82	90	64	3.6719	-1.20	120	0.231
		58	3.9828			
67	91	65	4.1538	-0.82	123	0.411
		60	4.3333			
2	93	64	3.5625	-1.44	123	0.152
		61	3.9508			
73	94	64	3.9375	1.06	121	0.293
		59	3.6780			
95	95	65	2.6000	-1.23	121	0.221
		58	2.9828			
4	96	39	5.2051	-1.64	69	0.105
		32	5.5938			
6	97	38	3.6053	-0.43	67	0.672
		31	3.7742			
10	98	39	2.6667	-2.71	69	0.008
		32	3.5000			
14	99	39	2.7949	-0.13	69	0.897
		32	2.8438			
16	100	39	4.2051	1.37	68	0.174
		31	3.6452			

*The first number indicates the results for women and the second for men.

**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest of the items in the scale. See Method Section for examples and explanation.

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Table 3. Analysis of Form II Items, cont.

Item No. on Form I	Item No. on Form II	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Deg. of Frdm.	2-Tail Prob.
17	101	39	4.0513	-0.19	69	0.849
		32	4.1250			
19	102	39	4.1538	0.52	69	0.603
		32	2.9688			
22	103	39	3.4872	-0.21	69	0.832
		32	3.5625			
23	104	39	5.2564	0.61	69	0.544
		32	5.0938			
25	105	39	3.9744	-0.38	69	0.707
		32	4.0938			
33	106	39	2.9487	1.75	68	0.084
		31	2.3548			
36	107	38	2.7105	-2.88	68	0.005
		32	3.6250			
37	108	39	3.1026	0.77	69	0.442
		32	2.8750			
39	109	39	3.1026	-1.20	69	0.235
		32	3.5313			
41	110	39	4.0769	-0.71	69	0.450
		32	.4.2813			
42	111	39	4.5897	-0.76	69	0.450
		32	4.8125			
46	112	39	4.3333	0.35	68	0.727
		31	4.2258	0.35	68	0.727

*The first number indicates the results for women and
the second for men.

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Table 3. Analysis of Form II Items, Cont.

Item No. on Form I	Item No. on Form II	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Deg. of Frdm.	2-Tail Prob.
48	113	39	3.7692	-0.22	68	0.828
		31	3.8387			
52	114	39	3.7436	-0.44	68	0.658
		31	3.9355			
58	115	39	3.2051	-0.80	68	0.426
		31	3.4839			
62	116	39	4.1026	0.97	68	0.337
		31	3.7419			
65	117	39	4.0256	0.69	67	0.496
		30	3.7667			
70	118	38	4.1316	0.69	67	0.492
		31	3.9032			
76	119	38	4.5000	0.87	65	0.388
		29	4.2414			
77	120	38	2.5526	0.42	65	0.673
		29	2.4138			
79	121	38	2.9737	-1.75	65	0.085
		29	3.6897			
83	122	38	3.8421	0.27	65	0.790
		29	3.7586			
85	123	39	3.3846	-0.30	65	0.762
		28	3.5000			
86	124	39	3.6667	-1.63	66	0.109
		29	4.1379			

*The first number indicates the results for women and
the second for men.

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Table 3. Analysis of Form II Items, Cont.

Item No. on Form I	Item No. on Form II	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Deg. of Frdm.	2-Tail Prob.
93	125	39	4.7179	0.42	66	0.677
		29	4.5862			
94	126	39	3.2821	-0.26	66	0.806
		29	3.3793			

*The first number indicates the results for women and the second for men.

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in the final questionnaire--Form III. On each of these 12 items men scored higher than women ($p \leq 12$). These items appear in Appendix F.

Analysis of Category B in Form II yielded the following results: as in Category A, on each of the 19 items, men responded more favorably than women. On eight items the statistical significance level was beyond 0.001. On 16 of the 19 items men scored higher than women ($p \leq 0.076$). Several items, however, were eliminated because of redundancy. Finally twelve items which represent different themes within this category were chosen to be included in the final questionnaire. These 12 items differentiate clearly between men and women ($p \leq 0.075$). The items chosen to represent Category B in Form III appear in Appendix F.

Analyses of items in Category C revealed the following results: Men scored higher than women on 12 items ($p \leq 0.115$) and on an additional three items ($p \leq .219$). On three items women scored higher than men ($p \leq 0.314$). Only four items elicited responses which were based on the original hypothesis, i.e., that men respond as favorably as women ($p \leq 0.461$). Contrary to the original hypotheses, but as the data reveals clearly across all of the five groups, men seem to resopnd much

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more favorably than women to items which reflect stereotypical and traditional views of men and women in the context of war. Consistent with this line of thought, the items which differentiate between men and women most clearly ($p \leq 0.09$) were chosen to be included in Category C of Form III. These items appear in Appendix F.

As for the three themes within Category C (which were described earlier. It seems that men responded more favorably than women on items representing all three themes. Of the final 11 items chosen, seven came originally from the six items of the subcategory which describes men's stereotypical sex roles, three came from the eight items in the subcategory which describes women's traditional sex roles during war, and two came from the six items of the subcategory which describes stereotypical interaction between men and women during war.

Statistical analysis of items from Category D of Form II yielded the following results: On six items women responded more favorably than men ($p \leq 0.248$), on 16 items men and women responded similarly ($p \geq 9.302$). On the rest of the 11 items men scored higher than women ($p \leq 0.241$). The items from the two subcategories which

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built this category were generally distributed equally
among the above three clusters of responses, 3, 10 and 7
respectively for the items from the first subcategory
and 3, 6 and 4 respectively for the second. Unlike the
first three categories, Category D is the only one which
elicits a cluster of responses consisting of women
scoring higher or the same as men.

Form III of the questionnaire consists of 48
items, including 12, 12, 11, and 13 items from each of
the four categories respectively. The 48 items were
randomly mixed to form the final form of the
questionnaire, Form III, which appears in Appendix G.

Results of Form III
and Final Analysis

As with Form I and II, statistical analyses of the
items were performed within each category. A total of
37 subjects (18 men and 19 women) responded to Form III.
The analysis of categories A, B and C includes the total
of 179 (85 men and 94 women) subjects who responded to
these items. The analysis of Category D includes 108
subjects (50 men and 68 women). The following section
reports the combined results of all the subjects who
responded to each specific category. The combined
results for Form IIi are reported in Table 4 (see next

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page).

In Category A men responded on all items more favorably than women ($p \leqslant 0.085$). Similarly, on Category B all items differentiate between men and women ($p \leqslant 0.053$). Six of the 12 items in Category B differentiate between men and women at the 0.000 levl of statistical significance. Eight out of the 11 items on Category C differentiate between men and women at the $p = 0.140$ level. On Category D 11 out of the 13 items elicit more positive responses from women than from men (p 0.261). One item elicited a similar response from men and women ($p = 0.889$) and on one item men scored more favorably than women ($p = 0.152$).

Included in Table 5 are summaries of the mean scale scores of men and women for each of the four scales, the T-value indicating differences between men and women on each scale, and the one-tail probability of the T-values.

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Table 4. Analysis of Form III Items

Item No. on Form III	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Degree of Freedom	2-Tail Prob.
1	83	3.7349	-2.84	157	0.005
	76	4.4474			
38	83	3.8675	-3.02	158	0.003
	77	4.6364			
5	82	3.9634	-1.08	158	0.280
	78	4.2179			
30	83	3.4096	-2.37	160	0.019
	79	4.0253			
31	83	2.6988	-1.04	160	0.299
	79	2.9747			
6	84	3.5000	-1.62	159	0.106
	77	3.9091			
43	92	4.3261	2.75	172	0.007
	82	3.5854			
44	83	2.6867	-2.07	158	0.040
	77	3.1688			
45	81	2.0864	-1.22	155	0.222
	76	2.3684			
48	93	2.9570	0.36	176	0.722
	85	2.8824			
40	84	3.7857	2.57	158	0.011
	76	3.0526			
26	84	3.6190	-2.81	161	0.006
	79	4.3165			

*The first number indicates the results for women and the second for men.

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Table 4, Cont.

Item No. on Form III	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Degree of Freedom	2-Tail Prob.
28	84 76	2.3929 2.8684	-1.92	158	0.057
19	83 79	2.8795 4.1392	-5.23	160	0.000
20	92 81	2.3261 3.3704	-4.50	171	0.000
32	84 78	1.8929 2.4231	-2.46	160	0.015
14	83 77	2.8916 3.1818	-1.20	158	0.232
42	94 85	2.1064 3.1529	-4.55	177	0.000
47	83 78	1.4578 1.9744	-2.93	159	0.004
37	83 78	2.3133 2.7179	-1.78	159	0.077
2	94 84	1.8617 2.3690	-2.43	176	0.016
18	84 79	3.5476 4.3418	-3.38	161	0.001
46	83 79	3.1446 3.6329	-2.33	160	0.021
27**	83 79	2.6988 3.8481	-4.35	160	0.000

*The first number indicates the results for women and the second for men.

**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest of the items on the scale. See Method Section for examples and explanation.

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Table 4, Cont.

Item No. on Form III	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Degree of Freedom	2-Tail Prob.
12	83 79	3.7108 4.4304	-3.07	160	0.003
36	83 79	3.6747 4.6456	-3.83	160	0.000
23	84 78	3.8571 4.1923	-1.38	160	0.170
13	84 77	1.9881 3.1169	-4.84	159	0.000
17	82 76	2.7561 3.3684	-2.43	156	0.016
24	83 79	2.4819 2.9873	-2.06	160	0.041
34	83 76	2.8193 3.4868	-2.73	157	0.007
29	83 79	2.0964 3.0506	-4.08	160	0.000
9**	84 79	4.5952 3.7468	3.27	161	0.001
10	83 76	3.3855 3.9737	-2.42	157	0.017
4	82 79	3.3780 3.8734	-1.95	159	0.053

*The First number indicates the results for women and the second for men.

**This item was phrased in an opposite way to the rest of the items on the scale. See Method Section for examples and explanation.

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Table 4, Cont.

Item No. on Form III	Number of Subjects*	Mean*	T Value	Degree of Freedom	2-Tail Prob.
11	57 50	4.0526 3.6600	1.19	105	0.238
22	58 50	3.2069 2.7800	1.46	106	0.146
39	58 50	3.3966 3.7000	-1.04	106	0.303
16	57 49	2.7193 2.3878	1.20	104	0.233
7	57 50	3.1754 2.8800	1.12	105	0.266
35	57 49	4.3509 4.2245	0.47	104	0.637
3	57 49	4.1404 4.1837	-0.14	104	0.889
33	58 48	3.9310 3.5000	1.41	104	0.162
15	57 49	4.4737 4.1429	1.21	104	0.228
8	57 47	4.7018 4.5319	0.64	102	0.522
41	57 47	2.7193 2.2979	1.48	102	0.142
25	56 47	3.7500 3.9574	-0.73	101	0.469
21	83 79	3.7108 4.4304	-3.07	160	0.003

*The first number indicates the results for women and the second for men.

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Table 5

Summary Analysis of the Scales

	Mean	T Value	Degree of Freedom	1-Tail Probability
Scale A				
Women 94	32.6489			
		-3.73	177	0.000
Men 85	40.2235			
Scale B				
Women 94	31.0213			
		-3.34	177	0.000
Men 85	38.0824			
Scale C				
Women 94	27.6809			
		-3.93	177	0.000
Men 85	33.8000			
Scale D				
Women 58	46.7414			
		1.81	106	0.036
Men 50	43.960			

Reliability

The reliability of the scales was calculated in two different ways. First part-whole correltions, e.g., correlations of each item with the total scale it belongs to, were calculated. These corrolations (r) and their level of statistical significance are reported in Table 6 (see next page). All items in Scale A correlate within the range of $0.3573 \leqslant r \leqslant 0.6588$ with the total scale score. All correlations are statistically significant beyond $p = 0.000$.

For Scale B, part-whole correlations ranged between 0.3467 and 0.6313, and again these correlations were significant beyond $p = 0.000$. As expected, the part-whole correlation range for Scale D was wider. These correlations ranged between 0.1443 ($p = 0.136$) and 0.5189 ($p = 0.000$).

The second measure of reliability, i.e., split-half reliability within the Spearman-Brown correction, was calculated for each scale. These reliabilities were 0.880, 0.779, 0.870 and 0.684 for Scales A, B, C and D respectively.

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Table 6

Part-Whole Correlations

of Each Item with the Total Scale

Scale A		
Item Number on Form III	r	p
1	0.6454	0.000
44	0.4406	0.000
26	0.6093	0.000
32	0.5009	0.000
2	0.3677	0.000
18	0.5617	0.000
46	0.4421	0.000
23	0.6544	0.000
21	0.4590	0.000
10	0.6588	0.000
4	0.6479	0.000
43	0.3573	0.000

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Table 6, cont.

Item Number of Form III	r	p
38	0.5163	0.000
6	0.4357	0.000
40	-0.0707	0.374
19	0.6095	0.000
20	0.4594	0.000
42	0.3688	0.000
13	0.6255	0.000
17	0.5488	0.000
24	0.3965	0.000
29	0.5415	0.000
27	0.3467	0.000
9	0.6313	0.000

Table 6, cont.

Scale C

Item Number on Form III	r	p
5	0.3650	0.000
30	0.5206	0.000
31	0.5566	0.000
45	0.2972	0.000
28	0.4232	0.000
14	0.5904	0.000
47	0.4201	0.000
37	0.4605	0.000
12	0.6163	0.000
36	0.5333	0.000
34	0.5980	0.000

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Table 6, cont.

| | Scale D | |
Item Number on Form III	r	p
48	0.1143	0.136
11	0.2917	0.002
22	0.3247	0.001
39	0.4052	0.000
16	0.3064	0.001
7	0.3637	0.000
35	0.3928	0.000
3	0.4606	0.000
33	0.5189	0.000
15	0.4220	0.000
8	0.4695	0.000
41	0.2461	0.012
25	0.3853	0.000

DISCUSSION

The highly significant results yielded by the statistical analyses of the responses of men and women to the questionnaire and the high reliability of the scales offer clear support to this study's attempt to extend C. Gilligan's theory to the context of war. It also supports the attempt to debunk the common belief that men are for and women are against war. The complexity of the differences between genders in their attitudes toward war will be examined in the following discussion.

As was originally hypothesized, men seem to be able to justify war according to rational and legal criteria more easily than women. This hypothesis was derived from Gilligan's theory that men's morality is different than women's. According to Gilligan, men think in terms of abstractions and right and wrong, while women's morality is interpersonal. Positive responses to items from Category A such as "War is justified in defense of freedom" or "War is justifiable as the chief cause of human progress" indicate the use of abstract reasoning. As predicted by Gilligan's model, men do respond significantly more positively than women to these items. This realization might mean

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several things. Initially, it might imply that men respond more favorably than women to reasoning which uses abstract and legal concepts. Simultaneously, it might also imply that men justify actions, including the declaration of war, along the same line of reasoning. Women, on the other hand, will neither respond to pro-war propaganda which uses only legal and abstract elements, nor will they conceptualize their own rationale for justifying war along these constructs.

A complementary hypothesis to the first one was added during the process of data collection, specifically from the content and statistical analyses of the results of Formm I. Items such as "Wars are justifiable when waged in defense of weaker nations" or "Aiding an attacked ally justifies war," which were included initially in Category A, elicited different patterns of responses for men and women than the rest of the items in Category A. These items and others like them might be responded to favorably by men using legalistic or righteous reasoning. A favorable response, however, might also come from an empathetic and interpersonal care for the "weak" and "attacked." Consistent with the theory, men scored higher than women only on the items which did not include any element of

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empathy, sympathy, caring for the weak, or concerns for the defenseless. When these issues were included (Category D), men and women scored either similarly or women scored higher than men. One illustration of how the relationship between men's and women's scores changes depending on whether abstract reasoning or empathy is elicited by an item is the following: The item "Aiding an attacked ally justifies war" contains both abstract legal and empathetic elements. As was expected, men and women scored similarly ($\underline{p}$ = 0.879). Adding the words "weak" to form a new item, "Aiding an attacked weak ally justifies war" changes the balance between abstraction and empathy. As a result, women scored significantly higher than men ($\underline{p}$ = 0.221). Another example in Category D is, "If any hostages in a foreign country are physically harmed, their country has the right to respond with military action." On one hand, this item speaks in terms of men's morality, in the use of the term "right to"; on the other hand, it speaks in women's terms when it describes the danger to real flesh and blood people, i.e., the hostages, and not in vague terms of nations and countries. Six items in Category D combine the two themes of abstract reasoning and empathy and these items clearly elicit different

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responses than the items which contain only one theme, as in Category A. Women responded more favorably or as favorably as men to these items in Category D.

One of the implications of this finding can be to analyze and construct propaganda for or against war. In a recent speech to gain support for the invasion of Grenada, Reagan claimed, "Now there was a time when our nation's security was based on a standing army here within our own borders and shore batteries of artillery along our coast, and of course a navy to keep the sea lanes open for the shipping of things necessary to our well-being. The world has changed. Today our national security can be threatened in faraway places" (<u>Newsweek</u>, 11/7/83). As a man who uses primarily men as his advisors and speech writers, Reagan apparently and not surprisingly used pure abstract, non-relationship reasoning in order to defend the Grenada invasion. Issues of "borders," "shores," are important to him and are an important part of men's morality, as described by Chodorow and Gilligan. This kind of speech will not elicit positive responses for women, but it might do so for men.

The analysis of the items on which women scored more favorably than men suggest that one way to mobilize

women to war is to use their empathy and sympathy for oppressed minorities and children in foreign countries. This kind of theme is constantly appearing in Reagan's recent speeches to gain support for his South American interventions.

The declaration of war is always accompanied with a justification of it by a defensive claim. The essence of the defensive claim is assigning evil and unjust intentions to the enemy. The division between us and them, good and evil, is clearer than before. Gilligan's model predicts that men will be able more easily than women to conceptualize these abstract notions of splitting than women. Unlike the continuous relationship of girls with their mothes throughout life, boys identify themselves as boys throughout disidentifying and disassociating from the primary caretaker, their mothers. The feminine personality defines itself in relationship and connection to other people mre than the masculine personality. Men, by contrast, have firmer and less permeable ego boundaries than women and are more tolerant of the split between us and them, right and wrong, and good and evil. These differences in personality account for the different responses men and women make to the items in Category A.

The separation dynamic comes into play also in the mechanics of war--killing, or violating the enemy. These actions require the ability to dehumanize the enemy (Gault, 1971). For instance, Orientals, during the Vietnam war, were regularly referred to as "gooks," "dinks." They were perceived as strange and different. Dehumanizing and caricaturing the enemy are part of separation dynamics and are easier for men than women. Women, for whom relatedness and interconnectedness is an important dynamic, might view the enemy as a victim and therefore connected to them. Thus, women are less able to tolerate the violation of the enemy, according to Gilligan's theory.

The second hypothesis claims that "Women find it more difficult to accept, condone, or justify acts of violence and destruction in war than men do, and women feel more empathy than men for wounded or violated enemies." Scale II was constructed to test this hypothesis. It includes items such as "Sources of food for the enemy like crops and domestic animals should be destroyed during war." Or, "Sometimes in order to avoid danger to our soldiers, it is justifiable to bomb the enemy's villages." These items pull on the rationale that "we are against them," "we're good, they're evil."

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It implies that enemy lives are cheap and so, too, their land and livestock. The hypothesis, like the theory, claims that men find it more reassuring to define themselves as what they are not, while the same separation dynamic raises anxiety for women. This hypothesis was fully confirmed in this study. Women find it much harder to justify any action of killing, hurting, burning, etc., for whatever reason. Women's responses to Category B clearly reveals that the issue of killing, hurting, and violating the enemy, regardless of its necessity and justification, raises more anxiety in women than in men. These responses imply more than simply that men are for war and women are against it. The implication is that men more than women are capable of accepting or even carrying out actions of violence during battle. Obviously, this might be one of the reasons why men, historically, became the soldiers. This was only if women historically were always the primary caretakers.

The third hypothesis and the results of items from Category C add anothe dimension to our understanding of war behavior and its relationship to gender. The initial hypothesis predicted that men and women would each identify with their own gender's tradaitional sex

role as expressed in the context of war. The results show clearly that men responded much more favorably to items which described men's or women's traditional sex roles during war. Examples of these items are: "It is a role of men to protect his family and his land," or, "Women should be proud and supportive during war." Men also responded more positively to items which reflect stereotypical interaction between men and women, such as, "The knowledge that his wife takes over the home and the children keeps the soldier free to concentrate on fighting." Even though the results are different from the original prediction, reviewing the theory reveals that the results are consistent with Gilligan's model. Unlike the sex role self-identification theme which was initially used to predict similarities on Scale C, Gilligan's model would have predicted the following: If men's personality is defined by firmer ego boundaries, and tends to split and to organize the world in linear, hierarchical ways, it can be easily predicted that men, more so than women, would be prone to categorize and stress the differences between men and women. Women, howevr, define themselves in relationship to others, and hence they would be less prone to organize the world, genders included, in distinct, clear, non-diffused

categories. Although this finding negates my original hypothesis it confirms the model that this dissertation is based on and ultimately reflects the high validity of this study. In this case, no experimental or theoretical biases could have tilted the results.

War has been described earlier as causing a separation of the population mainly along gender lines. This separation usually clarifies the differences between the genders. Simultaneously, during wartime there is almost an instant regression to older and more traditional sex roles, as has been described in an earlier chapter. Men, as in tribal times, became the warriors, the proteectors, while women, in the back lines, experience a sense of helplessness and dependency on the men. Issues of reparation raise less anxiety in men, which implies that men are more prone than women to tolerate the clear distinction between the genders which is elicited at the outbreak of war. AGain, it does not mean that men are for war, but it might mean that this dynamic might be more appealing and raise less anxiety for men's unconscious than for women's.

The data from Category C also reveal that women responded more favorably than men to the particular traditional roles, i.e. the perception that "Women are

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the traditional peace fighters," or, as another item states, "If women were to be the fighters and men were to stay home, there would be no more wars." Even though men also saw women in the traditional role of peace fighter, women scored significantly more positively on this item. This finding is especially interesting in that women responded less favorably to items which reflect other traditional roles of women, such as "Women are too emotional to fight; they are better at taking care of children and the home during war." These differences once again are consistent with Gilligan's model. Being against war is connected with avoiding bloodshed, avoiding hurt and destruction. Avoiding pain to even the enemy and caring for one's own son and husband are more consistent with female personality and morality. It is this morality that caused women to respond more negatively than men to items in Category B, which dealt with unavoidable necessity to hurt the enemy; in this case women responded more favorably to items which claimed that women are against war, and by this, taking the stand that they are against inflicting hurt, death and destruction on other people.

The additional Category D consists of two themes-- one, which has been discussed earlier, and is an

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elaboration of Category A, and the second, which involves the issues of group cohesion and interrelatedness of the community during wartime. The latter theme includes items like, "One of the advantages of the preparation for war is that it brings out unity in the community." Or, "In wartime community ties seem more important." These items and others are tapping directly into what women seem to value most-- relationship. War brings out a tremendous sense of cohesion experienced after or before the outbreak of war. When war breaks out, all war tasks are given priority (Bar-Yosef & Padan-Eisenstark, 1977). A unified community, working together toward a clear and single goal, is formed instantaneously. Group psychologists see the impact of war as increasing group cohesion due to the diversion of aggression to the outside target (Frank, 1982). Both the men in the front lines and noncombatant women experience this cohesion. War also intensifies the relationship among the group members. It emphasizes their relatedness and their connectedness; all these qualities, as was expected, are extremely appealing to women's psyche, much more so than to men's. Category D confirms this analysis.

This category is extremely important for the

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validity of the study. While the first three categories elicit more favorable responses from men, this one elicits more favorable responses from women. The ability of the instrument to elicit different responses is a reflection that it is not just measuring sex differences, but in fact measures psychological and personality differences between men and women.

Applying Gilligan's model to war further, it appears that women support war by attempting to reduce anxiety caused by separateness. Women's support for war can be initially motivated by their attempts to maintain relationships and connectedness. This might take the form of renewed or intensified ties with children and elderly people or volunteer activities in support of husbands and lovers at the front. When women send flowers, letters, warm clothes, and cakes to care for their loved ones who are fighting, they are also supporting the war. Thus, the role of women during war is consistent with their stereotypical role during peace. They are concerned with personal and affective ties, and thus extend the role of mother and wife during war.

Social scientists assume, as was mentioned earlier, that men are for and women are against war.

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This assumption affects the means as well as the conclusion of this study. As has been discussed above, there are indeed aspects of war which are less appealing to women than to men. The studies by social scientists, which have been reviewed earlier, have consistently ignored any aspect of war which might be appealing to women. Carful review of the existing scales of attitudes toward war reveal a surprising but consistent picture: that most scientists who research attitudes toward war study only one aspect of war. This aspect was explored in this research as well, but it was only one of the aspects of war studied. In the existing literature most of the researchers who have created scales used items reflecting abstract legalistic justifications of war, similar to this study's Category A.

One example of this is Stagner (1942) who tested his earlier collaborative work and used different techniques to measure attitudes toward war. A closer review of the items of his scale, however, reveals that 18 out of the 27 items tap issues which have to do with justification of war with abstract or rational criteria. Some examples are: "There can be no progress without war," "War is the only way to right tremendous wrongs,"

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or, "Defensive war is justified but other wars are not."
Not surprisingly, Stagner (1942) concludes that there is
a consistent tendency for women of all ages to be more
antiwar and more pacifistic than men. Stagner's (1942)
attempts to study attitudes toward war were unsuccessful
due to his unsophisticated and reductionistic approach
to the complexity of the war phenomenon. His findings
are consistent with the findings of this study, but the
conclusions are different.

Crown (1950), in his Warminded Scale, used an
eight-item scale. Out of the eight items, seven items
clearly fit into Category A of this study, which
reflects issues of the justification of war by abstract
and legalistic morality. Two examples of his items are:
"Certain issues are so vital for a nation that war is
preferable to submission," or, "War is an important
factor in progress, eliminating the unfit." Crown
(1950), who attempted to study the relationship between
warminded attitudes and neuroticism, was unsuccessful
for the same reason that Stagner was. By attempting to
reduce the complex behavior of war to a single dimension
of abstract justification of war, both researchers
presented an incomplete picture of the phenomenon they
studied.

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Porterfield (1937) claimed to study opinions about war by administering an eight-item questionnaire. Similar to Stagner (1942) and to Crown (1950), seven of his eight items reflect the same issues which are dealt with in Category A of this study. Items like "War is justified as a chief cause of human progress" reflect again abstract reasoning and not surprisingly, led Portefrield to his observation that men, more than women, exhibit warlike behavior.

Putney and Middleton (1962) use their own scale to make the same scientific error as the above researchers. They summarize their findings as follows: " . . . males are far more likely to accept war. . . . "

Of the dozens of studies reported in earlier Chapters, only two studies present an analysis by item of sex differences. Out of these two studies, only Jones (1970) reports item analysis (only partial) according to gender. Jones reports that the following items elicit the most extreme pacifistic attitudes in women: 1. If a man's country enters a war which he does not consider justified, he should nevertheless serve at the front or wherever he is needed. 2. It is our duty to serve in a defensive war. 3. Nations should agree not to intervene with military force in

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purely commercial and financial disputes. 4> A host of young men entered the war in a spirit of idealism and unselfish devotion to a great cause, only to return disillusioned and cynical. (Jones, 1970, p. 56)

Like the above researchers, even though Jones does not appear to consider it, it seems clear that items 1, 2 and 3 concern rational criteria for and justifications of war. It is interesting that although Jones cites items that elicited significantly more pacifistic responses in women, he does not specify which items elicited more militaristic responses in women. He merely states: "However, these differences were largely cancelled by greater militaristic attitudes on the part of women on other items" (Jones, 1938, p. 57). No data are available about these items.

Like most researchers, Stagner (1942), whose study was critiqued earlier, presents his results in a rather undifferentiated way. He presents sex differeneces as differences of mean scores among males and females on his Likert-type scales. No analysis of sex differences on individual items is reported. He concludes, as described earlier, that adult women are slightly more pacifistic than adult males. His original scale consists of 27 items, which were given to 125 students

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from five classes. The mean rating for each statement
was computed for each class. Six unspecified items
showing a range of more than 0.5 in the mean ratings of
the five classes were dropped. Item analysis through
gender for these items might have revealed, for example,
that the reason for the differences between the mean
ratings were due to different numbers of males and
females in the classes. The number of women and men in
each class was not given, even though it might have been
instrumental in causing a wide range of scores.

Many other researchers did not report or analyze
their data along gender lines, and hence do not mention
any sex-related correlations (Barkley, 1953; Caffrey &
Campbell, 1969). Droba and Quackenbush (1942), in their
revision of Droba's original scale, mention no analysis
by sex of their data. Granberg and Fay (1972) and Starr
(1975), even though they used Putney and Middleton's
scale, relate no sex differences. Farnsworth (1932)
studied only males, and hence makes no analysis along
gender lines.

The consistent failure to describe the
complexities and nuances of the war phenomenon led
either to the total neglect of gender differences, or,
more likely, to the conclusion that men are more warlike

than women. Most of these studies lacked a theoretical basis for their hypotheses, and are based only on the belief that men are pro-war and women are against war. The theory and findings of this study reveal that while a few aspects of war are less appealing or more alien to the female personality, there are several aspects of war dynamics which either appeal more to women or at least similarly as to men. These aspects, a sense of empathy and relatedness to oppressed people, women and children on foreign lands, and the appeal of cohesion of the community, and the intensification of interpersonal relationships during war, have been consistently neglected throughout the dozens of studies which have been described earlier.

Thus the question should not be whether men are more or less pro-war than women, because this question does not appropriately tap the depth of the issue. The questions should be phrased to encompass how men and women are _different_ in their personality structures and attitudes toward different aspects of war. This study attempts to answer these questions and succeeds in finding significant differences between men and women, not only in one direction. Some aspects of war are more alien to men and some are more alien to women. This

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study attempts to make an important first step toward revealing the complexity of the relationship between gender and war and at the same time understanding more clearly what might be the issues that we need to attend to if we want to prevent future wars.

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SUMMARY STATEMENT

Many scientists from many disciplines have attempted to study war. Political scientists view war as a clash between conflicting national systems. Economists, together with geographers and biologists, see overpopulatin, territoriality, and competition for resources as the causes of war. Marxists attempt to understand war as the result of inner social class dynamics. Biologists explore the constitutional factors determining war. Other scientists look for cues within their disciplines. Finally, within psychology there are numerous approaches to studying the roots of war. Psychoanalysis concentrated on the role of the death instinct in the making of war. The group who defined war as a deferred act of infanticide concentrated on the dialectic balance between the Isaac syndrome and the Oedipal complex. Environmentalists and behaviorists focus their attention on the direction of how environment socializes people to become part of the war machine.

These different approaches can be complementary if collaboration is thoughtful and conflicts are bridged appropriately and with respect. Such a collaboration can capture the complexities of the phenomenon of war

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and can lead to a view of war as violent group behavior that is only partially rooted in the individual's aggression. Only an interdisciplinary approach to the study of war can shed light on its roots and thus measures for prevention. This study concentrated on the differences in men's and women's attitudes toward different aspects of war. It also states the implications of its findings that war might bear different appeals or repel men and women differently.

The different psychological approaches inherently suggest different solutions for war prevention. Some are more hopeful than others. Unlike the fatalistic biological approach of Lorenz and some physiologists, the environmentalists and behaviorists believe in the powr of the culture to elicit different behavior under different circumstances. The psychoanalytic and the Authoritarian Personality model, as have been described earlier, view childrearing practices as crucial in our attempt to change society and potentially to prevent war. They also differ in their optimism. While the psychoanalytic approach tends more toward the biological approach, the Authoritarian Personality links harsh or rigid parenting practices to the development of the authoritarian personality.

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Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligns' theories are more encouraging. They believe that changing the parenting patterns of our society in a very specific direction can have a powerful impact on social patterns. When fathers start to parent alongside mothers, the development of boys and girls will be different from what has been described. Both boys and girls will have, under the new parenting scheme, an available role model to follow and the models won't be split according to the harsh lines of emotional, engulfing mothers and emotionally unavailable and physically detached fathers. Boys and girls will not have to choose between being either in fear of permeable ego boundaries or rigid impenetrable ones. When parental practices change in the direction of sharing parenting between fathers and mothers, hopefully boys, as they become adults, will be able to experience intimacy with men and women and will not need to march to the battlefields to find these ties. Also, hopefully, men and women will not be so extremely different in their psychological make-up. Then, war, as a separation dynamic, won't be appealing to men, nor will it appeal to women for its ability to elicit group cohesion and intensification of interpersonal ties.

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These conclusions do not attempt to view the
solution as that simple and one dimensional. Changing
parenting practices will only stasrt a long complex
process of change. The culture will not respond to any
change in a linear clear way. But the model does carry
the hope for a long-term change.

The solution of sex-role socialization scientists
is complementary to Gilligan and Chodorow. According to
these theorists, if war is rooted in the interaction
between men and women, which results in them "giving
birth" to war, an effective intervention would be to
attempt to change the quality of their interaction. It
seems possible that if fathers and mothers shared
parenting, the next generation would be different in
their psychological make-ups, e.g., their social
behavior would not be as rigid along stereotypical
gender lines, and the interaction between the genders
would have a different quality. This is where the hope
lies. Metaphorically, any change in the behavior of
Abraham (the father and the overt aggressor), Sarah (the
supposed passive bystander) or even Isaac (the victim)
woudl lead to different dynamics among them. The end
result of a different dynamic might not lead to violent
action and bloodshed. Similarly, when fathers start to

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father, the relationship between boys and their mothers or their newly involved fathers, or girls with fathers and mothers, will be different. Perhaps the recent antiwar movement during and since the Vietnma war was a turning point, at which the heroic image of the warrior-victim changed. Also the victims from now on might not let themselves be sacrificed as willingly as Isaac. The "Women for Peace" movement might also indicate in the future that bystanders will not be as passive as Sarah. Allowing the fathers into the birthing room in most modern hospitals also indicates another shift in the direction of fathers being more involved in parenting than before.

This study contributes an important new conceptualization of war behavior. It offers a new definition of war which is more inclusive and less reductionistic than most available definitions. It does not reduce war to actions of violence and homicide, and it gives a definition which reflects on the complexity of the behavior and reflects also on the different roles of the participatns. It does not assign the blame to either. This study implies that producing more food, creating new democracies, or controlling birthrates will not be enough to prevent future wars. The UNESCO

Charter states that "Since wars are made in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defense of peace must be constructed." Hopefully, this reconstruction can be initiated by changing parenting practices and shying away from rigid stereotypical sex roles. Also, future research or action should concentrate on building a social structure that allows non-violent resolution of conflict. Investigating ways to train individuals to resolve differences in a non-violent way should prove more productive than the search for a conflict-free utopian society which could not exist. A collaborative, interdisciplinary approach that explores all solutions in a complementary way is the best hope for understanding war and learning how to prevent it, and by this, giving hope to ourselves and to the future of our planet.

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APPENDIX A

Instructions to Judges of the Items

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Dear Judge:

Please read the following items and mark I. II. or III to the left of each, depending upon which category is best reflected by the item.

The three categories are:

I.   Justification of war according to legal and rational criteria.

This category deals with the justification that nations use when they declare war. It is about the rationale of war in general and not about actions during war.

II.   Justification and acceptance of violence, aggression and destruction during war and during battle.

This category deals specifically with issues of violence during war, e.g. killing, torturing, and other forms of aggression and destruction.

III. Issues which relate to traditional and stereotypical sex-roles during war.

Items are included such as men are traditionally protectors, aggressive, wrriors, etc., while women are stereotypically mothers, sweethearts, nurses, caretakers, etc. This category is also about the interaction between men and women during wartime.

Indicate by Q if the item does not reflect any of these categories or is too awkward or too unclear for your taste.

Items reflecting more than one category should be indicated as such (e.g., I, II, or II, III, etc.).

Thank you for your cooperation and support.

                        Ofer Zur

APPENDIX B

Items According to the Different Categories

Form I

<u>Category A: Justification of War According to</u>

<u>Rational and Legal Criteria</u>

1. Wars are justified when they are fought for defensive purposes.

2. It is justifiable to fight defensive wars but not offensive wars.

3. War is justified in order to defend one's own country's territory.

4. War is justified in order to protect the nation's access to necessary resources such as oil and gas.

5. War is sometimes necessary to bring a country's people together around a common goal.

6. War is necessary for economic growth.

7. The violation of a treaty justifies war.

8. War is never justified.

9. War is justified only when you have been attacked.

10. War is justified if a country violates the terms of a mutually agreed upon treaty.

11. War is justified in defense of freedom.

12. Aiding an attacked ally justifies war.

13. Being in danger of invasion justifies war.

14. Certain issues are so vital for a nation that war is preferable to submission.

15. War is an important factor in evolution, eliminating the unfit.

16. Under no circumstances can war be justified.

17. There is no such thing as a "righteous war."

18. War is justifiable as the chief cause of human progress.

19. War is justifiable when waged to protect the property and lives of citizens on foreign soil.

20. War is justifiable when waged to protect the property and lives of citizens on foreign soil when they are not engaged in seeking private profit.

21. It is justified for one nation to invade another to prevent an invasion of its own soil.

22. War is justified to expand a nation's territory or to acquire raw materials because of pressure of population.

23. Wars are justifiable when waged in defense of weaker nations.

24. There is no progress without war.

25. The liberty of oppressed nations should be fought for.

26. War may be the only way to right great wrongs.

27. War is necessary to avoid overpopulationn.

28. Under some conditions, war is necessary to preserve justice.

29. Wars are justified in order to protect basic human rights.

30. Because right may be more important than peace, war may be the lesser of two evils.

31. Fighting a war is preferable to social ostracism.

32. Every country should go to war when attacked.

33. War is conceivable when it is for the purpose of peace and justice.

34. Preserving freedom often involves the shedding of blood.

<u>Category B: Justification and Acceptance of Violence,</u>
<u>Aggression and Destruction During War and During Battle</u>

1. Sometimes in order to avoid danger to our soldiers, it
   is justifiable to bomb the enemy village.

2. When the lives of our soldiers are on the line, brutal
   interrogation of prisoners may be reqiored.

3. Medics should always treat all their wounded first,
   regardless of how badly wounded the enemy soldiers are.

4. Torture of enemy prisoners can be justified in order to
   elicit important information.

5. Torturing POWs is justified only in order to gain
   important information.

6. Killing during war is really no different than murder
   at any other time.

7. Killing in war is justifiable for self-defense.

8. The destructive results of war have repeatedly shown
   that there is no justification for human slaughter.

9. Killing in war is a self-protective act.

10. Violence and killing during war is as unjustifiable as
    war itself.

11. Kids can be deadly enemies during war.

12. The religious command against killing does not apply
    to soldiers in uniform.

13. It is inevitable that innocent enemy citizens may
    get hurt during war.

14. It is inevitable that the enemy's children get hurt
    during war.

15. War often results in the destruction of the enemy
    land.

16. Destruction of the land is inevitable during war.

17. It is inevitable that women and children will be hurt in war.

18. During war, a soldier has to do things he would not approve of in peacetime.

19. It may be necessary to destroy a whole jungle in order to get the enemy hiding within.

20. During wartime even children must be considered as potential enemies.

21. Acts of revenge or retaliation in war are bound to happen when soldiers lose friends.

22. Sources of food for the enemy, like crops and domestic animals, should be destroyed during war.

23. To properly interrogate a Prisoner of War one must forget that he might have a wife and children.

24. It is safer and therefore justifiable to bomb a village than to burn it down from the ground.

25. Killing during war cannot be judged by peacetime standards.

26. There is unspoken social approval for killing in wartime.

<u>Category C:</u> <u>Issues which Relate to Traditional and</u>
        <u>Stereotypical Sex-Roles During War</u>

1. There is higher status attached to the wounded
    soldier.

2. Boys who go to war return as men.

3. War is a modern version of a rite of passage for boys.

4. Women have an important role during war: To give
    emotional support to the fighting men.

5. During war women should fill in the job vacancies left
    by men in order to keep the economy going.

6. Men, being stronger and more aggressive, make better
    soldiers than women.

7. During war men rely on the women in the back lines.

8. It is the role of the man to protect his family and
    his land.

9. Soldiers like to drink and chase women for
    recreation.

10. Women's role during war is to keep the society going
    economically and emotionally.

11. Women's aversion to direct violence makes them poor
    soldiers.

12. Men are less emotional and therefore better soldiers.

13. The knowledge that his wife takes care of the home and
    the children keeps the soldier free to concentrate on
    fighting.

14. It is not by chance that men are the protectors of
    society.

15. Men could not replace women's stamina or their care
    for children and the elderly during war.

16. Women are the traditional peace fighters.

17. If it were up to women, there would be no more wars.

18. It is very important that women volunteer for work in hospitals during war.

19. A woman nurse can raise the spirit of a wounded soldier more than a male medic.

20. Men are attracted to war for the excitement they miss in everyday life.

21. Women who have given birth will never support any war.

22. War is an important outlet for men's aggression.

23. Sports might be an alternative to war as men can release their competitive and aggressive impulses.

24. Women are too emotional to fight but they are better at taking care of children and the home during war.

25. If women were to be the fighters and men were to stay home, there would be no wars.

26. Women during war should be proud and supportive.

27. Many women believe that men fighting wars are heroes.

28. My heart swells with pride when I see a man in uniform.

29. Women often find soldiers more attractive than civilians.

30. Men in uniform are very handsome.

31. Many parents, secretly, wish their son would become heroic soldiers.

32. War brings out the best in men.

33. There is something sexy about soldiers in uniform.

34. Basically, it is up to men to stop fighting and to bring an end to wars.

APPENDIX C

The Opinion Survey Questionnaire

Form I

Male _____   Female _____

Age _____

Opinion Survey

This is an opinion survey about attitudes towards war. We
would like to know the extent to which you agree or disagree with
certain statements about this issue. If you should find yourself
uncertain about any statement, follow your first hunch, but
please respond to all items.

Please indicate your sex and age.

Please indicate one of the following numerical responses on
the space provided to the left of each statement:

Strongly agree	+3	Strongly disagree	-3
Moderately agree	+2	Moderately disagree	-2
Slightly agree	+1	Slightly disagree	-1

_____ 1. Wars are justified when they are fought for defensive
purposes.

_____ 2. Killing in war is justifiable for self-defense.

_____ 3. Basically, it is up to men to stop fighting and to bring
an end to wars.

_____ 4. Destruction of the land is inevitable during war.

_____ 5. War is justifiable when waged to protect the property and
lives of citizens on foreign soil when they are not
engaged in seeking private profit.

_____ 6. Acts of revenge or retaliation in war are bound to
happen when soldiers lose friends.

_____ 7. It is not by chance that men are the protectors of society.

_____ 8. Women should be proud and supportive during war.

_____ 9. It is inevitable that women and children will be hurt in war.

_____ 10. Preserving freedom often involves the shedding of blood.

_____ 11. There is a high status attached to the wounded soldier.

_____ 12. There is unspoken social approval for killing in wartime.

_____ 13. Men are less emotional and therefore better soldiers.

_____14. There is no such thing as a righteous war.

_____15. Aiding an attacked ally justifies war.

_____16. War is necessary to avoid overpopulation.

_____17. Killing during war cannot be judged by peacetime standards.

_____18. Because right may be more important than peace, war may be the lesser of two evils.

_____19. During war a soldier has to do things he would not approve of in peacetime.

_____20. It is justifiable to fight defensive wars but not offensive wars.

_____21. There is something sexy about soldiers in uniform.

_____22. War is never justified.

_____23. It is justified for one nation to invade another to prevent an invasion of its own soil.

_____24. War is a modern version of a rite of passage for boys.

_____25. Wars are justifiable when waged in defense of weaker nations.

_____26. Many women believe that men fighting wars are heroes.

_____27. Killing during war is really no different than murder at any other time.

_____28. War is justified in order to defend one's own territory.

_____29. Many parents, secretly, wish their sons would become heroic soldiers.

_____30. It is inevitable that the enemy's children get hurt during war.

_____31. Killing in war is a self-protective act.

_____32. If women were to be the fighters and men were to stay home, there would be no wars.

_____33. It may be necessary to destroy a whole jungle in order to get the enemy hiding within.

_____34. Sometimes in order to avoid danger to our soldiers, it is justifiable to bomb enemy villages.

_____35. War is justifiable as the chief cause of human progress.

_____36. The liberty of oppressed nations should be fought for.

_____37. Women's aversion to direct violence makes them poor soldiers.

____ 38. Under some conditions, war is necessary to preserve justice.

____ 39. Men in uniform are very handsome.

____ 40. Being in danger of invasion justifies war.

____ 41. A woman nurse can raise the spirit of a wounded soldier more than a male medic.

____ 42. War may be the only way to right great wrongs.

____ 43. My heart swells with pride when I see a man in uniform.

____ 44. The destructive results of war have repeatedly shown that there is no justification for human slaughter.

____ 45. War is justified in order to protect the nation's access to necessary resources such as oil and gas.

____ 46. Men cannot replace women's stamina or their care for children and the elderly during war.

____ 47. When the lives of our soldiers are on the line, brutal interrogation of prisoners may be required.

____ 48. If it were up to women, there would be no more wars.

____ 49. Sources of food for the enemy, like crops and domestic animals, should be destroyed during war.

____ 50. War brings out the best in men.

____ 51. Every country should go to war when attacked.

____ 52. Under no circumstances can war be justified.

____ 53. The knowledge that his wife takes care of the home and the children keeps the soldier free to concentrate on fighting.

____ 54. Women have an important role during war: To give emotional support to the fighting men.

____ 55. The violation of a treaty justifies war.

____ 56. Medics should always treat their wounded first, regardless of how badly wounded enemy soldiers are.

____ 57. War is an important outlet for men's aggression.

____ 58. Preserving freedom often involves the shedding of blood.

____ 59. Fighting a war is preferable to social ostracism.

____ 60. War is justified only when you have been attacked.

_____ 61. War often results in the destruction of enemy land.

_____ 62. War is justifiable when waged to protect the property and lives of citizens on foreign soil.

_____ 63. During war women should fill the job vacancies left by men in order to keep the economy going.

_____ 64. There is no progress without war.

_____ 65. During war even children must be considered as potential enemies.

_____ 66. Certain issues are so vital for a nation that war is preferable to submission.

_____ 67. Kids can be deadly enemies during war.

_____ 68. War is justified if one country violates the terms of a mutually agreed upon treaty.

_____ 69. War is an important factor in evolution, eliminating the unfit.

_____ 70. Women's role during war is to keep the society going economically and emotionally.

_____ 71. Women who have given birth will never support a war.

_____ 72. It is inevitable that innocent enemy citizens may get hurt during war.

_____ 73. Men, being stronger and more aggressive, make better soldiers than women.

_____ 74. War is justified to expand a nation's territory or to acquire raw materials because of pressure of population.

_____ 75. It is the role of the man to protect his family and his land.

_____ 76. War is justified in defense of freedom.

_____ 77. It is safer and therefore justifiable to bomb a village than to burn it from the ground.

_____ 78. To properly interrogate a prisoner of war one must forget that he might have a wife and children.

_____ 79. Women often find soldiers more attractive than civilians.

_____ 80. Women are the traditional peace fighters.

_____ 81. War is necessary for economic growth.

_____ 82. Sports might be an alternative to war as men can release their competitive and aggressive impulses.

_____ 83. The religious command against killing does not apply to soldiers in uniform.

_____ 84. Torturing POWs is justified only in order to gain important information.

_____ 85. Women are too emotional to fight but they are better at taking care of children and the home during war.

_____ 86. War is sometimes necessary to bring a country's people together around a common goal.

_____ 87. Men are attracted to war for the excitement they miss in everyday life.

_____ 88. Torture of enemy prisoners can be justified in order to elicit important information.

_____ 89. Violence and killing during war is as unjustifiable as war itself.

_____ 90. War is conceivable when it is for the purpose of peace and justice.

_____ 91. It is very important that women volunteer for work in hospitals during war.

_____ 92. Soldiers like to drink and chase women for recreation.

_____ 93. Wars are justified to protect basic human rights.

_____ 94. During war men rely on the women in the back lines.

_____ 95. Boys who go to war return as men.

APPENDIX D

ITEMS ACCORDING TO THEIR CATEGORIES

FORM II

Category A:

Justification of War According to

Rational and Legal Criteria

1. War is never justified.

2. War is an important outlet for men's aggression.

3. War is sometimes necessary to bring a country's people together around a common goal.

4. Wars are justified when they are fought for defensive purposes.

5. Under some conditions, war is necessary to preserve justice.

6. It is justified for one nation to invade another to prevent an invasion of its own soil.

7. War is justifiable as the chief cause of human progress.

8. War is justified in order to defend one's own territory.

9. The liberty of oppressed nations should be fought for.

10. War is justified in defense of freedom.

11. Preserving freedom often involves the shedding of blood.

12. Under no circumstances can war be justified.

13. War is justifiable when waged to protect the property and lives of citizens on foreign soil.

14. Wars are justified to protect basic human rights.

15. War is justified to expand a nation's territory or to acquire raw materials because of pressure of population.

16. The violation of a treaty justifies war.

17. War is justified in order to protect the nation's access to necessary resources such as oil and gas.

18. War is conceivable when it is for the purpose of peace and justice.

19. Because right may be more important than peace, war may be the lesser of two evils.

Category B

Justification and Acceptance of Violence,

Aggression and Destruction During War and During Battle

1. Sources of food for the enemy, like crops and domestic animals, should be destroyed during war.

2. Sometimes in order to avoid danger to our soldiers, it is justifiable to bomb enemy villages.

3. During war even children must be considered as potential enemies.

4. It is safer and therefore justifiable to bomb a village than to burn it from the ground.

5. Kids can be deadly enemies during war.

6. It may be necessary to destroy a whole jungle in order to get the enemy hiding within.

7. Killing in war is justifiable for self-defense.

8. Killing during war is really no different than murder at any other time.

9. Torture of enemy prisoners can be justified in order to elicit important information.

10. To properly interrogate a prisoner of war one must forget that he might have a wife and children.

11. The religious command against killing does not apply to soldiers in uniform.

12. Killing in war is a self-protective act.

13. Violence and killing during war is as unjustifiable as war itself.

14. When the lives of our soldiers are on the line, brutal interrogation of prisoners may be required.

15. Torturing POWs is justified only in order to gain important information.

Category B, Cont.

16. Killing during war cannot be judged by peacetime standards.

17. During war a soldier has to do things he would not approve of in peacetime.

18. There is unspoken social approval for killing in wartime.

19. Medics should always treat their wounded first, regardless of how badly wounded enemy soldiers are.

Category C

Issues which Relate to Traditional and

Stereotypical Sex-Roles During War

1. During war men rely on the women in the back lines.

2. During war women should fill the job vacancies
    left by men in order to keep the economy going.

3. Women's role during war is to keep the society
    going economically and emotionally.

4. Women should be proud and supportive during war.

5. Women are too emotional to fight but they are
    better at taking care of children and the home
    during war.

6. Women often find soldiers more attractive than
    civilians.

7. The knowledge that his wife takes care of the home
    and the children keeps the soldier free to
    concentrate on fighting.

8. It is very important that women volunteer for work
    in hospitals during war.

9. A woman nurse can raise the spirit of a wounded
    soldier more than a male medic.

10. Women have an important role during war: To give
    emotional support to the fighting men.

11. Many women believe that men fighting wars are
    heroes.

12. Men cannot replace women's stamina or their care
    for children and the elderly during war.

13. Women's aversion to direct violence makes them poor
    soldiers.

14. It is the role of the man to protect his family
    and his land.

Category C, Cont.

15. Men, being stronger and more aggressive, make better soldiers than women.

16. Boys who go to war return as men.

17. War is a modern version of a rite of passage for boys.

18. War brings out the best in men.

19. Many parents, secretly, wish their sons would become heroic soldiers.

20. Men are less emotional and therefore better soldiers.

21. It is not by chance that men are the protectors of society.

22. Men are attracted to war for the excitement they miss in everyday life.

23. Basically, it is up to men to stop fighting and to bring an end to wars.

24. Sports might be an alternative to war as men can release their competitive and aggressive impulses.

Category D

Issues of Relationship, Intimacy
and Group Cohesion During War

1. A wife feels that any military action the U.S.
    takes to end a war would be justified if it meant
    her husband would come home sooner.

2. The enemy use of unfair tactics (e.g., sneak
    attacks) deserves a vigorous military response.

3. It was important to defeat the Japanese in World
    War II because their government used dirty military
    tactics such as the use of Kamikaze pilots.

4. Any regime which commits crimes against humanity
    should be destroyed militarily.

5. Countries like Germany had to be destroyed
    militarily because they committed the unspeakable
    crime of murdering millions of innocent women, men
    and children.

6. It would be justifiable for a country to respond
    with force if the Soviet Union or any other
    country shot down another civilian airliner.

7. If any hostages in foreign countries are physically
    harmed their country has the right to respond with
    military action.

8. It is important to support your country's military
    activities when your friends and your family are
    doing the fighting.

9. Rescuing a minority which is under the threat of
    extinction justifies the use of armed forces.

10. Any country which violates the rights of little
    children should be invaded.

11. It is important to stand up to any regime which
    shows disregard of basic human rights.

12. When the enemy uses unfair tactics like sneak
    attacks or gas it is justifiable to use military
    force in self-defense.

Category D, Cont.

13. It is OK to kill the enemy in defense of your own children and family.

14. War intensifies the connection among civilians.

15. During war people feel closer and more responsible for each other.

16. Often, war brings out unity in the community.

17. Often, during war, people make new lifelong friendships.

18. War helps people appreciate intimate relationships between men and women.

19. War often intensifies group cohesion and gives the individuals a new sense of community.

20. When men go to war the feeling between them and the rest of their family intensifies despite the distance.

21. Aiding an attacked ally justifies war.

22. Wars are justifiable when waged in defense of weaker nations.

23. When you lose a close friend in battle, it makes you want to get revenge.

24. The preparation for war brings out unity in the community.

25. The preparation for war is exciting because it brings people together.

26. In wartime, community ties seem more important.

27. The hardest thing about being at home during war is not knowing what is happening with loved ones in the army.

28. The buddies you make during the war will be friends for life.

Category D, Cont.

29. War is a unique context for men's friendship to develop.

30. The lives of children, whether citizens or refugees, should be protected at all costs, even by military means.

31. Aiding an attacked weak ally justifies war.

32. War is justifiable in order to rescue our citizens and their families when their lives are in danger on foreign land.

33. For the safety and the future of our children war might be conceivable.

APPENDIX E

Opinion Survey Questionnaire

Form II

Male _____   Female _____

Age _____

Opinion Survey

This is an opinion survey about attitudes towards war. We would like to know the extent to which you agree or disagree with certain statements about this issue. If you should find yourself uncertain about any statement, follow your first hunch, but please respond to all items.

Please indicate your sex and age.

Please indicate one of the following numerical responses on the space provided to the left of each statement:

Strongly agree	+3	Slightly disagree	-1
Moderately agree	+2	Moderately disagree	-2
Slightly agree	+1	Strongly disagree	-3

_____ 1. There is unspoken social approval for killing in wartime.

_____ 2. Wars are justified to protect basic human rights.

_____ 3. During war women should fill the job vacancies left by men in order to keep the economy going.

_____ 4. The lives of children whether citizens or refugees should be protected at all costs, even by military means.

_____ 5. Wars are justifiable when waged in defense of weaker nations.

_____ 6. When you lose a close friend in battle, it makes you want to get revenge.

_____ 7. A woman nurse can raise the spirits of a wounded soldier better than a male medic.

_____ 8. Sources of food for the enemy, like crops and domestic animals, should be destroyed during war.

_____ 9. It is the role of the man to protect his family and his land.

_____ 10. Any regime which commits crimes against humanity should be destroyed militarily.

_____ 11. Men, being stronger and more aggressive, make better soldiers than women.

Strongly agree	+3	Slightly disagree	−1
Moderately agree	+2	Moderately disagree	−2
Slightly agree	+1	Strongly disagree	−3

_____ 12. War is justifiable when waged to protect the property and lives of citizens on foreign soil.

_____ 13. The religious command against killing does not apply to soldiers in uniform.

_____ 14. It was important to defeat the Japanese in World War II because their government used dirty military tactics such as the use of Kamikaze pilots.

_____ 15. War is a modern version of a rite of passage for boys.

_____ 16. During war people feel closer and more responsible for each other.

_____ 17. A wife feels that any military action the U.S. takes to end a war would be justified if it meant that her husband would come home sooner.

_____ 18. Medics should always treat their wounded first, regardless of how badly wounded enemy soldiers are.

_____ 19. It would be justifiable for a country to respond with force if the Soviet Union or any other country shoots down another civilian airliner.

_____ 20. The knowledge that his wife takes care of the home and the children keeps the soldier free to concentrate on fighting.

_____ 21. Under some conditions, war is necessary to preserve justice.

_____ 22. If any hostages in foreign countries are physically harmed, their country has the right to respond with military action.

_____ 23. The hardest thing about being at home during war is not knowing what is happening with loved ones in the army.

_____ 24. Torturing POWs is justified only in order to gain important information.

_____ 25. War often intensifies group cohesion and gives the individuals a new sense of community.

_____ 26. It is not by chance that men are the protectors of society.

_____ 27. Under no circumstances can war be justified.

_____ 28. War is sometimes necessary to bring a country's people together around a common goal.

Strongly agree	+3	Slightly disagree	−1
Moderately agree	+2	Moderately disagree	−2
Slightly agree	+1	Strongly disagree	−3

_____ 29. Torture of enemy prisoners can be justified in order to elicit important information.

_____ 30. Women often find soldiers more attractive than civilians.

_____ 31. War is justified in order to defend one's own territory.

_____ 32. War brings out the best in men.

_____ 33. Any country which violates the rights of little children should be invaded.

_____ 34. Because right may be more important than peace, war may be the lesser of two evils.

_____ 35. Kids can be deadly enemies during war.

_____ 36. Rescuing a minority which is under the threat of extinction justifies the use of armed forces.

_____ 37. Aiding an attacked weak ally justifies war.

_____ 38. It may be necessary to destroy a whole jungle in order to get the enemy hiding within.

_____ 39. The buddies you make during war will be friends for life.

_____ 40. War is justified to expand a nation's territory or to acquire raw materials because of pressure of population.

_____ 41. Often war brings out unity in the community.

_____ 42. It is O.K. to kill the enemy in defense of your own children and family.

_____ 43. Preserving freedom often involves the shedding of blood.

_____ 44. Violence and killing during war is as unjustifiable as war itself.

_____ 45. The violation of a treaty justifies war.

_____ 46. It is important to stand up to any regime which shows disregard for basic human rights.

_____ 47. Women's role during war is to keep the society going economically and emotionally.

Strongly agree	+3	Slightly disagree	−1
Moderately agree	+2	Moderately disagree	−2
Slightly agree	+1	Strongly disagree	−3

____ 48. The enemy use of unfair tactics (e.g. sneak attacks) deserves a vigorous military response.

____ 49. War is an important outlet for men's aggression.

____ 50. Women should be proud and supportive during war.

____ 51. During war a soldier has to do things he would not approve of in peacetime.

____ 52. Countries like Germany had to be destroyed militarily because they committed the unspeakable crime of murdering millions of innocent women, men and children.

____ 53. Women have an important role during war: To give emotional support to the fighting men.

____ 54. When the lives of our soldiers are on the line, brutal interrogation of prisoners may be required.

____ 55. Basically, it is up to men to stop fighting and to bring an end to wars.

____ 56. War is justifiable as the chief cause of human progress.

____ 57. Women's aversion to direct violence makes them poor soldiers.

____ 58. War is justifiable in order to rescue our citizens and their families when their lives are in danger on foreign land.

____ 59. Many women believe that men fighting wars are heroes.

____ 60. Sports might be an alternative to war, as men can release their competitive and aggressive impulses.

____ 61. War is justified in defense of freedom.

____ 62. When the enemy uses unfair tactics like sneak attacks or gas it is justifiable to use military force in self-defense.

____ 63. Aiding an attacked ally justifies war.

____ 64. Men cannot replace women's stamina or their care for children and the elderly during war.

____ 65. It is important to support your country's military activities when your friends and your family are doing the fighting.

Strongly agree	+3	Slightly disagree	-1
Moderately agree	+2	Moderately disagree	-2
Slightly agree	+1	Strongly disagree	-3

____ 66. It is justified for one nation to invade another to prevent an invasion of its own soil.

____ 67. It is very important that women volunteer for work in hospitals during war.

____ 68. During war even children must be considered as potential enemies.

____ 69. Men are less emotional and therefore better soldiers.

____ 70. War intensifies the connection among civilians.

____ 71. War is justified in order to protect the nation's access to necessary resources such as oil and gas.

____ 72. Killing during war cannot be judged by peacetime standards.

____ 73. During war men rely on the women in the back lines.

____ 74. It is safer and therefore justifiable to bomb a village than to burn it from the ground.

____ 75. Killing in war is justifiable for self-defense.

____ 76. In wartime, community ties seem more important.

____ 77. The preparation for war is exciting because it brings people together.

____ 78. To properly interrogate a prisoner of war one must forget that he might have a wife and children.

____ 79. War helps people appreciate intimate relationships between men and women.

____ 80. Sometimes in order to avoid danger to our soldiers, it is justifiable to bomb enemy villages.

____ 81. War is never justified.

____ 82. War is conceivable when it is for the purpose of peace and justice.

____ 83. The preparation for war brings out unity in the community.

____ 84. Killing during war is really no different than murder at any other time.

Strongly agree	+3	Slightly disagree	−1
Moderately agree	+2	Moderately disagree	−2
Slightly agree	+1	Strongly disagree	−3

_____ 85. For the safety and the future of our children, war might be conceivable.

_____ 86. Often during war people make new life-long friendships.

_____ 87. Many parents, secretly, wish their sons would become heroic soldiers.

_____ 88. Killing in war is a self-protective act.

_____ 89. Men are attracted to war for the excitement they miss in everyday life.

_____ 90. The liberty of oppressed nations should be fought for.

_____ 91. Wars are justified when they are fought for defensive purposes.

_____ 92. Women are too emotional to fight but they are better at taking care of children and the home during war.

_____ 93. When a man goes to war the feelings between him and the rest of his family intensifies despite the distance.

_____ 94. War is a unique context for men's friendship to develop.

_____ 95. Boys who go to war return as men.

APPENDIX F

ITEMS ACCORDING TO THEIR CATEGORIES

FORM III

Category A

Justification of War According

to Rational and Legal Criteria

1. War is sometimes necessary to bring a country's people together around a common goal.

2. War is never justified.

3. War is an important outlet for men's aggression.

4. Wars are justified when they are fought for defensive purposes.

5. War is justifiable as the chief cause of human progress.

6. It is justified for one nation to invade another to prevent an invasion of its own soil.

7. Preserving freedom often involves the shedding of blood.

8. War is justified in order to defend one's own territory.

9. Wars are justified to protect basic human rights.

10. War is justifiable when waged to protect the property and lives of citizens on foreign soil.

11. War is justified in defense of freedom.

12. War is conceivable when it is for the purpose of peace and justice.

Category B

Justification and Acceptance of Violence,

Aggression and Destruction During War and During Battle

1. Sources of food for the enemy, like crops and
    domestic animals, should be destroyed during war.

2. It may be necessary to destroy a whole jungle in
    order to get the enemy hiding within.

3. Killing in war is justifiable for self-defense.

4. Sometimes in order to avoid danger to our soldiers,
    it is justifiable to bomb enemy villages.

5. It is safer and therefore justifiable to bomb a
    village than to burn it to the ground.

6. Kids can be deadly enemies during war.

7. Killing during war is really no different than
    murder at any other time.

8. The religious command against killing does not
    apply to soldiers in uniform.

9. Killing during war cannot be judged by peacetime
    standards.

10. Torture of enemy prisoners can be justified in
    order to elicit important information.

11. Violence and killing during war is as unjustifiable
    as war itself.

12. To properly interrogate a prisoner of war one must
    forget that he might have a wife and children.

Category C

Issues which Related to Traditional

and Stereotypical Sex-Roles During War

1. It is the role of the man to protect his family and his land.

2. Men, being stronger and more aggressive, make better soldiers than women.

3. Women are too emotional to fight but they are better at taking care of children and the home during war.

4. War brings out the best in men.

5. Women should be proud and supportive during war.

6. Men cannot replace women's stamina or their care for children and the elderly during war.

7. It is not by chance that men are the protectors of society.

8. War is a modern version of a rite of passage for boys.

9. Many parents, secretly, wish their sons would become heroic soldiers.

10. The knowledge that his wife takes care of the home and the children keeps the soldier free to concentrate on fighting.

11. Men are less emotional and therefore better soldiers.

Category D

Issues of Relationship, Intimacy

and Group Cohesion During Wartime

1. Any country which violates the rights of little children should be invaded.

2. In wartime, communities seem more important.

3. When the enemy uses unfair tactics like sneak attacks or gas it is justifiable to use military force in self-defense.

4. Aiding an attacked weak ally justifies war.

5. War intensifies the connection among civilians.

6. It is important to support your country's military activities when your friends and your family are doing the fighting.

7. It would be justifiable for a country to respond with force if the Soviet Union or any other country shot down another civilian airliner.

8. The preparation for war is exciting because it brings people together.

9. It is important to stand up to any regime which shows disregard for basic human rights.

10. One of the advantages of the preparation for war is that it brings out unity in the community.

11. Wars are justifiable when waged in defense of weaker nations.

12. A wife feels that any military action the U.S. takes to end a war would be justified if it meant that her husband would come home sooner.

13. If any hostages in foreign countries are physically harmed, their country has the right to respond with military action.

APPENDIX G

Opinion Survey Questionnaire

Form III

Male _____   Female _____

Age _____

Opinion Survey

This is an opinion survey about attitudes towards war. We would like to know the extent to which you agree or disagree with certain statements about this issue. If you should find yourself uncertain about any statement, follow your first hunch, but please respond to all items.

Please indicate your sex and age.

Please indicate one of the following numerical responses on the space provided to the left of each statement:

Strongly agree	+3	Slightly disagree	-1
Moderately agree	+2	Moderately disagree	-2
Slightly agree	+1	Strongly disagree	-3

_____ 1. Wars are justified when they are fought for defensive purposes.

_____ 2. War is an important outlet for men's aggression.

_____ 3. When the enemy uses unfair tactics like sneak attacks or gas it is justifiable to use military force in self-defense.

_____ 4. Wars are justified to protect basic human rights.

_____ 5. It is not by chance that men are protectors of society.

_____ 6. Killing during war cannot be judged by peacetime standards.

_____ 7. Aiding an attacked weak ally justifies war.

_____ 8. In wartime, community ties seem more important.

_____ 9. Violence and killing during war is as unjustifiable as war itself.

_____ 10. War is conceivable when it is for the purpose of peace and justice.

_____ 11. A wife feels that any military action the U.S. takes to end a war would be justified if it meant that her husband would come home sooner.

Strongly agree	+3	Slightly disagree	-1
Moderately agree	+2	Moderately disagree	-2
Slightly agree	+1	Strongly disagree	-3

_____ 12. Men, being stronger and more aggressive, make better soldiers than women.

_____ 13. It is safer and therefore justifiable to bomb a village than to burn it from the ground.

_____ 14. Men cannot replace women's stamina or their care for children and the elderly during war.

_____ 15. War intensifies the connection among civilians.

_____ 16. Any country which violates the rights of little children should be invaded.

_____ 17. To properly interrogate a prisoner of war one must forget that he might have a wife and children.

_____ 18. Preserving freedom often involves the shedding of blood.

_____ 19. It may be necessary to destroy a whole jungle in order to get the enemy hiding within.

_____ 20. Sometimes in order to avoid danger to our soldiers, it is justifiable to bomb enemy villages.

_____ 21. War is sometimes necessary to bring a country's people together around a common goal.

_____ 22. It would be justifiable for a country to respond with force if the Soviet Union or any other country shoots down another civilian airliner.

_____ 23. War is justified in defense of freedom.

_____ 24. The religious command against killing does not apply to soldiers in uniform.

_____ 25. One of the advantages of the preparation for war is that it brings out unity in the community.

_____ 26. War is justified in order to defend one's own territory.

_____ 27. Kids can be deadly enemies during war.

_____ 28. Many parents, secretly, wish their sons would become heroic soldiers.

_____ 29. Torture of enemy prisoners can be justified in order to elicit important information.

Strongly agree	+3	Slightly disagree	-1
Moderately agree	+2	Moderately disagree	-2
Slightly agree	+1	Strongly disagree	-3

_____ 30. Women should be proud and supportive during war.

_____ 31. Men are less emotional and therefore better soldiers.

_____ 32. War is justifiable as the chief cause of human progress.

_____ 33. It is important to support your country's military activities when your friends and your family are doing the fighting.

_____ 34. Women are too emotional to fight but they are better at taking care of children and the home during war.

_____ 35. It is important to stand up to any regime which shows disregard for basic human rights.

_____ 36. It is the role of the man to protect his family and his land.

_____ 37. The knowledge that his wife takes care of the home and the children keeps the soldier free to concentrate on fighting.

_____ 38. Killing in war is justifiable for self-defense.

_____ 39. If any hostages in foreign countries are physically harmed, their country has the right to respond with military action.

_____ 40. Killing during war is really no different than murder at any other time. \

_____ 41. The preparation for war is exciting because it brings people together.

_____ 42. Sources of food for the enemy, like crops and domestic animals, should be destroyed during war.

_____ 43. War is never justified.

_____ 44. It is justified for one nation to invade another to prevent an invasion of its own soil.

_____ 45. War is a modern version of a rite of passage for boys.

_____ 46. War is justifiable when waged to protect the property and lives of citizens on foreign soil.

_____ 47. War brings out the best in men.

_____ 48. Wars are justifiable when waged in defense of weaker nations.

APPENDIX H

Human Subjects Review Form

Peter Dybwad, J.D.
President

Edward E. Sampson, Ph.D.
Dean

Nevitt Sanford, Ph.D.
President Emeritus

Dear Ofer Zur:

This is to advise you that your human subjects protocol has been
approved by the Wright Institute's Protection of Human Subjects
and Research Review Committee.

If you are using consent forms, the consent forms signed by the
subjects must be kept on file at the Wright Institute for two
years in accordance with federal law. When you have completed
your research you must turn these forms in to the Dean's Office
to be placed with your file.

Congratulations and good luck.

Cordially,

Edward E. Sampson, Chairman
Committee for the Protection of
  Human Subjects and Research
  Review.

Human Subjects Review Form

INSTRUCTIONS:

> Please answer every question that is applicable to
> your proposed research. If a question is clearly
> inapplicable, respond with N/A. Please typewrite
> your responses.

Name: _____ O i'er 'hur _____

Title of proposed project: _____

> Men, Women and War.

_____

ONE.

Briefly describe the nature of your proposal including the
activities, if any, involving human subjects. (Your written description
should occupy no more than the space provided below.) If you have prepared
an Abstract of your proposal, the Abstract will serve the purpose of
this question.

In this dissertation I intend to study how men and
women differ in their attitudes towards war. This study ex-
tends and tests Carol Gilligan's model for gender differences
in psychological development.

Former attitude studies fail to capture the complexity
of the war phenomenon. Other studies give inadequate defini-
tions or descriptions of war. This thesis gives a new and
more complete definition of war. It attempts to study a few
dimensions or aspects of war and how men and women relate to
these aspects.

Most studies assume that men are more warlike than
women, or that women are naturally more pacifistic. They often
conclude that men are for war and women are against. This
study attempts to uncover more complexity in the way males and
females relate to war.

This research studies the following three aspects of
war:

A. Justification of war according to legal and
rational criteria.

This category relates to issues of how nations,
leaders and citizens attempt to explain and jus-
tify their nation's involvement in war (e.g.,
wars are justified when fought for defensive
purposes).

B. Actions of violence and destruction during war.

Unlike the first, more general, category, this one
more specifically focuses on actions of violence
and destruction during battle and war (e.g., kill-
ing enemy soldiers and civilians).

C. Issues which relate to traditional and stereo-
typical sex-roles during war (e.g., men are tra-
ditionally the protectors and warriors, and are
stereotypically more aggressive and less emotional.
Women are stereotypically mothers, nurses and
sweethearts). Also included in this category are
issues of the interaction between the sexes during
war (e.g., protected-protector, wounded soldier-
nurse).

I expect to find differences in attitudes between men
and women on the first two categories. When agreement is
found it reflects an agreement on stereotypical sex-roles
during war.

TWO.

Describe the human subject group(s) involved in your proposed research, e.g. students, minors, disabled, mentally retarded, clinical patients, elderly, etc.

The sample will consist of about 130 students in three classes of American History in a community college in California. These classes are optional, as the students need to have a total of seven units in American Institutions. American History classes are under this category and each class is two units. The classes have generally equal numbers of men and women and the age varies largely. The subjects will be asked to volunteer for this study by the instructor a week before the date of the optional participation.

THREE.

Describe the potential benefits to the subjects of your proposed research.

The subjects will be given an opportunity to contribute to the study of the psychology of war, the importance of which will be described in the following item (4). As for more specific immediate benefits: After completing the opinion survey all groups will receive a brief presentation by me about "Gender and War." This presentation will be limited to a summary of the rationale for my research and what I hope to find. The presentation will be followed by a discussion. During this discussion all subjects will have an opportunity to express their thoughts and feelings regarding the general subject of war or my presentation. Hopefully the presentation and discussion will be experienced as intellectual and emotional stimuli for growth for the subjects.

FOUR.

Describe the potential benefits of your proposed research to humanity, e.g. the scientific importance of the knowledge to be gained, the usefulness of the information gained to the community at large.

This study of the psychology of war carries extreme importance for humanity at large, our community and the subjects participating. Studying the complexity of war, its appeals and its appalling aspects is the first step towards further understanding the phenomenon. This understanding is crucial in our attempt to prevent future wars and the destruction of our planet.

FIVE.
      Describe the known or forseeable risks of harm to which your human subjects may be exposed, e.g. emotional upset, psychological harm, legal risk, invasion of privacy, exposure of confidential or sensitive information, etc. Note that there are possible risks involved with interviews, questionnaires, tape recordings, photographs, field work, work with children, evaluations deception, final publication, etc. State by name all standard tests and instruments you will use. If you plan to use any non-standard tests and instruments, attach one copy of each to this form, or if not prepared yet, describe the kinds of information they are intended to elicit and the means they will use to do so.

      The group-administered Likert-type items around issues of war might elicit some feelings of anxiety for some subjects. I assess this risk as minimal, considering the nature of the stimulus .No issues of confidentiality or exposure of the individual are involved because the only information required is age and gender.

      The instructions for the Opinion Survey are attached. Also attached is a sample of the first ten items.

If in your judgement human subjects will not be at risk, check here._____

NB: Please do not check, if your proposed research employs interviews or any form of personality instrument, or if any data will be gathered that should be regarded as confidential. The W.I. Human Subjects Committee considers these to be forms of risk. Indicating that such risks exist does not necessarily reduce the liklihood that your proposal will be approved; it only necessitates response to question SIX, below.

SIX.
    Describe the safeguards to be used to eliminate or minimize each of the possible risks described in FIVE, e.g. numerical coding of written material, secure handling of master list to codes, restriction of information to the immediate investigator, publication only of statistical data from which personal information has been removed, etc.

    Please note that under APA guidelines, it is the responsibility of the researcher to ensure that a therapist is available to all subjects who might have an emotional reaction, immediate or delayed, to any research procedure.

    As was noted before, there will be a discussion which will follow my presentation. During the discussion subjects will be free to express any thoughts and feelings they have in regard to the subject of my presentation. Also, my telephone number will be available to the subjects through their junior college instructor. I am a licensed psychological assistant and will be ready to meet with any subject who might request it due to any emotional upset which requires professional help.

SEVEN.
         Informed consent is <u>required</u> for subjects at risk. A sample
of your informed consent form(s) should be attached hereto, for review.
Note that the informed consent forms must include the following:
              (1) A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed,
including identification of those which are experimental;
              (2) a description of attendant discomforts and risks that
can reasonably be expected;
              (3) a description of the benefits reasonably to be expected;
              (4) in client service situations, a disclosure of appropriate
alternative procedures that would be advantageous to the subject;
              (5) an offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures;
              (6) an offer that the subject is free to withdraw his/her
consent, and to discontinue participation, at any time for any or no reason.
              (7) Notice that the Wright Institute will not provide
compensation or long term medical care for physical injuries directly
incurred through participation in research activities under its sponsorship.

         If subjects are minors, a parental consent form is required.

         Oral consent: <u>only</u> in unusual circumstances may the consent
of the subjects be obtained orally. Permission to obtain oral consent and
waiver of the requirement for written consent must be granted in writing
by the Institute Human Subjects Committee. Permission may be granted in
cases where: (a) the risks to the subjects are minimal; (b) obtaining
written consent would invalidate an important research objective; or (c)
where oral consent would be, for some reason, more protective of the subjects.

         No informed consent is required for this anonymous,
low-risk task.

EIGHT.
         I hereby affirm that my responses to these questions have been
accurate and complete, that the safeguard measures described under item SIX
will be carried out fully in practice, and that consent forms will be obtained
from every subject involved in the research.

         I understand and will carry out my responsibility to inform
appropriate authorities if, in the course of my research, I uncover evidence
of any clear and present danger to any individual. My subjects will be
informed of this responsibility of scientific investigators.

_____
            (name)

_____
            (date)

WI/ks
Revised August 1980

NINE. (To be completed by the Chair of your Dissertation Committee)

      I affirm that I have seen and reviewed the completed version
of this form, filled out by my student. The information provided
regarding the research procedures to be carried out in this dissertation
research is complete, and no changes in methodology are expected
hereafter.
      In my judgement, the safeguards my student has designed to
protect human subjects are adequate given the risks involved. The
research plans described herein have my approval, from the standpoint
of the protection of human subjects.

_____
Signature of Chair of Dissertation
Committee

_____
Date